Opinion: Sanctions Trigger Protests and Split in Nomenclature

The chances of the regime's survival are plummeting.

U.S. sanctions made Russian companies reduce oil supplies to Belarusian refineries. It has recently become known that European banks refuse to finance deals on Belarusian oil products not to fall under Washington's sanctions. The Network expressed the view that the sanctions would lead to a split in the nomenclature:

- Economic suppression on all fronts is one of the main challenges for the Belarusian dictatorship today. It is noteworthy that such pressure on the regime to achieve goals seems to be the most effective tactic used by such eternal antagonists as the EU/US and Russia. Let us analyze why it happened and what it will lead to.

The reason why both the West and the East use economic instruments of influence is simple. Both a foreign and domestic observer can see that active support for the regime has shrunk to a few tens of thousands of people - the structures of the Interior Ministry/KGB and high- and middle-ranking officials.

These people are not united by any common ideology or values. The only thing that unites them is to maintain their privileged financial position. If the regime's top officials are unable to maintain their current financial position, their chances of survival will plummet.

Moreover, analysts in both Washington and Moscow have data on how the protest potential within Belarus is arranged. The number of surveys shows that an ordinary Belarusian opposes the regime but at the same time behaves quite passively. That is, the majority of Belarusians cannot accept the current political situation, in principle, not so much to participate in protests and strikes.

The question arises: where is the limit beyond which the silent majority will finally decide to actively express its discontent? It is logical to assume that it lies at the economic level. If the standard of living drops significantly, the already numerous protest movement will flood in with a powerful stream of those who do not care but who have no money to buy food.

As a result, we have a clear picture: the Belarusian dictatorship is able to cling to power as long as it has money. It is why Russia and the West pressurize, first of all, the economy.

Of course, they put pressure in different ways. Russia, for example, simply refuses new loans and stifles smuggling from Belarus. It is not even pressure, but a reasonable policy in the national interest - why should it let one steal from itself?

The EU and the U.S. rely on sanctions schemes. As we suggested earlier, Washington D.C. was the first to impose real restrictions. Numerous examples show that the American sanctions have already (and they come into force in June only) quite painfully hit the core branches of the Belarusian state economy. Brussels seems to be inspired by this success and promises to adopt a much more extensive package of sanctions against the Belarusian dictatorship in a few weeks.

This level of pressure from the West in the absence of direct financial aid from Russia has the potential to break the already fragile state economy. However, both the U.S. and the EU say that it's only the beginning. If political prisoners are not released and free elections are not held, the volume of sanctions will only increase. As for assistance from Russia, it seems to entail demands that Lukashenka is not ready to meet.

Conclusion. The regime will not be able to survive without money. The number of it is falling. Therefore, sooner or later, he will have to meet either the West's or Russia's conditions. Such a choice cannot help but split the regime.

It would better for Lukashenka and his closest entourage to surrender to Moscow and leave for their residences on the Sochi coast. Residences are certainly better than a prison cell. At the same time, it will be much easier for private businesses, officials and middle-ranking law enforcement officers to accept the West's terms.