Economist Named Three Targets for Sanctions against Lukashenka's Regime

Better to focus on measures that will hit the economy.

There is now unusual consensus in the West over aggressive sanctions against Lukashenka. I think that several factors influenced this, writes British economist Timothy Ash for Novoye Vremya.

It seems that the European Union and the United States are coordinating the next sanctions, starting with the simplest - restricting flights to and over Belarus.

Interestingly, there is now an unusual consensus in the West over aggressive sanctions against Lukashenka. I think several factors influenced this:

Firstly, Lukashenka clearly crossed the red line by his actions in relation to the Ryanair flight, it is difficult to disagree with this. It is obvious that Lukashenka is a “bad guy,” and who would not agree to help the opposition movement in Belarus? Moreover, its representatives themselves are calling for aggressive sanctions. If they are willing to pay the economic price for it, why not listen to their decision?

Secondly, Lukashenka is not Putin, and the West is less concerned about the consequences of sanctions against the Belarusian leader. Lukashenka has far fewer ways to retaliate against the West. He has far fewer allies, friends, and patrons capable of lobbying for his interests in the West than Putin. Much fewer economic ties - perhaps, potash production and oil refineries, but it’s quite easy to find a replacement. Belarus needs the West much more than the West needs it.

Third, some supporters of a hard-line policy towards Russia understand that attacks on Lukashenka indirectly hit Putin. After all, in the end, Lukashenka is Putin's man in Minsk (for Putin his own devil is closer, but for others - even quite literally). They understand that, if the West hits the economy of Belarus, Putin will have to pay for it. It is important to note here that the cost of supporting Lukashenka for Russia may increase from $ 2 billion to $ 5 billion per year. By itself, this would not be a punishment for Moscow, but if we add to this the cost of supporting Crimea, L / DPR, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria, and Syria, it becomes clear that all this hangs dead weight on the Russian financial system, which is struggling to ensure the growth and recovery of Russia's stagnant economy under the yoke of sanctions. And the fact that they are paying for all these adventures of Putin may affect the disposition of Russian voters, who will face the ballot boxes in September.

What can be sanctioned:

1. Sovereign debt is a very convenient target. Why can Belarus take loans in foreign markets in dollars and euros, while Russia cannot (at least, not in dollars and now not in rubles)? This is illogical. And the West may decide to extend sanctions on the primary issue and new issue of securities on the secondary market.

2. Oligarchs - they should include friends and family members who have large businesses. This should include people from outside who have interests in Belarus. That is, they should do the same as with Russia.

3. Large state-owned enterprises - producers of potash fertilizers, tractors, and oil refineries. Yes, of course, Russia can pick up here, but it is already noticeable that even Russian representatives began to reduce the number of trade chains with Belarus for fear of falling under secondary Western sanctions.

As for the latter, if Putin wants to pay for it, he should be allowed to do so, but raise the cost enough to make him wonder whether he values his relationship with Lukashenka so much.

In many ways, I believe that the cancellation of flights to and from Belarus harms more ordinary Belarusian citizens. I am sure that the regime can fly in private or public planes. If Belarusians want to leave, then it is worth keeping the path open so that they can see how much better life is in the West. It is still better to focus on the economic sanctions mentioned above.