Andrey Zubov: Lukashenka Will Meet The Same Fate As All Dictators Who Have Lost Power

Belarus can join the family of European nations and join NATO.

Andrey Zubov is a well-known Russian historian, Doctor of Historical Sciences, philosopher, political scientist and public figure. In 2014, the historian published his article “It Already Happened Before”, where he compared the military occupation of Crimea to the Anschluss, Germany’s annexation of Austria. The Vedomosti news publisher released this article. The article deals with the future war and the isolation of Russia. For his civic position, he was fired from Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), where he taught at the Department of Philosophy.

The Charter97.org website talked to Andrey Zubov about the imperial syndrome of Russian society, the historical parallels of the war in Ukraine, and the future of Belarus and Russia.

— Andrei Borisovich, let's go back to 2014, this year largely predetermined the beginning of the war in Ukraine. Even those who are considered to be liberals in Russia were very enthusiastic about the seizure of Crimea. What is the genesis of this effect, which was called “Krymnash” (the neologism in the Russian language, meaning a positive attitude towards the capture of Crimea - Ed.)?

— Let's start with the fact that I wrote this article on March 1, even before the official annexation of Crimea, it was seized two weeks later, on March 14. These events in Crimea had just begun then, but it was already clear to me what would happen.

I felt that I needed to tell the society about it. Yes, indeed, after that I was fired from the institute. As for many liberals, I think this is a bit exaggerated. The Yabloko and our People's Freedom Party, the two leading parties that are considered liberal, unanimously and resolutely opposed the aggression. They made a number of public official statements, which can be found on the websites of our parties.

All the rest, the so-called liberals who "joined", I don't know if they are liberals. The basis of liberalism is still respect for human rights. As for the people who supported the annexation of Crimea, I do not know among those people who really deeply support human rights.

Some said that "it is necessary to hold a referendum", "to find out the will of the people". But this is a kind of palliative. The problem was that not everyone understood everything at that time. Even I first spoke about the need to hold a referendum under the control of international commissions. Later, probably around August 2014, I realized that there could be no question of any referendum. There should be a restoration of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.

Then, it was hard to understand the whole political situation at once. Nevertheless, condemnation of the annexation of Crimea among liberals was almost unanimous. The case is that we do not represent the majority of society.

Basically, society accepted this with enthusiasm, because the imperial syndrome, which calls for the restoration of the Soviet Union, has not been eliminated. Most people have dreamed about it. We know this from opinion polls.

The collapse of the country was perceived very painfully. While in other states that emerged on the territory of the former Soviet Union, a significant part of the people rejoiced at the acquisition of national independence, in Russia no one felt that we had national dependence. The Russians felt like a people ruling their country. Leastwise, in totalitarian circumstances, but nonetheless. That is why they saw the negative moment of the collapse of the Soviet Union, that is, part of the territories that they ruled left them. You need to have both time and political wisdom to see something else. All this did not happen just at once.

— Why do Russians get this imperial syndrome?

— The imperial syndrome is a common disease of all collapsed empires. It was very strong in the British Empire in the fifties and sixties of the twentieth century, there were imperial movements. In fact, the participation of the British Empire in the Suez crisis is the result of imperial syndrome. The Algerian War for France was very cruel and bloody. The Indochina War. It’s not worth talking about Germany, it's obvious. Italy, too. I mean Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. We see almost the same tendencies. People are struggling with the loss of the land they consider theirs. But what kind of French land could be, let's say, in Algeria? Nevertheless, this is not some special feature of the Russian people. All imperial nations suffer from this.

The question is how to cure this disease, how to get rid of this disease. It's possible. The vast majority of the English, French or Germans have been freed from this disease, they no longer suffer from the imperial syndrome. But the Hungarians, for example, are sick. So they elected Orban again, who is an imperial, a Hungarian imperial. The Turks are pretty much sick, so they vote for Erdogan, who is definitely an Ottoman imperial and pan-Turkist.

So this is a big problem, but today it is impossible for people with imperial ambitions to build normal relations with the world. The world lives by other values, the values of the primacy of individual rights, and not the right of some peoples or states to own and rule, to keep other states in their orbit by force.

That time is gone. It was in the 19th century, it was at the beginning of the 20th century, and maybe even between World War I and World War II. But it completely ended in the civilized world after World War II. But our peoples, I mean the peoples who were under the rule of the communists, did not realize this new condition, a completely new reality when nationalism was already outdated and when nationalism led to two wars. Nationalism in Western Europe, the United States is definitely something with a minus sign, but imperial nationalism is something with two minuses.

We have preserved it. Since we did not know what was happening in the West, we did not deal with it. Even in the German Democratic Republic, the current eastern part of Germany, different political behavior, much more similar, let's say, to Russian, imperial, than in the western part of Germany. Their attitude towards refugees, their attitude towards radical right and left movements. This is an illustrative example. The political rejection of Putin's Russia in former East Germany is far less than in West Germany.

This is the reality. The reality that not only Russians face, but almost all the peoples of the former Soviet space face it. This is national intolerance, an interethnic conflict that is hard to overcome.

Let's say, Estonia and Latvia have overcome it. But it has been a difficult 30 years of re-thinking their past. There was a desire to make Latvia for Latvians, and Estonia for Estonians at the very beginning. They demanded the restoration of rights to those lands that passed to Russia after the 45th year: the Pytalovsky district, Pechery, the Luga Bay region. Only the European Union explained: if you have these ambitions, you will never become part of Europe, you will live on your own. The smart peoples of the Baltics chose the path to Europe, even refusing some seemingly legitimate demands. Because these were the demands of the beginning of the 20th century, the demands of nationalism, which are no longer relevant.

— Putin gave an almost hour-long lecture on history before the start of the war with Ukraine. We see that he often makes references to history. Recently he compared himself with Peter I. How did you describe its views, what makes him tick?

— I've listened to his speech. He did not compare himself with Peter I. He said that we must continue his work. These are different things. Still, this is very dangerous, of course, in itself. Because you see, Peter I lived at the beginning of the 18th century, that is, 300 years ago. Then there were completely different values in the world and in Europe, which differed from those that exist now.

Putin's first mistake (which, by the way, is the mistake of many amateur historians) is anachronism, the transfer to the present of what happened centuries ago, when there was a completely different measurement system of, let's say, coordinates.

And then everyone, both Charles XII of Sweden and the King of Prussia, for example, did the same with Peter I. Peter I was only one of many, more successful, let's say.

But now no one in the civilized world acts like that. After Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini, everyone hates to think about empires, about conquests, everyone is full of it. However, Putin continues to think about it. Therefore, of course, this is his first historical mistake.

The second mistake is that he does not take history as a whole, he does not consider some historical period as the set as science requires, but singles out what is pleasant and important for him to see in it. He even manipulates historical facts when he lacks what he needs.

This is certainly unacceptable for a historian.

I had to make a big scientific effort once, I published it on the Web. A response to his article on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and everything around it. His article was published in 2019. I explained a lot of mistakes. Not formal ones, not everyone knows everything - this is natural, but intonational ones. It means that he wanted to make mistakes, he deliberately made mistakes in order to manipulate historical reality. That's too bad.

For example, he stated that "the Slavs have always lived on the lands that Peter conquered". But it's not right, you see, it's historically wrong. The Slavs in general all came in the 7th-8th centuries either from the Carpathians or from the Danube, there were different movements, but there were no Slavs in the Ladoga region until the end of the 8th - beginning of the 9th century. There was, of course, the Finno-Ugric population, and this is known to scientists. Even if there were Slavs there, so what, this does not mean that these lands belong to Russia.

He remembered neither the Treaty of Oreshek nor the Treaty of Stolbovo, the agreements that define the boundaries of the region. These are such classic historical mistakes that are unacceptable for a head of state. The head of state can appeal to history, but if he appeals to it, he must know it, otherwise, it causes problems.

— Many say that this war for Russia is a repetition of the Crimean War of 1856, they give examples of the Japanese war, the Finnish war of 1939. Which historical parallel is more accurate from your point of view?

— You know, of course, this is similar to the Soviet-Finnish war, taking in account that Finland was part of the Russian Empire from 1809, then gained independence at the end of 1917, and Stalin decided to reattach it to the empire that he was building.

This is similar to the Polish-Soviet war of 1920, when the Bolsheviks wanted to annex Poland, which the Provisional Government granted independence in March 1917. In both cases, it was a failure. In one case it was a complete failure, these are the Soviet-Polish war, the Miracle on the Vistula and the1921 Treaty of Riga. In another case, it was a partial failure, because Stalin did not achieve his goals, but nevertheless, he managed to chop off a large piece of Finland, with Vyborg and Ladoga.

So these two wars unleashed for the reunification of the lost parts of the empire, they are similar. Of course, Russian-Japanese and Crimean wars are completely different matters, since we are talking about other states that have never been part of Russia. These two wars are similar.

In this case, you see, a dilemma will arise in the future. Putin, of course, would like (he already understood that he will not completely conquer Ukraine) to “Finlandize” Ukraine, to take away a significant occupied part of it, this is now about 20% of the territory, and make the rest a dependent regime, which was Finland after 1945, without the right to join blocks and so on. In the case of Poland in 1921, there was another option. This is a complete defeat, a peace treaty that has significantly pushed the Polish border to the east.

And, by the way, Belarus and Ukraine were created as the Union republics precisely thanks to this 1921 Treaty of Riga. Because the Poles, promising both Belarusians and Ukrainians that they would support their statehood, set a condition for Lenin that Belarus and Ukraine would become independent states, but in the sphere of influence of Russia. Lenin decided this in his own way - they became union republics of the USSR, in fact, having lost all statehood. But this was stipulated directly during the Riga negotiations and in the documents of the Peace of Riga.

The two options. Which of these options will be implemented depends on the result of the hostilities. There will be a “Miracle on the Dnieper” or a “Miracle in Donbas”, it does not matter, the outcome will be one. If there is no such miracle, but there is a breakthrough of the defense line, as there was a breakthrough of the Mannerheim line in 1940, then there will be a different outcome. Now everything is unpredictable, and the battlefield decides on it.

— Are there any other options for the development of events?

— There is a third option: the current regime in Russia will collapse due to a military defeat in Ukraine, under the pressure of sanctions and the discontent of their own people, who realize that Putin actually pushed them into a terrible adventure, bloody and unpromising. The society does not see it yet, since the people hope, especially stunned by Putin's propaganda, that Russia will win. But when they will see that there is no victory, and the cost of defeat is extremely high, then public discontent and regime change are possible.

Then, naturally, there will be a question of how to restore relations with the West. It will be necessary to make great concessions to the world community to do this with its main goal to ensure the security of the world from aggressive Russia, just as after 1945 the world did a number of actions that ensured its security from new German aggression.

— Will Russia remain within its borders or will it collapse?

— The fact is that when Napoleon lost, they talked about the fragmentation of France, they were going to divide it into seven states. Churchill offered to divide Germany and Austria into eight states after the defeat of Hitler. But neither in the first nor in the second case, no one agrees with it.

Eventually, both France and Germany remained integral states for one simple reason. Because a divided people always strives for reunification, it always wants to be united, like the people of Germany, like the people of Italy.

Any forcible division of a people is an investment for the huge potential of future aggression against those who divided them. This potential, as a rule, ends catastrophically: a new world war. There is no reason to do this.

Look, after the Second World War, not a single square centimeter of Germany, which was established by the Treaty of Versailles, was alienated by anyone in the West. Stalin did what he wanted in East Germany. Not a single square meter was taken from West Germany, the border remained the same as it was after 1920. Therefore, I see no reason for Russia to disintegrate.

— Do you see a chance for Belarus to break out if Putin's Russia loses?

— As for Belarus, it is annexed, as they say, to some extent because of Lukashenka, who, being an unpopular dictator who has turned away from most of the Belarusian people, clings to Putin to stay in power. It is obvious.

I think that if the Putin regime falls, then Lukashenka's, as they say, will not last long. After that, Belarus will become an independent country within its internationally recognized borders. The same, no one will take a square meter. I hope it will be a democratic country that will join the European community, maybe even NATO. And everything will be fine.

— What will happen to Lukashenka?

— You know, it's very hard to predict an individual future. I believe that he will suffer the fate of all dictators who sooner or later lose their power. I don't want to talk about different scenarios, because these are personal things. Let him pass, this Lukashenka. I think the most important thing for Belarus is to get rid of Lukashenka. God will judge Lukashenka's personal fate.

— Russia will change a lot. How do you assess the self-identification of Russians after democratization? How will they identify themselves? Belarusians remember the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and Ukrainians talk about Kievan Rus. What pages of history will free Russians remember?

— I think that historical reflections are also one of those things that are outdated. We must, of course, know our history well, but we are building not the past, but the future. In that romantic 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, right up to Hitler, everyone was digging into their history and saying that “they are building a thousand-year-old Reich,” that they are restoring this and that.

However, there is no need to restore anything - we need to build a future country. It is necessary to build a future democratic Russia, of course: a federal one, with greater rights not only for the territories, but also for the peoples that inhabit Russia.

Of course, you need to know your history and love it, but don't try, you know, to engage in a reconstruction of this or that period of Russian history. In fact, Putin is a kind of reenactor, who is trying to reconstruct the Soviet Union, the Russian Empire, and play in World War II, the Great Patriotic War, as he calls it. This must be avoided. France and England have no such ideas. No one in England is trying to reconstruct either the era of Queen Elizabeth I, or the Battle of Hastings, or the Empire of the early twentieth century with India and Africa, or anything else. Everyone lives and solves the problems of today. There are a lot of them today.

Think about tomorrow, but just know about yesterday. I would also advise Belarusians not to talk so much about the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. It was, it's great, it's interesting but look at neighbouring Lithuanians: they don't talk about it much, they mostly think about the European Union, NATO and the future construction of their state. It seems to me that the future Belarus, and the future Russia, and Ukraine will have to follow the same path. Otherwise, it is fruitless, you see, historical things transferred to politics are always dangerous, and they always evoke totalitarian, authoritarian overtones. God forbid that!

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