ISW: Russia Recognises Its Helplessness

The occupiers simply cannot defend their oil depots.

Amid new Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil depots, Russian "war correspondents" have intensified complaints about the Russian government's inability to protect Russian infrastructure and repel such strikes. Meanwhile, there are signs that the Russian Federation is engaging in combat operations the units that have not yet been restored to the planned level.

This is the subject of a new brief from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).

ISW analysts have noticed a wave of complaints from Russian "war correspondents" and a number of officials about insufficient protection of critical infrastructure in Russia's rear areas, particularly in response to a Ukrainian drone strike on the oil depot near Tsimlyansk in Rostov region on July 13.

Russian sources have released footage showing two security guards armed with anti-drone rifles allegedly watching the Ukrainian UAV strike on the oil depot without even attempting to shoot down the drone. This provoked a storm of criticism among Russian "war correspondents" about the guards not trying or not having enough capability to defend the base. Russian sources claimed that Russian authorities actually tried to remove any responsibility for the Ukrainian UAV strikes by ordering Russian facilities to hire their own guards. Also "war correspondents" and other sources raised questions as to why the Russian government had not organised mobile firing groups similar to those protecting Ukraine from Russian "shaheds".

Dmitry Rogozin, the former head of Roscosmos (Russian Space Agency), responded to this criticism and said that the Rosgvardia does not have enough resources to set up defence posts at every critical facility in Russia because it is a structure whose main task is to protect Vladimir Putin's regime from internal threats and the most critical infrastructure. Instead, Rogozin proposed to create, train and equip specialised volunteer BARS (Russian Army Combat Reserve Force) units to provide protection for critical energy and transport infrastructure. The ISW reminds that Rogozin is in charge of several BARS units, in particular the BARS-10 battalion of the Tsar Wolves brigade. At that, the owners of Russian irregular formations have previously tried to use "threats from Russia" to appeal on the need to move their units from the frontline areas of Ukraine to protect the rear or border areas of Russia.

In addition, ISW analyses reports that the Russian military command is probably sending inadequately equipped units, which were probably intended to become the Russian operational reserve, to take part in combat operations. Perhaps the Russians had to make such a decision because of the limited capabilities of the Russian defence-industrial complex or because of an attempt to strengthen the current offensive operations in Ukraine, ISW believes.

In particular, Ukrainian military observer Konstantyn Mashovets said on July 13 that the Russian command intends to create the 27th Motorized Rifle Division (the 2nd Combined Arms Army of the Russian Central Military District) as an operational reserve of the Center Group of Forces (which controls Russian offensives in the Pokrovsk and Toretsk directions), which allegedly could be used in case the Ukrainian counteroffensive develops in these two directions.

At the same time, Mashovets said that the Russians have already redeployed some units from this 27th division (in particular, the 433rd motorised rifle regiment, manned by the depleted remnants of the 21st Motorised Rifle Brigade), to the north-west of Avdiivka before their full combat capability is restored. Similarly, the occupiers prematurely redeployed the 506th and 589th Motorised Rifle Regiments to the Toretsk direction even before they had reached the doctrinally required amount of armaments and equipment when restoring (to at least 87% of what is needed).

For their part, ISW analysts note that they first recorded a report of engaging units of the 27th Division near Avdiivka in April 2024 and near Toretsk in early July 2024. Mashovets' July 14 observation stating that these regiments were deployed for combat earlier than planned may indicate that the Russian military command has fallen behind the planned schedule of staffing and arming and has failed to bring these units to the target of 87%.

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