Really Critically Situation

Where are the Russians moving?

The critical situation in the Pokrovsk direction, which immediately requires systemic and balanced decisions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Over the past seven days, the enemy has advanced 6 km toward Myrnohrad-Pokrovsk. On a narrow front, the flanks are shot through, but they advanced.

The city of Myrnohrad is 14 km away. Just 14 km. Myrnohrad is in the zone of long-range artillery shelling. If we allow the enemy to enter Myrnohrad, they will get a zone of concentration and accumulation, and they will be able to attack Pokrovsk directly. The Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration is the last defence area in front of the Dnipropetrovsk region. The enemy is very close, the situation is critical, as the pace of the enemy's advance causes concern.

According to the commanders and fighters who defend the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area, the main problem in the conditions of intensive actions is primarily the management and organization of our actions.

The Russian command attacks, first of all, those brigades that have weak management and organization, poor manageability and coherence. That is, the enemy is not looking for and pushing through the most vulnerable defence lines, but the most vulnerable units and formations.

All of the commanders are doing their best.

But when a poorly controlled brigade is attacked, it cannot hold even a narrow line. Therefore, all marching replenishments and reserves go to strengthen the weak units that bear the worst losses. This prevents the creation of significant tactical reserves that would have time for additional training, could rotate fighters more often at zero, and equipped the second and third defence lines.

The lack of prepared positions for defence, reliable fortifications occupied by troops, does not allow to stop the enemy at any line. In fact, a continuous oncoming battle continues, digging in during the offensive.

The Russians are attacking in a routine and predictable way. The Russians carry out frontal attacks of small infantry groups with heavy losses, the enemy is given a very difficult advance, they also send everyone they can into battle, their companies are knocked out to the last soldier. The main axis of attack is along the railway. It is convenient to hide and disguise in landings. Everyone understands this, but it is not yet possible to turn this route into an impassable one by engineering means.

A critical problem is the lack of a single competent leadership for all the forces of drones and electronic warfare means, which continue to be used in a fragmented and inconsistent manner. Our own EW destroys a significant number of our own drones. Units of drones receive tasks without taking into account tactical and technical capabilities.

I cannot say that the Ukrainian command does not see and does not understand the criticality of the situation. A lot is being done, all of the commanders are doing their best. Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrsky pays personal attention.

But we are obviously lagging behind in the response, although the enemy's plans are obvious, well known to us, and intelligence gives a good idea of the next steps.

The direction lacks well-coordinated brigade headquarters, the logic of the use of troops and ammunition. Setting tasks for weak headquarters of poorly organized brigades is ignoring the real combat capability of the troops, this practice is sharply criticized in the troops. Brigade headquarters are a key element of combat capability.

Attempts to pull a bunch of units on a certain site do not have an effect if there is no single clear logic of application.

The situation requires focusing on the direction of at least one brigade with a high-quality headquarters, which will be able to manage the battle of heterogeneous units in the breakthrough area and support the reserves of the brigades that hold the flanks of the enemy's breakthrough to Myrnohrad.

Why do inexperienced brigade commanders and weak brigade headquarters continue to lead at a time when the command of the ground forces keeps dozens of experienced commanders in reserve who have a reputation deserved in the heavy battles of 2022-2023? How can we explain this? Why don't they solve the personnel issue, although everyone sees that this is the main problem, and although we have experienced personnel?

We need systematic solutions, we need to stop misleading ourselves, we need those measures that will be approved by the competent commanders of brigades and battalions in the area, and the command unit must be urgently strengthened.

Yuriy Butusov, Facebook

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