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Russia and the West: Sketching Possible Scenarios

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Russia and the West: Sketching Possible Scenarios
Joerg Forbrig

It is now acknowledged by most that the post-Cold War order was buried when Russia annexed Crimea and the Kremlin waged war in Eastern Ukraine.

However, few in Europe or the U.S. have taken a deeper look at the potential contours of a new European order, or of the relationship between the West and Russia that lies at its heart.

A useful point of departure can be found in a remarkable dual development of the last year. The West has responded to Russian aggression against Ukraine with hitherto unthinkable political and economic sanctions, hoping these can undermine the Putin regime and change its policies. At the same time, Russia has revealed shocking reach into European societies through business ties, political sponsorship and a strong media presence, all of which the Kremlin uses to manipulate Western debate and decision-making. Each side takes aim at weakening the other’s cohesion, the key requisite for effective action by any government.

Four Scenarios

This conflict will be shaped by the degrees to which both sides are able to maintain their internal cohesion. It may become a race against time, with both sides banking on the cohesion of the other fading before their own ranks break apart. This basic fault line can serve to model a number of scenarios.

Scenario 1 – Standoff.

In what is effectively the status quo, both Russia and the West retain their cohesion. Russia’s open challenge to the West further boosts Putin’s standing among Russians, criticism from within remains manageable, the costs incurred continue to be absorbed, state propaganda permanently feeds a nationalist frenzy. The West regains its composure after initial surprise and while its responses may be insufficient, they are still unexpected in both unity and strength.

With cohesion prevailing on either side, a protracted war of attrition is indicated. Russia can be expected to be proactive and regularly seek the offensive. It will pressure those neighbours that remain outside Western institutions, and seek to puncture these institutions, by threatening countries that are most exposed militarily or by enticing those economically weakest.

The West will likely be more reactive and defensive. Its focus will be on increasing its own resilience, with a limit largely to current EU and NATO members, and reducing vulnerabilities to Russian influences. Toward Ukraine and other Eastern neighbours, it will remain halfhearted, responding to particularly egregious actions by the Kremlin, but mindful to avoid direct confrontation.

Scenario 2 – Western decline.

Under Russian assault, the fragile unity among Western nations falters. The EU fails to muster the consensus needed to extend political and economic sanctions against Russia. This establishes a dangerous precedent, making any resolute EU response to Russian aggression near-impossible, rendering a common EU foreign policy an illusion, and sacrificing transatlantic unity.

Russian triumph over the EU will only embolden the Kremlin to test NATO, which is poorly prepared to ensure the territorial integrity of its Eastern periphery. A lack of clarity towards hybrid warfare, defence cuts and fragmented political will in Europe all undermine Article 5 obligations.

In its immediate neighbourhood, this gives Moscow a free hand to re-establish its hegemony over former satellites, and to build the regional sphere of influence it believes it needs to qualify as a global power. A less integrated and principled Europe will provide fertile ground for advancing Russian political and economic interests in a traditional divide-and-conquer manner. Vis-à-vis the U.S., Russia feels that it levels the playing field, stripping the U.S. of its European allies and questioning its global leadership.

Scenario 3 – Russian decline.

Conversely, it could well be Russian internal cohesion that withers. Russia has long faced formidable structural problems, dysfunctionalities, and centrifugal tendencies, but was able to mask these with plentiful revenues from energy exports. A lasting drop in oil prices and the inevitable costs of Western sanctions close out this option and drive Russia into prolonged economic agony.

In response, the Putin administration prioritises investments in the military and security apparatus over those in the social welfare system and economic modernisation. This may prompt a response among technocrats and the urban middle class who lose out. The Duma election is coming up in late 2016 and, if generating momentum, modernisers might take aim at the 2018 presidential elections. However, indications are that System Putin will be able to handle this whether by marginalisation, suppression or absorption.

Prolonged economic stagnation will fuel infighting among key elements of the state apparatus, put into question elite loyalties and lead Russia’s peripheries to question their relationship to the political center. In order to postpone and prevent Russia’s eventual implosion, the Kremlin will be tempted to seek external conflicts as valves to release growing internal pressure.

Scenario 4 – Chaos.

The worst possible scenario sees internal cohesion wane in both Russia and the West. Dual collapse has dramatic consequences for the entire Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space, and for the globe. It ends seven decades of Western integration that resulted in the single-most advanced model of international cooperation in history. The EU retreats from foreign policy, its integration loosens and further enlargement is halted. NATO will have proven ineffective in guaranteeing the territorial integrity of its members, thus depriving Western integration of its security dimension. In sum, the West will cease to be a credible actor that can project a vision of a cooperative world order, whether in its immediate vicinity or further afield.

This lack of an able West will be felt most strongly in Eurasia. Absent the stabilising and modernising effects from the West, Russia will be unable to stem its decline and sink into economic and political upheaval. Its direct neighbours, dependent on Russia, will become de-stabilised and experience state failure, civil strife and poverty. Knock-on effects will quickly reach the EU and NATO’s Eastern-most members and unable to absorb these pressures, they will turn to an EU whose capacity to assist, political will and sense of solidarity are greatly weakened. As a result, instability returns to large swathes of the European continent.

Recommendations

None of these scenarios is bright, least of all given the hopes and efforts invested by the West in the transformation of Europe, and Russia, over the last 25 years. Yet each of these trajectories seems possible and can be substantiated with evidence. This not only highlights the extent to which the West and Russia find themselves at a turning point, but also speaks to the critical long-term consequences of any political decisions made by the West and Russia in the short term. In this spirit, a number of recommendations can be derived for Western policy.

1. The current standoff with Russia as the best of a bad lot

It may sound counterintuitive for Western politics and publics, which became accustomed to a difficult but rarely belligerent Russia, but the current standoff is the far preferable scenario to any other. It is the only trajectory that keeps the West intact as a key global player and advocate of strong international cooperation, and that does not presume Russian decline (plausibly a long shot). When the current regime in Russia eventually lapses, the consequences and uncertainties will be comparable to those of the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Managing the potential fallout will require a united and capable Western community and institutions. Until then, the West had better prepare itself for years of stalemate.

2. Accommodation is risky for the West and Russia

Seasoned Western Russia watchers have repeatedly called for the new grand bargain with Russia over the last year. Whatever its exact form and content such an accommodation is fraught with risks for both sides. For the Russian leadership, the concessions necessary for such an accord would run counter to its ideologised claim to superiority and its challenge to the West; that might be read as a weakness the Kremlin can ill-afford. For the West, concessions would almost certainly compromise key Western values such as the inviolability and sovereignty of European states. Thus, neither of the diametrically opposed sides can really afford accommodation without the risk of ushering in its own decline.

3. Reinforcing Western unity is paramount

In order to withstand Russia’s assault on the West, it will be key for the U.S. and its European allies to fortify their cohesion. This requires clear commitment to the norms underlying the European order as it has developed over the last decades. Ongoing and future violations of these principles by Russia must be punished more resolutely than so far, both to limit damage and to weaken the culprit. In turn, the West needs to boost its own resilience and that of Russia’s neighbours to the economic and energy pressures, political meddling, propaganda and military threats launched by the Kremlin. Across these areas, lowest common denominators and introversion will not suffice. Instead, the EU and U.S. should demonstrate their ambitious and proactive unity aimed at the longterm integration of all of Europe.

4. U.S. and German leadership are indispensable

Responsibility for ensuring Western unity and for facing up to Russia rests primarily with the U.S. and Germany. The former has to acknowledge that it is the ultimate addressee of Kremlin policy, whose end goal it is to curtail U.S. leadership in global affairs. Consequently, Washington should re-prioritise Russia, re-engage with its European allies and strengthen its presence as a key guarantor of security in Europe. Germany, in turn, is central to cohesion among EU members. Berlin will have to take the concerns of those EU members and neighbours that are particularly exposed to Russian pressures more seriously and to formulate its position accordingly and unambiguously. Enhanced shuttle diplomacy and a focus on Russia as the EU’s key foreign policy challenge will have to be ingredients of German leadership, as will stronger political, financial and military commitment to securing the EU and NATO’s Eastern flank.

Joerg Forbrig, The German Marshall Fund of the United States

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