ISW: FSB Can Take Advantage Of Situation In Russia

Z propagandists are worried.

The storming of Makhachkala airport and other anti-Semitic riots and pogroms in Dagestan and the North Caucasus undermine the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to present Russia as a supposedly 'religiously tolerant' country. Some Russian security forces may take advantage of the situation, while "war correspondents" are already worried about the risk of the anti-Semitic riot in Dagestan turning into an internal "anti-Russian" riot.

This is how analysts at the Institute for the Study of War assess the events in Dagestan.

They note that the current anti-Semitic demonstrations in the Republic of Dagestan and other regions of the North Caucasus underline the aggravation of inter-ethnic and inter-religious tensions in Russia.

The Kremlin has not reacted quickly to the demonstrations and appears to have left the immediate response to the regional authorities. Officials such as Sergei Melikov, head of the Dagestan Republic, Rashid Temrezov, head of the Karachay-Cherkessian Republic, and Kazbek Kokov, head of the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, have attempted to do so. On 29 October, they called on the inhabitants of the North Caucasus to refrain from aggressive actions and to stop attempts to incite inter-ethnic discord. In addition, the North Caucasus Muslim Coordination Centre separately condemned anti-Semitic actions following the first demonstrations in the region on the evening of 28 October. Dagestan's Minister for National Policy Enrik Muslimov and Youth Minister Kamil Saidov later arrived at Makhachkala airport on 29 October to talk to the demonstrators, but were apparently unable to prevent them from storming the airport. Melikov later described the demonstration as a violation of the law, and the Main Department of the Interior Ministry of the North Caucasus Federal District warned that it was illegal to hold 'demonstrations' without prior permission and coordination.

The events in Dagestan undermine Moscow's efforts to portray Russia as a supposedly 'religiously tolerant country'. The Kremlin is likely to find it difficult to reassure voters that the situation is under control and to convince Jewish audiences that Jewish minorities can feel safe in Russia, ISW analysts said. Ovadya Isakov, spokesman for Russia's Chief Rabbinate in Dagestan, said on 29 October that hundreds of Jewish families in Dagestan should leave Dagestan and the Russian Federation altogether because "Russia is no salvation" because "there have been pogroms in Russia too". Meanwhile, just a few days ago, on 25 October, at a meeting with the leaders of several Russian religious organisations, in particular the leaders of the Jewish and Islamic faiths, Vladimir Putin declared the alleged "harmonious development of inter-ethnic relations based on harmony and mutual understanding between people of different ethnicities, traditions and beliefs" in Russia. ISW describes these latest Kremlin efforts as a Russian attempt to play on the issue of protecting religious minorities in order to win favour with Muslim and Jewish audiences against the backdrop of the war between Israel and Hamas, as well as to ease tensions caused by the growing ultra-nationalism of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Russian ultranationalist circles are already expressing concern that anti-Semitic demonstrations will spread from Dagestan and the North Caucasus to other parts of Russia. Some Russian ultranationalists have tried to shift the blame to the Ukrainian disinformation operation, but others have expressed concern that the anti-Semitic movement could spread and become a factor of internal destabilisation or "anti-Russian" activity in the Russian Federation. One Russian military blogger rhetorically asked whether "pogroms" should be expected in Moscow, and said that events in Dagestan could lead to a situation similar to the killings of ethnic Russians in Tajikistan and Chechnya in the 1990s. The ISW also expects that Russian ultranationalists may begin to sharply criticise the Russian authorities' response to the anti-Semitic riots in Dagestan, as several sources have already admonished the "weak" official response.

The exacerbation of ethno-religious tensions in Russia could be used by Alexander Bortnikov, the head of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), and Alexander Bastrykin, the head of Russia's Investigative Committee, to try to win back Vladimir Putin's favour, the ISW predicted. Russian "war correspondents" recall the failure of Putin's declared policy in 2012 to use migration to solve Russia's demographic problems.

At the same time, Russian bloggers complain about the lack of integration of migrants into Russian society. A leading war correspondent declared that "the only way to stop the migration plague is to write a 'Russian' isolationist programme for the indigenous population and migrants". In his view, only Putin "can stop everything and bring it all back". "For this to happen, someone very trustworthy like Bortnikov or Bastrykin must fly into his orbit and personally convince him of the need to change migration policy. Otherwise, everything will remain as it was and we [Russia] will face an internal war for subjectivity," the Russian blogger writes. ISW noted this reference to Bortnikov and Bastrykin, suggesting that they have now fallen out of Putin's inner circle, even though they are the people the dictator needs to address ethno-religious tensions in Russia related to Central Asian migrants.

ISW reminds us that the Kremlin tends to react slowly to events that exacerbate ethno-religious tensions in Russian society. This often only fuels a new cycle of such tensions, including Russian ultranationalists' anger at the Russian government's inaction, which further exacerbates ethno-religious conflicts. In the Russian media space, Bortnikov and Bastrykin may seek to present themselves as people capable of breaking this cycle, ISW believes.