Erdogan Outplayed Putin

Few saw this coming.

Another extraordinary weekend, this time marking the end of Bashar al-Assad's 53-year rule.

Notably, few saw this coming — including Israel, whose efforts to weaken Iran and Hezbollah in recent months played a major role in Assad's eventual downfall. Israel viewed him as an enemy that could be described as “the devil you know”, fearing that something worse would fill the void left by the Syrian president's departure.

Israel is clearly not taking any chances, seizing additional territory adjacent to the Golan Heights in the coming days as an additional buffer zone, and conducting 70-plus bombing raids in conjunction with the United States to weaken Syria's remaining military capabilities, which are now in the hands of the rebels (the new government).

Most Syrians are celebrating the end of Assad’s brutal regime — images of prisoner releases reveal the human tragedy of the regime. People are now hoping for a better future — and that the various communities can come together in some kind of national unity government.

A quick glance at a map on the eve of the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) rebels’ latest offensive, however, reveals a patchwork of different ethnic groups and fighting forces – Alawites, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Syrian National Army (SNA), the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), HTS, ISIS, etc. Pick your acronym.

Many of them have spent as much time fighting each other as they have the Assad regime over the past decade, so it will be difficult to bring them all together to govern effectively. Add to that a host of malign external actors who now have a stake in the new Syria failing — Russia, Iran, Hezbollah, ISIS — and it’s going to be tough.

The US under Trump is also likely to take a back seat — as the man signaled over the weekend, and the weekend’s events make it more likely that the 1,000-plus US troops in Syria will soon be withdrawn. Not that the US has a track record of successful military intervention or nation-building in the region. Many will say, “Good riddance.”

Let’s hope that the void left by the US will be filled by less malign actors who understand the region better — including Turkey, the Gulf states, and Europe (Macron seems to think he understands the Levant, and might see it as a welcome distraction from his problems at home — not that he’s been much of a foreign affairs expert either).

It is encouraging that HTS leader Jolani, now likely to become Syria's leader, seems set to pursue a moderate and inclusive line under Turkish leadership (his emphasis on institutions over leaders makes current developments in some Western democracies look questionable) — although his past ties to al-Qaeda and Western designation as a terrorist are obvious concerns.

Here are my thoughts on the winners and losers:

First, in terms of global influence, Syria is now only a small oil producer, pumping out just 400,000 barrels a day, mostly for domestic consumption. The recent fighting has not affected production, and all sides have an interest in keeping the oil flowing so they can continue to earn dollars.

Some of the roughly 6 million Syrian refugees stranded abroad may now return home, which could ease social, economic and political problems in the host countries — including roughly 4 million refugees in Turkey and large numbers of Syrians in Lebanon, Jordan, etc. But note that while Assad’s opponents may return to the country, we may see another exodus of 2 million or so Alawites from Assad’s own community, and potential pressure on a similar number of Kurds in the north, depending on Turkey’s actions.

Turkey has benefited greatly from the events of the last few weeks, because although HTS was not seen as a Turkish proxy, it now appears to be behaving like one. Erdogan gave the green light to the HTS offensive, initially to force Assad to the negotiating table. But then he, like everyone else, was shocked by the melting away of the Syrian president’s forces, and then went with the flow, seeing that the country’s future was best secured without Assad. Now nothing happens in Syria without a nod from Turkey — Assad was evacuated to Moscow with Turkish help, and in Ankara last week I heard that Turkey had intervened to rescue several trapped Russian generals. Turkey has an interest in seeing the 4 million Syrian refugees it hosts return home (opposition forces are using them to fuel nationalist opposition to Erdogan) and in containing the power of the Syrian Kurdish forces (YPG), which have allied themselves with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey, in the north.

There has been talk for months of a Turkish military offensive in Syria (like the Kobane offensive a few years ago) to weaken the YPG — this could still happen, and it could create new refugee flows.

But now everyone should be in Ankara to talk about Syria — Erdogan holds most of the cards. Notably, if Trump wants to pull US troops out of Syria, he will likely need Turkey to cover their retreat and contain ISIS after they leave. This gives Erdogan leverage over Trump — an excuse for the latter to be nice to Turkey.

On the Kurdish issue, there is talk in Turkey of a new Kurdish peace process, which could potentially be facilitated by events in Syria. Peace with the Kurds would be a huge advantage for Turkey — there are big peace dividends to be had there.

As for Russia, this is a huge humiliation for Putin, who has talked a lot about never abandoning his allies. That is what he did with Yanukovych and now with Assad. The limits of Russia’s military power have now become obvious — it is not capable of waging several wars and is currently stuck in Ukraine.

Putin is struggling to hold on to such a valuable asset as the warm-water port of Tartus — and if he does keep it, he may have to make concessions to Turkey in other areas (gas loans, probably, given the recent sanctions against Gazprombank). Now Putin is entering peace talks on Ukraine from a position of weakness. Notably, while enjoying the fall of Assad, Trump arranged a friendly photo shoot with Macron and Zelensky in Paris and emphasized Russia’s weakness. I think developments in Syria make peace in Ukraine more likely — with Putin now weaker and Trump able to see the benefits of backing the good guys.

Iran — things are only getting worse here, with another proxy domino falling — Hezbollah, now Assad. Could Tehran be next? Could we see domestic forces rising again? The question is, what can Tehran do to stop the rot? Accelerate its nuclear program? Then there’s the specter of an Israeli-American strike. I wondered why Iran hadn’t resorted to a global terror campaign — it could go back to bombing and killing to try to change the dynamic.

The Gulf states are not exactly laurels, as MBS, MBZ, were working hard just a few months ago to get Assad back into the Arab League etc. They will be nervous about the HTS political Islam credentials, but now they will have to put their money where their mouth is to help fund the reconstruction of Syria and an inclusive, “secular” administration. Not sure US/Israeli airstrikes on rebel targets in Syria will help — better stop soon, or risk fueling anti-Western/anti-Israeli sentiment and emboldening the Islamists again. The Gulf states will probably look to Turkey for political and military leadership in Syria.

For Lebanon, Assad's fall could be seen as a positive, as it will further weaken Iran's supply routes to Hezbollah and perhaps force Hezbollah to cooperate in much-needed domestic political normalization, with attention now focused on the presidential vote on January 6. The new international focus on efforts to rebuild the Levant will undoubtedly pull Lebanon along with it, as will Syrian forces, provided that some stability and political reform are achieved in Syria itself.

Jordan/Egypt — strategically important until the situation in Syria, Lebanon and Gaza calms down. Things could still go wrong — imagine Jolani is killed and Turkey invades northern Syria to wipe out the YPG.

Israel, meanwhile, views the situation with some nervousness, as the situation in Syria could go either way. But the benefit of Hezbollah’s supply routes has diminished further. It is unclear where Gaza and the West Bank are heading, but the hope is that cutting Hezbollah’s supplies will ease the pressure in southern Lebanon. It will be interesting to see the new Syrian administration’s stance on Gaza — it will likely be similar to Turkey’s.

Timothy Ash, New Voice

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