Ukrainian Armed Forces' Plan Becomes Clearer

What the latest events in the Kursk direction indicate.

The plan of the Ukrainian command in the Kursk operational direction, I think, has already become quite clear and obvious. Especially after the attacks on the bridges over the Seim River and the probable exit of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' advanced units to the western bank of this river in the Byrdyn-Tetkino section.

As for me, the task is to take south of the Seim River in the section from Alekseyevka to the Spalnoye-Gir'i line in the Kursk region of the Russian Federation under full control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

As far as I understand, as of yesterday evening, the immediate task in this regard was defined as the elimination of the “Tetkino advance”. Considering the fact that the Ukrainian Armed Forces' advanced units have already reached the Komarovka-Novoivanovka line (approximately) from the east, this does not seem so unrealistic.

Now regarding the reaction of the Russian command to the events in the Kursk operational direction.

Apparently, it was decided to “hold on to the last” (as expected), that is, at the moment, the enemy's “North” group of forces has been ordered to “find internal reserves”, to scatter personnel among various caches (including the former Koenigsberg and “polar units”), but to deploy at least 5-6 more formations of the “battalion” level in combat-ready condition in key directions. The only thing that the senior “comrades” agreed to was to return to the “North” group its regular forces and assets, that is, units and formations that are permanently part of the “Leningrad Military District”.

For example, units of the 200th separate motorized rifle brigade are already being recorded in the rear of the “Kursk” group, and as far as I understand, the 80th separate motorized rifle brigade will also soon pull up.

The first from the Kramatorsk direction, the second from the Dnipro direction. Both are part of the 14th Army Corps (AK).

In general, these are those 5-6 battalions, but this is if these brigades reach Kursk in a sturdy state.

However, the enemy's real need for forces and means in this direction is much greater, this is obvious. The operational density of troops that the Russian command has in the Kursk operational direction does not yet allow it to completely slow down the movement of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

No norms and standards are maintained by the Russians in this regard. They are capable of blocking the main transport hubs, directions, but they cannot properly solve the problem (stop the Ukrainian Armed Forces).

If we distract ourselves from professional terminology, then let's say this: for now, the Russians have a “focal defense” in this direction (thanks to which the advanced mobile groups and units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces find gaps in the enemy's defense and advance on the flanks and rear of the enemy), although they are trying to build it up and make it continuous. In this sense, the “5-6 battalions” I mentioned will not fundamentally resolve the issue. Sooner or later, the enemy command will have to think about larger reserves.

Moreover, the Russian command, in its characteristic style, is introducing soldiers into battle, as the military say, “on the fly”. I described it in detail back during the Balakleya offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, so I will not repeat myself. Those broken and burned Russian columns near Rylsk and Korenevo are a direct consequence of the management (“driving of troops”) demonstrated by the command of the “North” group of forces.

Thus, it becomes obvious that the regrouping of a certain set of troops (forces) of the enemy's “North” group from the Vovchansk direction (units and subdivisions of the 11th and 44th Army Corps) did not solve the problem. The enemy has not yet managed to stop the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

At the same time, the Russian General Staff is in no hurry to use the bulk of its reserves as plumbing tow in the Kursk operational direction. Well, actually, no one expected that ignoramuses would serve there, after all, they wear fashionable striped pants and beautiful epaulettes there for a reason.

Some of them even expressed a “daring idea” at certain meetings (which almost followed one after another), and not to copy the Ukrainian Armed Forces and prepare, so to speak, their “asymmetric response” in an unexpected place for them?

The problem is only that this response, just like the plumbing work in the Kursk region, will require another, and serious, batch of forces and resources.

The question is: where to get them quickly and in sufficient quantities? Mobilization will no longer save (because it requires the expenditure of the main resource, which Putin has almost no left — time).

So, in a strategic sense, the military-political leadership of the Russian Federation (this is what we call the collective of psychopathic Chekists who have seized the Kremlin), in the context of the current course of the war, is faced with several, let's say, “issues”:

“Leaks” that threaten to turn into a real flood in the Kursk region need to be plumbed somehow;

Pokrovsk and Toretsk also “must be taken” (but they haven't even crawled to the former yet). Abandoning these “offensive ambitions” for the sake of plumbing work in the Kursk region will mean the same thing as last year's “offensive” meant for the Armed Forces of Ukraine;

Obviously, neither the Armed Forces of Ukraine, nor Ukraine in general will surrender or fall “this year”. Meanwhile, within the Russian Federation itself, there have been quite significant and quite unpleasant “alarm bells” in the financial and economic sphere (it may happen that something will start to be noticeably lacking in the next annual cycle);

Probably, the Kremlin is now frantically calculating the consequences of continuing the mobilization deployment of the Russian Armed Forces. But these consequences, even now, are completely unpredictable — from the economy (including the “wild growth” of the military-industrial complex), which is already suffering from a shortage of skilled labor, in conditions of semi-isolation, to the socio-political sphere or interethnic relations.

And all this must be resolved not just simultaneously, but in a very short time. Moreover, this requires a whole bunch of money, resources, etc. And most importantly, people. You see, if they start raking out all sorts of unsuitable and reserved people from the entire “terrible” mobilization resource of the Russian Federation, the Kremlin will, of course, find someone to put into service, and quite a few. But, as always, there are nuances. And the main one is: who said that Ukraine will “quietly observe” the Kremlin’s attempts to “solve its current and future problems”?

As for me, the main gifts are usually prepared for Christmas.

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