«Оружейного барона» Виктора Бута не выпустили под залог
3- 11.03.2008, 8:42
Суд Таиланда отказался отпустить под залог подозреваемого в крупномасштабной незаконной торговле оружием гражданина России Виктора Бута, который находится под арестом.
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Меркаванне
Мы – паўсюль. Яны - нідзе
Крэмль благае Такаева ўсё схаваць
Надежду не победить
Гэты нумар не пройдзе
Следующим будет арестован Лукашенко!
Адказаць___________________________________
Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD
30 September 2004
Regime Finance and Procurement
We have said with certainty that the embargo will not be lifted by a Security Council resolution,
but will corrode by itself
Saddam speaking in January 2000 to mark the 79th anniversary
of the Iraqi armed forces.
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Use of Banks in Belarus
The CBI used Infobank in Belarus to hide Regime assets in employee-named accounts. These accounts held funds accumulated through the kickback of funds from import contracts under the UN OFF program. Huwaysh, former Director of the MIC, estimated that there was $1 million in this account and the Iraqi MIC had $1.5 million for procurement of Belarusian goods in this account. However, that actual total was $7.5 million (see Iraq’s Illicit Revenue section).
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Belarus
Belarus was the largest supplier of sophisticated high-technology conventional weapons to Iraq from 2001 until the fall of the Regime. Complicity in this illicit trade was exhibited at the highest levels of the Belarusian Government. Belarusian state establishments and companies implemented cooperation agreements with Iraq to transfer technology, equipment, and expertise to the embargoed Regime.
• The Iraqis constantly worked to improve the illicit trade relationship with Belarus despite the absence of a formal trade agreement between the two countries. The illicit trade relationship allowed Iraq to obtain high-technology military equipment. Belarus was relatively advanced in military research and development including air defense and electronic warfare.
• Belarus acquired hard currency and a market for its post-Soviet defense industry, according to a detainee.
• The intelligence services of both countries helped to facilitate this trade, according to a cooperative source with good access. A detainee debrief affirms that Belarusian aid in radars, laser technology, metallurgy, and electronic warfare systems were the key areas of cooperation.
In 2001 and 2002, two MIC delegations visited Belarus to discuss Belarusian assistance in upgrading Iraqi defense capabilities, particularly air defense and electronic warfare systems. Former MIC Director, Huwaysh, led the Iraqi delegations. The Iraqi delegations also included the former Director of Al-Kindi Dr Sa’ad Da’ud Shamma’, the former Director of the Al-Milad air defense company, Brigadier General Husayn, and several high-ranking Iraqi air defense officials. Huwaysh, however, was the overall manager of the relationship between Iraq (especially MIC) and Belarus according to a detainee debrief.
A former high-ranking Iraqi government official says that diplomatic relations between Belarus and Iraq were so strong that an Iraqi-Belarusian Joint Committee was formed to promote illicit trade. The committee was cochaired by the Iraqi Minister of Finance, Hikmat Mizban Ibrahim al-Azzawi, and Vladimir Zamitalin of the Belarusian Presidential Office. Indeed, the President of Belarus, Aleksandr Lukashenko, consistently supported the political positions and defense needs of Iraq. In a September 2002 meeting, President Lukashenko met MIC and MFA officials to discuss military cooperation. During the meeting, President Lukashenko expressed his willingness to support Iraq and to send air defense experts to help Iraq fight the United States.
Key Belarusian Individuals Linked to Illicit Trade With Iraq
The following Belarusian individuals were instrumental in driving forward the illicit trade with Iraq:
• Vladimir Zamitalin. Ex-deputy to the head of the Presidential Bureau and former head of the Belarusian side of the combined Iraqi-Belarusian Committee for Commercial and Economic Cooperation. He was in charge of the special military cooperation with Iraq and functioned as a secret envoy between President Lukashenko and Saddam.
• Leonid Kozek. Ex-deputy to the head of the Presidential Bureau and member of the Iraqi-Belarusian cooperation committee.
• Nikolai Ivanenko. Current deputy to the head of the Presidential Bureau and last head of the Belarusian side of the combined Iraqi-Belarusian committee for economic cooperation. He had a role in the special military cooperation with Iraq, and is a relative of President Lukashenko. He visited Iraq twice and met with Saddam, carrying a written letter to Saddam from President Lukashenko.
• Vitali Kharlap. Belarusian Minister of Industry.
• Professor Kandrinko. Director of the communications department at a Belarusian concern called AGAT. He played a successful role in negotiations with Salah Al-Din state company and concluded many contracts concerning the manufacture of communication sets.
• Professor Kloshko. A scientist who led the department of telemetric systems for surface-to-surface missiles and had many contracts with the MIC.
• General Petr Rokoshevskiy. Deputy for arming and training in the Belarusian MoD. Rokoshevskiy had a role in activating military cooperation with Iraq. This involved working with the Iraqi MoD, SRG, and the MIC for supplying rocket propelled grenades (RPG-7), munitions, and laser-directed Konkurs antitank rounds. He played a major role in signing a contract with the Iraqi MoD and the MIC for training 20 officer engineers of the SRG in using the S-300 PMU-1 (SA-20) air defense system at the Belarusian military academy. Rokoshevskiy was also involved in signing contracts for supplying engines for T-72 and T-55 tanks, MiG-29 fighter jets, and BMP-1 mechanized infantry fighting vehicles.
Materials, Equipment and Services Provided by Belarus
Belarus exported a range of military goods to Iraq. This illicit trade was organized and executed by a number of Belarusian companies. Captured documents reveal that in December 2002, Balmorals Ventures Ltd.implemented contract 148/2002 with the Al-Kindi General Company to deliver electronic components to the value of $70,367. This price included the cost of delivery to Syria and onward shipment to Baghdad. The goods could have been components for a radar jamming system.
Viktor Shevtsov was the director of Infobank and of another Belarusian company involved in illicit trade with Iraq named BelarusianMetalEnergo (BME). Infobank helped finance deals with Iraq and, according to Huwaysh, may have been run by Belarusian intelligence. BME was involved in supplying castings and machinery for T-72 tanks, and modernizing SA-2 air defense missiles and associated radar systems. BME had many multimillion dollar contracts with Iraq and worked closely with Infobank to finance illicit trade. Shevtsov organized, at his own personal expense, trips on-board Belarusian airlines from Minsk to Baghdad. These flights transported experts and directors of Belarusian companies connected to Iraq as well as technical and military equipment destined for Iraqi ministries.
Alexander Degtyarev was also a major player in the illicit trade business with Iraq.Degtyarev was a Russian scientist whose specialty was missile guidance and control. Shevtsov introduced Degtyarev to the Iraqi MIC. Degtyarev owned the Belarusian companies named Systemtech and ElectricGazCom (EGC), which had contracts with Infobank and Iraq to supply radars plus control and guidance systems for SA-2 missiles. The latter equipment was transported through Syria and paid for through Syrian banking institutions. Degtyarev was a regular visitor to Iraq, traveling there every two weeks according to a high-level MIC official and a mid-level former Iraqi civil servant with direct access to the information.
A high-level MIC official stated that EGC signed contracts with the Iraqi Al-Karamah State Establishment to build a facility for the manufacturing and testing of control and guidance systems for surface-to-surface missiles such as al-Samud. This trade also included the sale of gyroscopes and accelerometer testing stages. In addition, ECG signed contracts with the Al-Batani State Company for the technology transfer of manufacturing systems for an Iraqi satellite research project.
A former Iraqi official revealed that President Aleksandr Lukashenko as a vehicle for illicit trade with Iraq promoted a joint Belarusian-Iraqi company. Lukashenko was anxious that illicit trade should continue on a regular basis and requested that a firm called Belarus Afta be established in Baghdad as a clearinghouse for illicit military trade.
• Radar technology and air defense were the most crucial export commodities to Iraq from Belarus. Captured documents and a mid-level Iraqi military officer with direct access to the information affirm that there was joint Belarus-Iraqi development of an improved P-18 (Mod Spoon Rest) early warning radar between November 2000 and March 2003. This radar was employed at Al-Habbaniyah Air Defense Center against Coalition aircraft during OIF.
• Systemtech provided assistance in the fields of research, testing, and project implementation. Dr Raskovka was the senior Systemtech official helping the Iraqis, visiting Iraq every 3 to 4 months for 3 years. The Iraqis wanted to purchase an S-300 air defense system. Contracts were signed and training undertaken, but the pure logistic problems of supplying the system without alerting the international community were insurmountable.
Other interviewees revealed that Belarus provided numerous supplies of illicit goods to Iraq. These included equipment for T-72 and T-55 tanks; Volga, Pechora (SA-3) and other air defense missile systems; Mi-17 helicopters; spares and repairs for MiG-23, -25 and -29 plus Sukhoi 25 jets; laser guidance systems; fiber optics; infrared spare parts; GPS jammers; and radios.
IAEC-MIC Cooperation for the Procurement of CNC Machines
Based on interviews with Fadil Al Janabi, former head of the IAEC, and 'Abd-al-Tawab Al Mullah Huwaysh, former Minister of Military Industrialization, it is evident that the MIC procured CNC machines for the IAEC as part of a "special project" for modernizing Iraq's scientific infrastructure in 2001.
• According to interviews with Fadil Al Janabi, presidential secretary 'Abd Hamid Mahmud Al Khatab Al Nasiri was approached in 2001with a proposal for a modernization program that included procurement of new machinery and equipment, enabling the IAEC to create molds and manufacture specialty parts in-house. Al Janabi wanted to procure these CNC machines through the MIC to bypass foreign supplier's reluctance to sell manufacturing equipment to the IAEC.
• Huwaysh recalled that in 2001, Al Janabi and Khalid Ibrahim Sa'aid contacted him with a presidential order to assist the IAEC with a "special project." The MIC was not to be involved with establishing technical specifications or providing funding, but was to serve as a functional link.
• During this initial meeting, which was also attended by Munir Al Kubaysi, Director General of MIC's Al-Basha'ir Company, Huwaysh claimed he was informed that he did not need to know what was being procured. He further remembered the relative high cost of the machines, costing approximately half the budget of the entire special IAEC modernization project.
IAEC scientists and employees, in contrast, have claimed that CNC machines procured from Taiwan were not high precision and were the same as those used at the Al Badr General Company.
• A source with access stated that the most precise machines were capable of 5-micron accuracy, but none of the machines were five to six axes because this would have "broken sanctions and all of the machines were declared to inspectors." The IAEC employee stated that these high-precision machines were installed at Tuwaitha and information regarding these machines was provided to the UN and IAEA in the declaration given in December 2002.
• ISG has found Iraqi documents that corroborate this assertion, showing that the IAEC had prepared UN forms (OMV Form 22.5/ MOD.2) for eight CNC machines, all of which were identified as three-axes machines. The descriptions in the declarations are consistent with the statements of the mid-level managers.
It is important to note, however, that these IAEC sources referred to the MIC manufacturing company Al Badr and not Al-Basha'ir, the MIC front company involved in negotiations with Huwaysh. In the interchange between the IAEC and the MIC, Al Janabi was explicitly ordered that all transactions and communications on this procurement project were to go through Munir Al Kubaysi and Al-Basha'ir. ISG judges it is probable that this "special project" procurement was carried out by Al-Basha'ir as a separate classified channel for IAEC precision machinery. This assessment supports Huwaysh's claim of the sensitivity surrounding the "classified" nature of the IAEC modernization project in 2001.
Even during the prelude to OIF, the illicit Belarusian military trade with Iraq did not stop as shown by captured documents. Belarus provided PN-5 and PN-7 night-vision devices for Iraq through the Al-Basha’ir front company. Three months before the onset of the conflict, President Lukashenko instructed the Belarusian Ministry of Defense to allow Iraq to purchase any goods from Belarusian military supplies.
Payments From Iraq to Belarus
The main revenue stream for funding illicit trade with Iraq came from the Iraq-Syria Trade Protocol. The amount of illicit military trade between Belarus and Iraq was significant according to captured documents, with Belarusian Governments receiving nearly $114 million in payments from Iraq.
According to a detainee, the critical financial element in the illicit trade process between Belarus and Iraq was Infobank. Belarus demanded to be paid 75 percent of the contract price in hard currency before delivery of any goods. Iraq did not agree to this. Therefore, Infobank agreed to provide bridging funds, including the 75 percent up-front fee, to finance illicit deals between Belarus and Iraq for a fee of 15 percent of any contract. According to a high-level Regime source with direct access, kickbacks paid to Iraq by Belarusian companies for exports to Iraq under the UN OFF Program were kept at the Infobank to fund future illicit Iraqi imports from Belarus. A senior former executive in the Iraqi MIC believes that Infobank had a total of $7 million of Iraqi money in its accounts before OIF. Infobank also financed illicit military trade between Iraq and Yugoimport-FDSP of Serbia, paying equivalent up-front fees, according to a former senior executive in the MIC.
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The note:
I invite you to visit website at:
https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/chap2.html#top
Спасибо за предоставленную инфо.
АдказацьВ соответствии с ней руководство страной очень реально может попасть... не только на санкции (что уже началось...), но и на международные процессы.
Россия не будет "хлопотать" за Бута.
Адказаць