The Great "battle For Moldova"

There are several possible scenarios.

Parliamentary elections on September 28, 2025 in Moldova are seen by local pro-European politicians as a decisive battle for the country's future.

Prime Minister Dorin Recean warns: against the background of the current hybrid confrontation between Russia and Europe, voting could become a battlefield. He says that in past elections there have been significant attempts at vote rigging, and this year the risk is even higher, as Moscow-oriented structures see vote manipulation as a path to victory.

The elections are taking place against a backdrop of increased pressure on Moldova. Over the past year, Recean and Sandu's team has pushed forward reforms aimed at rapprochement with the EU, and European integration has come to the point of negotiating the country's accession to the Union, but this course is meeting stiff resistance from the pro-Russian opposition.

Two main forces stand out in the electoral "layout": the ruling PAS led by Sandu (promising continued reforms, European aid and the preservation of visa-free travel) and the united "Patriotic Bloc" of pro-Russian parties. The bloc includes associates of Ilan Shor and other populists previously restricted from participating because of ties to Moscow.

United by slogans of "traditional values" and anti-corruption rhetoric against PAS, they declare their intention to bring back a "Russia-friendly" government and roll back European integration.

With this background, the main campaign themes have been energy, inflation and social payments. PAS insists that a victory by pro-Russian forces will lead to an energy blockade, the stoppage of infrastructure projects and social benefits, and ultimately to the loss of visa-free travel and EU membership prospects. Their opponents promise "peace with Russia" and a tough fight against "Western values".

The parties declare commitment to fair elections, but tensions are high.

Although Moldova is not a party to the war in Ukraine, it is in fact on the front line of the hybrid confrontation. Russia uses a full range of soft and hard instruments: information operations, financial schemes, intimidation. Disinformation networks are active on social networks and messengers, replicating anti-Western narratives. Investigations indicate that pro-Russian forces hire bloggers and network "farms" to create information waves. Hundreds of TikTok and Facebook accounts have published thousands of videos and posts since the beginning of 2025, promoting theses about allegedly inevitable falsifications and absurd conspiracy theories about "European integration." Moldovan citizens are told stories that joining the EU will mean that their land will be taken away, churches will be closed, and definitions of "parent one" and "parent two" will be introduced, destroying the family as an institution of society.

The diaspora is particularly vulnerable. According to the Moldovan president, the diaspora is under unprecedented pressure: bribery attempts, a surge of fake accounts coordinating anti-European messages and discrediting reforms. In addition, church and security channels are being utilized. The involvement of individual clerics in spreading propaganda in rural communities has been reported, as well as networks of bots masquerading as foreign media. Moldova is also vulnerable because of Transnistria. A region that the central government does not control.

In parallel, the West is mobilizing diplomatic and technical resources to prevent a revenge of pro-Russian forces. EU leaders regularly reaffirm their support for Moldova's sovereignty. Together with Chisinau, mechanisms for monitoring disinformation have been built.

If we talk about possible scenarios, there are several of them.

Pro-European coalition. It is likely that PAS will retain influence in parliament, but may not get an absolute majority and will be forced to look for partners. Negotiations are possible with moderate forces. For example, with Renato Usatii's Our Party (who, however, before the election stated that he was not going to join either the pro-European or pro-Russian coalition) or with the formally pro-European bloc Alternative. Such a coalition would continue the course of EU and security consolidation, but without monolithic control it would be fragile. The opposition could block decisions, provoking political crises and the risk of early elections.

Pro-Russian majority. Less likely, but quite possible: the Patriotic Bloc could gather a majority with the support of some moderates, forming a coalition loyal to Moscow. Moldova would then accelerate its turn toward Russia: it would curtail preparations for EU membership, restore former economic ties, and reduce pressure on Kremlin-connected oligarchs. Foreign policy implications include cooler relations with the EU and NATO and a growing military threat to the region, given the Transnistria factor. Although the pro-Russian forces will not be able to change the constitution, they will be able to make a significant tactical turnaround.

Party "pat" or protracted crisis. It is possible that neither PAS nor the pro-Russian bloc will gain 51 mandates, and that the various potential partners of the main players will be unable to form a solid majority. Difficult coalition negotiations will ensue, and short-lived governments or repeated elections are likely. The economy and reforms risk being in limbo. A key condition for the legitimacy of the result will be the transparency of the vote count. Any perception of non-transparency will increase information attacks and social tensions.

The outcome of the vote will have a tangible impact on its neighbors. Moldova borders Ukraine, and stability or chaos in Chisinau directly affects the security of our region. The success of the European course will facilitate cooperation in energy and infrastructure, strengthen resilience to external pressures, and create a window for EU investment and assistance. A U-turn toward Moscow, by contrast, will complicate regional coordination, increase risks in Ukraine's southwest, and strengthen Transnistria's role as a point of vulnerability.

For Ukraine, this is all important for several reasons. First, Moldova can be used as a springboard for hybrid attacks on Ukraine if a pro-Russian government emerges there. Secondly, Moldova is Ukraine's main partner in European integration, after Georgia, which has already become pro-Russian, "fell away". Moldova's "falling away" may lead to the fact that European integration in the region will be significantly slowed down.

Petr Oleshchuk, Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor of Taras Shevchenko National University, specially for Charter97.org.

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