Undesirable Russian Generals: Kremlin Leads Army To Defeat

That circle is closed.

Underestimating the enemy often leads to defeat. In almost the entire history of mankind, not a single army and not a single commander have been able to defeat the enemy with bragging. To defeat with a number of troops - yes. But can the dissemination of your own army be called a real "victory", even if the banner of victory remains in the hands of the last surviving warrior?

Will, focus and skill always win. That is, exactly what the modern Russian army does not have at all. This is not a dismissive underestimation of the criminal enemy at all. Well, how can the invaders have the will, if the focus of the so-called "special operation" is not clear to anyone and exists only in the foggy brains of the insane dictator? Their will is a purely mental function, which consists of the ability of an individual to consciously control the psyche and actions in the decision-making process to achieve goals. That circle is closed... No focus, no will...

As for skillfulness, everything here is simpler on the one hand, and on the other hand, it's much more difficult. Battle successes depend on each participant in the hostilities. Starting with a simple shooter or machine gunner, and ending with tactical and strategic command and control of troops at the level of generals. There are talented shooters and heaven-born pilots. There are privates, lieutenants, majors, colonels who see the whole picture at their level and can predict events and their possible consequences, have a tactical or even strategic vision. But the general course of hostilities does not really depend on their “vision”. Because they don't make final decisions. This is a power of the Russian generals, who, fortunately, are making trouble for the Russian army with their incompetence.

It was the incompetence of Russian generals that has become one of the key factors that seriously affect the effectiveness and combat effectiveness of the army of the Russian Federation over the past decades. Without qualified leadership and professional training of military leaders, any army becomes just "cannon fodder", the results of which depend solely on the amount of resources. Everything is fine with resources in Russia so far. Not to mention the leadership.

The modern Russian army has more than 1,300 generals of various ranks. The vast majority of them have long ceased to be only military (even if they once were), turning into representatives of a separate caste, which is as far from the military as the power of the Kremlin is from the Russian people as a whole. And it is these “complete” generals who are at the top levels of “military power”, dealing not with issues of increasing the combat readiness of the army, strategic analysis and planning, but only with the issues of their own enrichment and protection of “savings” by “blurring” the eyes of Commander-in-Chief Putin. In general, this is a familiar picture of the rotten and corrupt Russian society, where only involvement in a “caste” makes it possible for any success and “growth”.

The top generals of the Russian Federation in terms of rank and capabilities have long passed the age limit of 55 years and consist of those captain lieutenants who, during the collapse of the USSR, did not leave the army, realizing the futility of further service, but, having no abilities and talents for “civilian” life, continued to "slave it away". Was it patriotism? Maybe so, but for only a few of them. The vast majority of those who did not take their straps off are losers and alkies who would have been better off staying in the army than being on the sidelines of life without any chance of success in “civilian life”.

Even in this "general stratum" there are those to whom Yeltsin gave a high military rank during his reign, hoping to strengthen his own vertical of power in this way. There were 2,200 generals and admirals for 2.822 million military personnel of the Russian Federation at the beginning of 1992, and 2865 senior officers for 1.7 million soldiers in 1997.

The number of generals significantly decreased after Putin came to power and the Kremlin's increased attention to the Russian Armed Forces. However, this did not improve the quality of the generals. The main indicator of the "success" of the generals in the days of Shoigu was the brightness of paper presentations and the holding of parades or "tank biathlons" to demonstrate the "invincibility" of the Russian army. Billions of budgetary funds were spent for performances that did not reflect the true state of decline of the Russian Armed Forces at all.

Of course, in addition to the general foreman and rescuer Shoigu at the position of the Minister of Defenсe, there are Russian generals such as Gerasimov, who graduated from the Suvorov Military School and two more military academies. However, such “exceptions” should play “according to the rules” of the majority in the clan and elite apparatus of the Russian Armed Forces since it has been developing over decades.

The real threat to Ukraine is the younger generation of the leadership of the Russian Armed Forces. Those who went to military schools after the collapse of the USSR. 45-50-year-old generals who have already received combat experience and have their own professional military vision and their own opinion about the course of events at the front. At the beginning of Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine, 39 out of 166 commanders of Russian units, (23%) already had real combat experience, (journalistic investigation of the Proekt news publisher). 26 of them gained experience in Syria, where Russian troops mostly faced not regular army, but combat armed groups with light small arms without heavy war machinery. Another six commanders participated in the conflict in Donbas in 2014-2015, under conditions closer to the current military situation.

Perhaps this is not quite a sufficient combat experience compared to a full-scale war, where the enemy gives a brutal response to the invaders. Nevertheless, the “young” generals are no longer puppet actors, hung with anniversary medals and opportunistic orders.

Major General Popov is one of these “young” ones, the former commander of the 58th Army of the Russian Federation. He had a reputation as one of the fastest-growing commanders of the Russian Ground Forces. So, he decided to call a spade a spade in a report to the Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov about the real lack of weapons and munitions for counter-battery fighting, the "shell hunger", the need for rotation. They considered him to be an enemy because he declared the problem. There are no reasons for the leadership to let the truth in. After all, if there are no such truthful ones, you can wave reports with peace of mind and proudly declare that everything is fine. Therefore, the system gets rid of people who tell the truth, so as not to interfere with bravura reports upstairs.

The Russian MoD high command and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation can forgive defeats and failures. This does not interfere and is not the main threat to the clan of the generals and the system in general, unlike the reports on the real state of affairs. Sure, Popov's report did not surprise Gerasimov. But it is one thing to know, and quite another to speak openly about it. Therefore, Popov was removed from his post in a matter of hours and sent "at the disposal". It is already known that after the vacation he is serving an equivalent lieutenant general post of deputy commander of the Group of Forces in the Syrian Arab Republic. Out of sight, away from possible sharp statements and, God forbid, demarches like Prigozhin's performance raid on Moscow.

Speaking about "forgiveness". Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces S. Surovikin, who temporarily went missing after the Prigozhin's march, returned from vacation on July 17 and assumed his duties, in particular, he became the First Deputy Commander of the Northern Military District. No criminal case or reduction in rank and the like. He is not going to give excuses and interviews “where and why he disappeared”. The former commander of the 106th Traffic Police Department, V. Seliverstov, after being removed from his post for a conflict with the top leadership of the Russian MoD, is sent for full-time training at the Academy of the General Staff. There is a saying: "Bowed heads don't get chopped off."

Prigozhin is not a general, however, he is the first rebel at the Russian MoD and he moved to Belarus. 80% of the personnel of his PMC are already fighting in the ranks of the Ministry of Defence and other volunteer formations. About 10% were demobilized. The rest - just over 2,000 troops and seven persons from the former Council of Commanders are also in Belarus. The Chief [Prigozhin - Ed.] took them to work in a Belarusian legal entity belonging to him. So far, the new company provides only consulting and educational services to the Belarusian security forces. But Prigozhin hopes to return to Africa soon, using his reputation and personal acquaintances among the African leaders on a purely commercial "front".

General Liamin, who came to replace General Popov, is also from the "young ones with experience". But he is more promising for the clan, because, according to rumours, he understands the rules of the game very well and is not going to cross the line. He realizes his "place" and that is the necessary key skill of Putin’s generals. Strategic thinking, analytical skills, leadership, communication skills and the ability to make decisions in difficult situations are also needed, but only within the strictly defined framework of the behaviour of an individual "cog" in the general mechanism of corruption and dictatorship.

Putin has created a system of governing a vast country, which rests solely on total lies and forceful coercion. Any manifestations of not only actions, but even thoughts that run counter to pro-government trends, pose a threat to the very existence of such power. No matter how much you shout about the fact that “the army is separated from politics”, still the army is the largest component of the power structures, which is the main support of Putin's dictatorial power in Russia. And the authorities in the Kremlin cannot allow any “fermentation” within this force. Because then it's over. Defeats, deaths of hundreds of thousands of Russians are not a problem. The Kremlin will forgive. The country is huge and has a huge human resource. In place of one killed occupier, the authorities will by force overtake a hundred of the same mentally disfigured by propaganda sick criminals-executors.

But to have your own opinion, which will finally lead to the questions: “Why?”, “What for?”, "Who is responsible?” This is unacceptable for the Kremlin. After all, the answers are known to any more or less conscious Russians, not even generals. The fear of the real repetition of the Prigozhin’s March not in the form of performance, but a real military rebellion against the dictator and his supporters, forces them to destroy the manifestations of any independent “non-clan” understanding of the situation. Therefore, it is probably not worth expecting serious changes in the leadership of the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation under Putin's rule. The system will not withstand the load of an independent mind.

The Ukrainians sincerely support the corruption and unprofessionalism of the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Let it be. The Kremlin's problems are the joy of us! Let our generals be smart, but for Russians, let brains be a steadily disappearing rudiment...

Yuri Fedorenko, Obzrevatel