Don't Smarten Dictators

Charter97.org continues to publish extracts from Andrei Sannikov's book Belarusian Amerikanka or Elections under Dictatorship

The beginning of extracts is available here.

- I avoid the personal characteristics of the dictator. I don’t answer the questions of journalists about what Lukashenka is like as a person. It’s not him I oppose; it’s what he is doing as head of state, that system of personal power, ruthless and inhumane, which he created.

As a man, Lukashenko is absolutely uninteresting to me; moreover, he’s repugnant. I don’t have any acquaintances like him, or friends, of course. If I met people like him in life, then I tried to avoid talking to them, I removed myself to a respectful distance so as not to see and hear them. But I was forced to meet them, just like every one of us. There are a lot of them in the prisons and in the zones. All of them, pretending to be poor and miserable, try to insinuate themselves into your confidence in order to then do you harm later. In school, they rifle through satchels, and stick to the boys hanging out in the doorways, always in the company of people like themselves. They use everybody around them, never helping anyone. They use their own misery as a measuring stick for other people and on that principle select accomplices for themselves.

They spend their whole lives getting even for their childhood hurts. The older they get, the more they get revenge. They perceive power only as a means to impunity. The impunity to steal, disrupt homes and destroy families, to cripple and finally kill people, deprive them of life, enjoying the full extent of their power over the defenseless all the while. They rid themselves of human relations in life along with morality, and completely give themselves up to animal instincts.

They come to power only in order to hang on to it at any price. All kinds of bastards then stick to them, sensing that a leader of the pack has come to power and brought with him their hour, too. If they are allowed in the first hours to get the upper-hand, society will very quickly become their hostages, begin to disintegrate and lose the sense of decency.

That’s what happened in Belarus.

I once asked my journalist friends not to analyze Lukashenka. I figured – and I still figure – that searches for deep meaning in a human non-entity only encourages the bad guys and erodes morale. The dictator is able to extract his powers from the fact that signs of state wisdom are seen in banal greed, enmity and envy; they look for deep meaning in the behavior of an unbridled thug.

Dmitry Muratov, editor-in-chief of Novaya Gazeta, with whom I discussed this topic, found a more exact phrase: “One shouldn’t «smarten» dictators”.

After the first presidential elections in 1994 in Belarus, in which Lukashenka won, we didn’t have a conflict between reformers and conservatives. Despite the enormous role of national democratic forces which led Belarus to independence, Soviet retrogrades held power in the country. Lukashenka’s lumpens, greedy for power, clashed with the old Communist nomenklatura.

In the first months of his rule, Lukashenka could be varied – foaming at the mouth and fulminating at the Belarus Popular Front (BNF), and crying in parliament as he read the anti-corruption report; believing in his exceptionalism and sweating in envy at the independent press. He could seem strong and weak, a liberal and a tyrant, you could be deceived for a while about him, but not about his cadres. Like liquid manure, they penetrated to all the levels of power and ensured there the triumph of ignorance, that is, Lukashenka. They were notable for their supernatural development of prehensile reflexes and a high degree of misanthropy. The formation of Lukashenka’s power was complete with the disbanding of the last, elected parliament and total victory of the lumpen over the Party nomenklatura.

At one time, the Foreign Ministry, where I worked, remained outside the fray, we even managed to make decisions that extremely irritated Lukashenka, for example, on the disarmament issues, but that could not go on for long.

I saw Lukashenka only once, on the eve of my appointment to the position of deputy minister. The audience with him (fortunately, the first and last) dispelled practically all hopes for his sanity, I was shocked at the entirely groundless nature for his aggressiveness.

I remember right after that meeting, I called my friend Valyantsin Golubeu, a deputy in the Supreme Soviet, and asked to meet. We strolled around the center of Minsk and I said I would not last long in government. Valyantsin talked me into being patient and continuing to do my work, and at the new level I could do more.

A month later, Valyantsin was beaten up right on the floor of the parliament, along with a group of deputies who had organized a hunger strike in protest against Lukashenka’s plans to change the state symbols. Valyantsin called me early in the morning and told me what happened. I advised him to disseminate the news as widely as possible, above all to the embassies. When I came to work that day, I was told that US Amb. Kenneth Yalowitz had asked for me to get in touch. All my colleagues had avoided talking to him. I immediately responded to his request. Now I don’t recall whether we talked on the telephone or whether I received him in my office. Ken expressed outrage in connection with the night-time beating of the parliamentarians. I supported his outrage and advised him not to lower his attention to this crime. Ken, I think, was even taken aback. Of course it was all understood that Lukashenka’s people stood behind the beatings. Least of all, evidently, the US ambassador expected that he would not only be heard out at the Foreign Ministry but would be advised to be tough on the authorities’ actions. I didn’t care that the telephones were bugged, that there would be unpleasantness. I really wanted there to be a tough international reaction to this crime.

I really wanted to slam the door after the false referendum, after which the inappropriate Soviet-style emblem and flag appeared in Belarus. But a lot had been started in various fields and I had to complete what I had started. Friends also advised me to be patient. But in principle, I made my decision to leave even then, after the “referendum” of 1995.

I was acquainted with some people from Lukashenka’s election campaign, in particular Anatoly Maysenya.

Tolya (Anatoly) was then a visible figure in Belarus; in politics, analysis, and intellectual life. Creator of the first analytical center called “East-West,” a brilliant writer, a man of incredible energy, he tried to actively influence all processes underway in Belarus. I was friends with him, and his activism suited me. I liked his amazing ability to learn. In general, in the early 1990s, we didn’t have analysts or international journalists in Belarus. And even now, we don’t have very many of them. Anatoly tried to fill these gaps himself. He realized that it was vitally necessary for the young state to have your own view on the world. And he was not shy about learning.

I took part in all the early meetings of the CIS leaders as an expert. Anatoly attended them as a journalist. I remember that we took these meetings apart bit by bit, both before they began, and during them, and afterwards. Anatoly often listened to my advice about whom to speak with and from whom to get commentary. He could go up to anyone and talk to anyone. He was so concentrated on what was important to him to find out, he was prepared for any conversation, that his interlocutors, whether they were the president of one of the CIS countries or a general, even if at first they frowned, would immediately be infused with his passionate manner of holding discussions and completely engage with them. I remember how Anatoly took on Marshal Shaposhnikov in the air field at the Kiev Airport and began to “gut him” right on the spot. Shaposhnikov’s annoyance – he was then commander-in-chief of the CIS – with the journalist’s persistence lasted literally a moment. In a few seconds they were already walking up and down the air strip in the drizzling rain and were completely engrossed in a conversation with each other. Anatoly spoke very quickly, slightly stuttering, and during his interviews, he turned from a journalist into an equal conversational partner. And he was perceived as an “equal.”

In the spring of 1994 in Zurich, there was a large international conference in which Anatoly Maysenya took part. At that time I worked in our mission in Geneva and learning about this conference, I went to Zurich to meet with him. We sat in the hall of the hotel and talked for a long time, and in detail. A new constitution had already been passed in Belarus and the country was preparing for elections. Lukashenka was preparing for elections, and Anatoly was on his team. He was the one to sound out to me the strategy of the “young wolves” as Lukashenka’s team was known then: the main thing was to win the elections, and then they would cope with the crude Lukashenka; he was controllable, and they could conduct reforms that were necessary for Belarus. I was skeptical of all this and said that homely personalities, due to their lack of education, become unmanageable and look for decisions in what they do know. In the case of Lukashenka, he only knows how to rule by humiliating others. Anatoly grew heated, explaining to me that just as they had “given birth” him, so they would remove him.

Later, Anatoly Maysenya would go into hard opposition to the man that he helped “give birth” to. His brilliant publications, especially his article “Belarus in the Darkness” should be studied in school.

Tolya was killed on November 12, 1996. According to the official version, Maysenya fell asleep, “couldn’t cope with the steering” of the automobile and caused an accident. Maysenya’s personal automobile crashed into an oncoming GAZ-53 at the 286th kilometer mark on the Brest-Minsk highway at high speed. Tolya suffered severe trauma and died on the way to the hospital.

Anatoly’s death was a shock for Belarus and it seemed that with his death, he warned of the impending tragedy. General Yury Zakharenko, former interior minister of Belarus, who immediately went out to the site of the tragedy, maintained that the automobile crash was not an accident. I don’t know whether that is true. At the time, I didn’t give it too much thought. It seemed incredible.

Anatoly’s death broke a very important line in the life of Belarus which only he could lead.

Two and a half years after the death of Maysenya came the terrible year of 1999 for Belarus, which forever defined the nature of the Lukashenka regime. One after another, Lukashenka’s opponents began to disappear. Gennady Karpenko, the undisputed leader of the opposition died prematurely under mysterious circumstances. People like him are called “prominent.” He really did draw attention to himself wherever he went. The vice speaker of the parliament, a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences, the director of a large factory, an athlete (a soccer judge of the all-union category), and simply a charming man, at home in any company. It was with Gennady that I had linked my hopes for change in Belarus. I had been happy to work with him, recognizing his authority and his leadership.

In May 1999, Gen. Yury Zakharenko disappeared, Karpenko’s comrade-at-arms, who was involved in creating a union of officers. Zakharenko was the interior minister, and refused to submit to Lukashenka’s orders and was sent into retirement. In our “shadow” government which Gennady Karpenko led, Gen. Zakharenko was responsible for the defense sector and Lukashenka had good reason to fear him. After he was dismissed, he became even more popular among people in uniform.

In September of that year, Viktor Gonchar, a brilliant lawyer and speaker, a man with leadership qualities and ambitions, disappeared with his friend Anatoly Krasovsky, a businessman. He was in the small circle of Lukashenka’s team, and held the post of vice premier in his government, but very soon understood that Lukashenka was rapidly turning Belarus into an abyss of personal power. Gonchar went into the opposition and became one of the strongest leaders of the opposition. He worked at that time with Karpenko.

In June of the next year, the cameraman Dmitry Zavadsky disappeared. He had once been in the group of journalists allowed to cover Lukashenka’s activity.

It became clear that a special operation was underway to remove political opponents of Lukashenka. News appeared that there was a hit list with about 100 people in it. From several sources it was learned that these lists had my name in them. I had to leave Belarus for several months, especially because in early 1999, even before the disappearances of the politicians, the fascistic thugs from the Russian National Unity (RNE) group attacked me, Zmitser Bandarenka and Oleg Bebenin. My ribs were fractured, my nose was broken but thanks to the selflessness of Zmitser and Oleg, who did everything to bear the brunt of the fascists on themselves, I was left alive. Now it is clear that this attack was not accidental. In that year, 1999, tragic for Belarus, opposition leaders perished, most probably murdered: Karpenko, Zakharenko and Gonchar.

Lukashenka was right, considering me his main enemy. He knew and saw that I continued the line that Karpenko, Gonchar, Zakharenko and I had defended together.

Most likely I was lucky that after long years of opposing Lukashenka, I “only” wound up in the Amerikanka, and didn’t disappear along with my colleagues and friends.

To be continued