Historian Alexander Freidman: The Lukashenka Regime Is a Terminally Ill Person on Artificial Support Devices

The power system in Belarus can collapse like a house of cards.

Historian, Ph.D., graduate of the Belarusian State University and lecturer at Heinrich Heine University (Dusseldorf) and Saarland University (Saarbrücken) Alexander Freidman is known in Belarus and Germany for his interesting analysis of the political situation in our country and regular reviews of the foreign press on this topic.

The Charter97.org website spoke with Alexander Freidman about the current state of the Belarusian society, the problems of the Lukashenka regime, and possible scenarios for the development of events.

- Recently, one year has passed since the beginning of daily protests in Belarus demanding Lukashenka's resignation after he lost the elections on August 9. What struck you the most about the Belarusian protests? What historical analogies do you have as a specialist?

- I was amazed by the whole scale of how it started. In August, there was a gamut of emotions - surprise, shock, horror, and delight. I followed the entire election campaign, saw that there was an upsurge, the rallies of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya gathered a large number of people. It was obvious to everyone that, on August 9, people would take to the streets. It was also clear that the regime would not tolerate this and that there would be a forceful response. It seemed to me that the 2010 scenario would repeat itself, when everything was brutally suppressed.

In the protests, I was struck by the fact that people came out not only in Minsk, as was expected, but in the provinces too. By and large, the whole of Belarus has risen, and, since August 9, it has not retreated. The most severe suppression continued on 10 and 11, and then there was a fantastic rally on August 16. I don't know how many people were there - 250 thousand? Some media outlets write that there are 400 thousand people in total.

I did not expect that in Belarus they would rise to such a struggle for freedom. Until today, I wonder how this happened. What made the Belarusians rise and fight for freedom for so long and uncompromisingly.

As for historical parallels, there are a lot of cases when elections were rigged and people took to the streets. Let's remember the history of the first Ukrainian Maidan, there are many other examples from the countries of Asia and Africa. Such discontent arises in many ways spontaneously, but I was struck by the scale, as well as how long it lasts. This struggle continues today but in a different form; it has not gone anywhere.

- How do you assess the situation in Belarus today? At what phase is the process of regime change in the country?

- The situation in Belarus is very difficult to assess. We are dealing with a cruel dictatorship, a huge number of political prisoners, violence, and fear that permeates Belarusian society. Moreover, it is very difficult to assess it from the outside.

Naturally, I communicate with people who live in Belarus. On the one hand, they talk about the fear of being repressed, going to jail, and also about absolute uncertainty about the future. At the same time, they have an understanding that the situation is abnormal and cannot continue this way. To get an impression of the state of society, I communicate with quite a few people. Some people treat this regime with contempt, some with hatred, some with neutrality, according to the principle "my house is on the edge." I also periodically communicate with people who are on the side of Lukashenka.

I do not presume to judge what can happen in Belarus: the situation is absolutely unpredictable. I agree with many analysts who say that everything in the country can end very quickly, that is, the power system can collapse like a house of cards. It can very well happen, especially if some serious economic problems begin to emerge because Lukashenka has virtually no serious electoral support, it is simply meager.

It can also come down to the stabilization of the regime, if, for example, there is very serious financial support from Russia or the West for some reason gives up its the hard line. I don't believe in this, although theoretically, anything is possible, but, then again, this regime has no prospects. Mostly, today it's a question of when it will end. And that it will end is quite obvious to me.

From my point of view, the Lukashenka regime is in a state of agony. Let me give you an analogy: today's Lukashenka regime is a terminally ill person who is supported by appropriate devices. Moreover, there are more and more of them, that is, support is becoming more artificial. If some devices begin to disappear, then the body cannot exist without them. For example, without a security apparatus, without financial support from Russia, the existence of a regime is impossible. If these elements begin to gradually drop out of the system, then, from my point of view, it will die.

Yes, today the society is permeated with fear, people do not dare to take to the streets. People came out, they were beaten and put in prisons. They saw that they had not achieved their goal through a peaceful protest, that is, the regime remained. However, this needs to be looked at differently. This peaceful protest is a step towards the collapse of this regime.

Many people in Belarus think like maximalists: we went out, we were beaten, someone was imprisoned, someone left the country, but Lukashenka stayed. That is, they believe that if they have not reached the goal, then why to go out again. In fact, by their protest, people weakened this system and accordingly brought its end closer.

What can make people take to the streets today? It's hard for me to say. If Lukashenka continues in the same vein, that is, continues to intensify repression, this means that hatred will also intensify. Perhaps economic discontent will be added to this, so it may well be that people will again take to the streets in large numbers. When? The question is open. Belarus is a kind of black box. It may happen tomorrow, in a week, a month, or two years, although, I do not believe that it will take so long.

- Assessing the rhetoric of the Belarusian regime in response to the investigations of its crimes started in Germany, and you noted that “Lukashenka is increasingly talking about the executed friends-dictators.” Why is retribution for such regimes inevitable and in what form can this happen in Belarus?

- If we look at the history of the last dictatorships of the 20th century or the beginning of the 21st century, when a serious popular movement began, then the dictators faced a choice: either they decide on the use of force, which can be very bloody, or they do not unleash a war, they do not sow hatred but just leave or run away. If you look at what Lukashenka is talking about, he is not guided by those people who fled, such as Yanukovych or Ben Ali.

For him, these people are not an example. He puts himself on a par with dictators who did not give up and “fought to the end”: that is, with Gaddafi, Hussein, sometimes he recalls Milosevic, but in a negative context, that he hoped for justice, but ended up in The Hague and died there during process time. Gaddafi and Hussein are people who “did not give up and fought to the end,” but their fate is known. Gaddafi was lynched, and Hussein fell into the hands of justice.

Lukashenka has been in power for a very long time. The last stage of his reign is especially associated with repression, as well as with the dead people. Of course, there is a desire on the part of democratic countries to conduct investigations. Then there will be the question of who should be held responsible for these crimes. Lukashenka understands that, for him, there is a risk of criminal prosecution when he is removed from power.

This danger of criminal prosecution certainly weighs on him. This applies to the future of Belarus and abroad. Lukashenka will never enter any European country again, will not go to the United States for a UN meeting - this is out of the question. I don’t know how seriously he takes it, but judging by his harsh statements, it was in his mind that some charges could be brought against him, an arrest warrant was issued, and so on. This is still a very distant and vague prospect, but living with it is extremely unpleasant.

I thought he would be most concerned about the situation in Belarus after he is no longer "president." Here I agree with Vitaly Shklyarov when he said that the main hostage of the whole situation is Lukashenka himself. The same Babaryka, I'm not even talking about Kalesnikava - they are free people in prison too. They can be free at heart, but Lukashenka is a hostage of the situation, he has nowhere to go, his future is very vague. I think it's very stressful for him.

- The Belarusian authorities are increasingly at the center of international scandals. What do you think about the “hybrid war” launched by Lukashenka against Lithuania and the EU using illegal migration? How soon can the regime on this path make a fatal mistake that hits it?

- The migration history is very amazing. I would go a little deeper and start with the story of Raman Pratasevich. If we take everything that happened before May, then we must admit: the first half of this year was quite “successful” for Lukashenka. There was no outbreak of protest movement at the beginning of the year. There was no outbreak either in winter or in spring. He gradually managed to suppress active protests, even street marches, with the help of repression. Moreover, trials of political prisoners began, and, one by one, people were jailed.

How did Europe react to this? Unfortunately, it expressed concern, condemned, and introduced some kind of sanctions, but they were cosmetic in nature. Tsikhanouskaya actively traveled, lobbied for the sanctions agenda, but there was no success. It would seem that the situation for Lukashenka is calming down; on May 9, they talked about some kind of outburst of protests, but nothing happened, then the massacre of tut.by began, and so on. He decided that now everything had calmed down and settled down, but then the situation with Pratasevich happened. We still do not know how and why Lukashenka made the decision, whether he was guided solely by a sense of revenge or something else. I do not presume to judge; someday, I hope, we find out.

This story with Pratasevich immediately went to the international level. Thanks to this story with the plane, Lukashenka has become not a Belarusian problem, not a regional-eastern problem but a European one. The flywheel of sanctions is beginning to unfold, a new dynamic is underway, the Europeans are adopting sanctions. They are unpleasant but relatively bearable. This is not a disaster for this regime, as European politicians themselves admit.

Then the story of refugees begins, this is one of the most painful topics for Europe, in principle. This is the card that dictatorial regimes use against the EU. For the EU, this is like a red rag for a bull, and Lukashenka uses it. He is doing what Turkish President Erdogan or Moroccan King Mohammed VI regularly do. But there are peculiarities here: the Europeans know that, if these autocrats start such a policy, let the refugees in, then they want something. This is an offer to sit down at the negotiating table. You can negotiate with them. With Lukashenka, no one will sit down at the negotiating table, because how can you sit down at the table with a person whom you do not trust and his words do not mean anything.

By his actions, Lukashenka only aggravates his position in the European arena. Why is he doing this? That's a very good question. Are these features of his character, personal feelings of revenge, or manipulation by Moscow? This remains an open question, but, by continuing this policy, it becomes even more of a European problem.

If you look at the European and American press today, they are discussing why he does this. There are different theories and explanations, but the main question is not why Lukashenka is doing this, but what to do with him. Here the point of view is unambiguous: Lukashenka has become a serious European problem.

For Europeans, the internal political conflict in Belarus is terrible and unacceptable, but the point is not only domestic politics, because what Lukashenka is doing is a threat to the European Union. Lukashenka is trying to destabilize Lithuania and Latvia, probably, he will soon deal with Poland. Today's Lukashenka is a European problem. Europeans and Americans are forced to deal with this problem.

- Another “black swan” for Lukashenka was the situation with the Olympic athlete Krystsina Tsimanouskaya, whom they tried to forcibly take to Belarus from Tokyo. Why did the regime “shoot itself in the foot” in the sphere where it was used to asserting itself - in big sports?

- I think that, in fact, this is because the people who make decisions in Belarus today are absolutely not aware of the consequences, and the performers do not understand what kind of game they are getting involved in. These people who make decisions live a completely different reality, they do not calculate the moves.

Let's take a look at the whole situation. Krystsina Tsimanouskaya makes a non-political statement, and this criticism is completely justified, as I understand it. However, the very fact that Tsimanouskaya dared to say something, and it spread, did not please someone in Minsk. In the West, they believe that the decision was made by Lukashenka himself. I heard versions that the decision was made by Viktar Lukashenka, but one way or another, this is speculation. It is quite clear that the instruction was given from above. Whether Aliaksandr Lukashenka did it himself is another question.

It turns out that an order was given, the people who are below were given the task to transfer Tsimanouskaya to Belarus. Since these people are held captive by sexist stereotypes, they believe that they just need to scare the "young girl" and put her into place. And they are people from this system, they have a hard time dealing with free people who have their own opinion. Such people are not used to thinking but only to obey orders. The fact that a young athlete can have her own opinion is simply unacceptable. Tsimanouskaya behaved completely shocking for them, she made a scandal, did not want to dance to their tune. It was absolutely shocking for them. They did not understand what they got themselves into and how it could end.

When I read the message on the telegram channels that she was being taken to the airport, it immediately became clear to me: if she did not want to go, then she would not go anywhere. In a democratic country, if she approaches a police officer in Tokyo and says that she does not want to go anywhere, then no one will do anything to her. These people could not even imagine that Krystsina could refuse to go. They didn't even think of taking the phone from her. Krystsina was taken out at an absolutely amateurish level. You could consult with your colleagues from North Korea, or Iran, or Cuba. In North Korea, in general, everything is simple, everything is under control, no one has any phones, no one will leave. Without thinking, they got a huge international scandal.

In one fell swoop, Tsimanouskaya became, probably, the most famous Belarusian athlete today, becoming famous all over the planet. What happened to Krystsina Tsimanouskaya is understandable to the Western public. A Western citizen who reads information about Belarus is trying to somehow organize and understand what is happening. People very often intuitively compare Belarus with North Korea. This terrible image of European North Korea is already in many heads of Europeans.

This image of North Korea in the center of Europe already existed before the story of Tsimanouskaya, but it is only getting stronger: they say, it is already exporting athletes, like North Korea. The image blow to the regime is disastrous. The statements of the Western press and politicians have become much harsher. I would say that the story with Tsimanouskaya is a blow to the regime much stronger than the story with Pratasevich. Of course, there are also serious differences, for example, economic sanctions followed the Pratasevich case. There will be no serious sanctions for Tsimanouskaya, this is completely different, but there is an image component here. Moreover, the situation on the border with Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania only aggravates the situation. It feels like the Lukashenka regime does not want to soften the sanctions agenda, on the contrary, it is doing everything to force the Europeans and Americans to accept the most severe sanctions. It's such a pretty masochistic position in a way.

One thing surprises me: a lot of the most interesting and important articles about Belarus are being published in the West. In Belarus itself, they don't even know about these articles. This is bad from my point of view. Just recently there was an article in The Guardian by British historian and political scientist Andrew Wilson. He worked a lot with Lukashenka, wrote a whole work on his dictatorship. Wilson tried to analyze this strange strategy in foreign policy and brought up the topic of the "madman theory." This political strategy was used by American President Richard Nixon in the early 70s. It lies in the fact that the head of state begins to behave, shall we say, completely insane, that is, uncontrollably, making inadequate decisions, disproportionate. This fits well with what Lukashenka is doing now.

The task is simple: you create a stressful situation for your partners and opponents, they see that you are inadequate and everything can be expected from you. Your hope is that your opponents will simply decide not to mess with you. Wilson does not exclude that this strategy was borrowed by the Belarusian regime. For the Western public, this is a plausible explanation, but there is one caveat: Nixon had a strategy, and Lukashenka lives for one day.

However, from a European point of view, this is not the case when they let go because capitulating to Lukashenka is a huge defeat for the whole of Europe. If you surrender to such a dictator, what kind of negotiations can you have with Erdogan, will Mohammed VI take you seriously? Therefore, the line taken by the Europeans and Americans is as follows: we do not give in to Lukashenka's blackmail, we fight on.

- You are, perhaps, the only one who made a very subtle and interesting observation, comparing the cases of Ryanair in Minsk and Tsimanouskaya in Tokyo. You said: “Lukashenka will leave on Sunday.” One can immediately recall the unprecedented mass Sunday rallies in August-September, and historical parallels, for example, with “Bloody Sunday”... Do you think this is really a fatal day for a dictator?

- This observation is somewhat ironic, but there is some kind of system. The problem is that we know little about Lukashenka, especially how he makes decisions because the Belarusian system is absolutely non-transparent. We do not know how Lukashenka spends his free time, how he lives, breathes - this is a closed topic. However, if you look at the fatal events that significantly worsened Lukashenka's position, then this really happened on weekends.

As far as I can imagine, on weekdays, a significant part of Belarusians, even those who are interested in political events, live their own lives. Of course, there are Belarusians who live in politics 24/7, but I think there are not so many of them. It seems surprising to many: it's conditionally 1937 in Belarus, and people live a normal life - they go to cafes, walk around the city in the evening, watch football, and so on. How does it work? It is quite normal, the same thing happened in the Stalinist Soviet Union. Someone sat and trembled at night that they would come and take it away, and someone slept completely calmly because they did not notice all the horror that was happening or were not interested.

So, on weekdays, people are less interested in political issues, then the weekend comes, where there is free time. People begin to read more, analyze what is happening, that is, the degree of politicization of society usually grows on weekends. In Belarus, there is also a special dacha culture, when people go to the dacha on weekends, but the dacha season ends at the end of September - at the beginning of October. And last year, it seems to me, it did not at all lead to a decrease in protest activity.

It is quite possible that, if any mass actions start in Belarus, they will most likely start on the weekend because much more people can be mobilized on these days. If we believe in symbolism, then I do not exclude that the history of this regime may really end on one of the Sundays.

- The other day the world was shocked by the death of the leader of the Belarusian house in Ukraine Vitaly Shishov, who was found hanged in Kyiv. The Ukrainian police, as one of the versions, admit premeditated murder disguised as suicide, and experts draw parallels with the murder of Pavel Sharamet, the elimination of which was discussed at one time by the ex-head of the KGB Zaitsau. What do you think about it?

- Now the most different versions are being expressed. I hope that the Ukrainian police will work out all these versions. If you look at how these events are covered, then most people who write on the Belarusian topic are fully convinced of the trail of the special services. This is obvious to the Western press: traces of this crime are going to Minsk.

Bellingcat and Christo Grozev inspire me with a certain optimism in this matter; they are real professionals who know how to work, they showed this in the story with Navalny. They took on this case.

What I find hard to believe is the version that it was suicide. I would just wait for the results of the investigation. I really hope that this time, unlike the case of Pavel Sharamet, the Ukrainian police will be able to solve this case. I have not heard anything like this yet, but maybe there will be help from police officers from other countries, and they will be able to reveal everything.

If we digress from the investigation and look at the perception, then for the Western public, the version that official Minsk is behind the murder of Shishov is absolutely clear and plausible. It fits very well into the image of the Belarusian regime that has developed today.

Now we are in such a situation that it is no longer a matter of investigation but faith. Let's compare two cases: the murder of Shishov in Kyiv and the story of the death of an Iraqi citizen, which the Belarusian authorities are presented as a murder. This is a matter of faith, if you are a staunch supporter of Lukashenka and believe his propaganda, then you will believe that this Iraqi was killed by the Lithuanians. You won’t ask much of why he was killed. If you are a staunch opponent of Lukashenka, then you can believe that this whole story with the Iraqi is staged by the regime. It's the same with Shishov's story.

Roughly speaking, for people who believe in everything that Lukashenka says, it does not matter at all what version the Ukrainian investigators present. If they don't like this version, they won't believe it. No matter how convincingly Lukashenka speaks, if you don’t believe him in principle and also believe that he can come up with such a thing or order someone to come up with such a thing, then you will not believe him.

- One of the most odious accomplices of the regime, the commander of the internal troops and the former head of the GUBOPiK Mikalai Karpiankou said in April that he was ready to “clean up” the opponents of the regime abroad on Lukashenka's order. In doing so, he allegedly referred to the practice of the Israeli special services. Why are such comparisons unacceptable?

- As they like to say in Russia, let's separate the cutlets from the flies. What do we have here compared to Israel? If the Mossad carries out any actions, then it is not about the political opponents of the Israeli leadership but people who are engaged in terrorist activities. There is no talk here about the destruction of any political opponents and adversaries. This example is from another matter.

By and large, if such "actions" take place, if you theoretically imagine that the story with Shishov is a touchstone, then this is nothing more than state terrorism.

- Is it possible to speak in general about the anti-Semitic essence of the Lukashenka regime? How does it manifest itself?

- I would not talk about the anti-Semitic essence of the regime, because there is no purposeful persecution of Jews in Belarus. There is anti-Semitic rhetoric in Belarus.

How Lukashenka himself relates to a Jew is a rather interesting question. One way or another, when he addressed this topic for 27 years, there were often statements that were rightly assessed as anti-Semitic. It was his last statement on July 3, which he made, and was personally condemned by the Israeli Foreign Ministry. If I am not mistaken, then Lukashenka is the only European politician who has earned two condemnations from Israel for his personal anti-Semitism.

Now we are seeing a situation where the theme of anti-Semitism is used in the fight against the protest movement. What was emphasized in the propaganda? That among the leaders of the protest or people who sympathize with the protest, there are people of Jewish origin, with Israeli citizenship, and so on. It has a long tradition, an old map: to show that outsiders, in this case, Jews, are behind the protest.

Another point that is present in the Belarusian propaganda is the use of the Holocaust theme. The theme of the Holocaust is 100% used by the regime, that is, on the one hand, when they develop their concept of the genocide of the Belarusian people, the Holocaust plays a second or third-rate role. Usually, they don't talk about it or talk very little, and when you need to somehow sting your opponents, then this topic sticks out.

This whole story that "Jews were killed under white-red-white flags" is an attempt to emphasize special participation of Belarusian collaborators in the extermination of Jews. This is a very paradoxical phenomenon, because if you look at other European countries, the same Lithuania, Latvia, and so on, then the local population there really was very actively involved in the persecution and extermination of Jews. They talk about this topic, but it is very difficult and unpleasant. This is a very sad page in their history. On the contrary, they emphasize the role of people who saved Jews.

And what is the Lukashenka regime doing? On the contrary, he is trying to emphasize the role of Belarusians in the extermination of Jews, that is, to create the impression that it was the Belarusian collaborators who participated most actively in this, and it was under the white-red-white flag, that is, there is a one-sided use of this topic. However, the peculiarity lies in the fact that anti-Semitism, which is present in the official propaganda, is not directed entirely at the Jewish population of Belarus. Those Jews who live in Belarus and sympathize with the Lukashenka regime are not interested in propaganda, but when people of Jewish origin engage in politics or somehow articulate their position, they are immediately attacked with anti-Semitic character.

This is a common phenomenon that I have experienced firsthand. All publications about me that were in the state press are anti-Semitic in nature, there are open insults. There is nothing surprising in this, the Lukashenka regime is in such a difficult situation that they are ready to grasp at any straw, and, since there are no moral principles for a long time, no one disdains anti-Semitism.

- What can become “X-day” in the struggle for democracy in Belarus? What triggered changes in other countries where the situation was similar?

- This is a very good and difficult question. In general, being a historian, it is difficult to predict anything. We do not know the most important thing: how much more the Belarusian people are ready to endure. This is very difficult to assess. When this very red line for the broad masses is crossed, when people will say everything.

If we look at August, there was a falsification of the elections, people came out. Good question: what would have happened if they had not been suppressed so harshly? Would they have stood and gone away? Would they have tried to take control of some government buildings? What would have happened if events had unfolded as they did in Ukraine during the first Maidan? Whether or not the regime would have fallen is a good question, it's very hard to say. However, a crackdown by force began, which led to people taking to the streets in huge numbers.

What could be now? It's very difficult to say. Perhaps such an outbreak of protests will be a response to violence or massive repression if the pace of arrests and attacks on society is intensified. The economic situation can also very much heat up the situation. As I understand it, Lukashenka proceeds from the fact that the main enemy is the economy, if to believe what he says. He apparently believes that everything else will not affect people very much, but if they have nothing to eat, then they can go out.

If we take the classic example of Romania in 1989, then a combination of several factors acted there. Let's just say, on the one hand, we have similarities and differences between Belarus now and Romania then. We live in a different society with different communication. We have a tough dictator who is ready to suppress any dissent with harsh repression. In Romania, there was the same situation: Ceausescu was in power for 25 years, that is, a dictator who relied entirely on the power bloc, people were tired of him and did not want him anymore. However, in Romania, there was a difficult economic situation, which only worsened.

The economic situation in Belarus is not brilliant, but it is not as bad as it was in Romania in the 1980s. What led to the collapse of Ceausescu? Repression, he went too far. In the case of Romania, it was not only a popular uprising, it was a mix of a popular and palace coup because part of the Romanian elite supported the rebels. Is something like this possible in Belarus? Good question. Someone says that the officials are still completely under his thumb and are loyal to him, but there are estimates that the officials are in the state of the Italian strike. A new upsurge in street activity may occur at a moment when the regime goes overboard again, and people will say: no, we will not tolerate this anymore. How close or far this situation is - I cannot judge.

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