Impact Of Russian Mobilization On Situation In Ukraine

The Armed Forces of Ukraine do not need crowds of people with guns in the combat zone.

Recall that on this day, the Kremlin dictator Vladimir Putin is to address both chambers of the Russian parliament. There, he can announce the annexation of the occupied territories of Ukraine by "holding" pseudo-referendums there.

I think that now we should only fight as efficiently as possible and introduce changes in our lands. Now the strategic initiative is ours, not on the side of Russia. All this talk about mobilization, nuclear strikes is Putin's attempt to seize the strategic initiative. But the intiative no longer depends on him, no matter what they come up with. They are trying to turn the war in Ukraine in the imagination of their own electorate from an aggressive war into a domestic war with these words. That is, they used this narrative for 22 years with the St. George ribbons and the immortal regiment, and now the world war, which Putin actually unleashed, will be turned into a new great patriotic war.

To do this, they need to somehow explain to people why they are driving them to die undet HIMARSs strikes. For the enemy, the announcement of the annexation of our territories is another measure to mobilize manpower in order to continue the war and get the main deficit - the human resource. The Putin regime has run out of all mercenaries, volunteers, military personnel and convicts. Now it remains to drive out those who are humble and believe in state propaganda. That's what this last chord is designed for.

We are not talking about combat readiness, but as far as I see their doctrine, and how they realize it, they are trying to add mobilized people wherever they lack manpower. Everywhere. It means to replace the personnel of the units located in Ukraine, to replace the second line units, to form reserve units, to replenish the mobilized units in the first line, despite the fact that the mobilized have no training. They are not mobilizing 300,000, but as many as they need to drive into all the holes of their planning as cannon fodder.

However, mobilization in the Russian Federation is not a problem for us. The Russian regular army is a problem.

Combat effectiveness in modern ground warfare is ensured by the quality of the commanders. This means training in peacetime or wartime. The training of this manpower in Russia is ineffective, but it takes place exclusively within the framework of the personnel army. Therefore, this is the main problem for us, and we need to change our strategy for such a sudden mobilization, where there was no time for anyone to think, it was necessary to bake new battalions urgently, like pies, in order to plug holes with them on 2 thousand km of the front and border.

Now the time has changed, the front has stabilized, and now we need to make changes aimed at creating advantages in a war of attrition, a long war. We need qualitative changes in the preservation of people so that we select people for compliance with their positions so that only those who are really combat-ready are in combat position so that there is a quality rear and support, and logistics are organized. So that we can organize high-quality combat training within the framework of organizational changes. We need to create an army that will have a qualitative superiority over the enemy in all components. We still cannot provide this with military equipment but we are able and we must train people. There must be an absolute quality in people. And people need to be protected as much as possible. It is the fundamental resource of war.

There is reason to believe that all strategic decisions of the Russian Federation are approved in the office of one dictator. This is good for us, in the sense that we, as a decentralized democratic society, are more flexible, and all signals and changes pass through us much faster than through this centralized Russian system. But at a certain level, we need a certain centralization. It is a case of planning. Russia has poor planning. We need high-quality defensive planning that would correspond to the situation. Unfortunately, we lack it now as well as before. I think that everyone who collects aid to the front, these endless columns of cars that are constantly needed, break down, and the military itself has to repair them, constant requests for drones and all other support, this cannot be a problem exclusively of civil society. It is impossible to carry out about 95% of reconnaissance missions with volunteer equipment. This is what the army should do. The state should provide at least some significant part of it. We still have a volunteer war. The state does not prevent the people from winning the war and supplying the army and fighting alongside the army.

We need high-quality defensive planning that would correspond to the situation. We do not need crowds of armed people in the combat zone and all the villages filled with soldiers. We need combat units that are well trained at the training grounds, consisting of people who know their job well (military specialty). This requires centralized changes initiated by the leadership, it is not available to us.

Yuri Butusov, NV.UA