Grigorij Mesežnikov: Not Even In Soviet Times Was Such A Thing Ever Seen

Putin is a rat that has cornered itself.

Why did Putin decide to start mobilization? Should we take the Kremlin's claims about a nuclear strike seriously? What can protests in the Russian Federation lead to?

Slovak political scientist and president of the Institute for Public Affairs (IVO, Bratislava) Grigorij Mesežnikov answers questions from Charter97.org.

— Why did Putin decide to start mobilization? Did the people who stood for the war to the end win?

— He decided to mobilize, because he no longer had a way out. In fact, he is a rat that has cornered itself. The Russian army is losing, and if such dynamics continue, then Ukraine could liberate a significant part of the territory that was captured by Russia by the end of the year. In general, even the prospect of the liberation of Donbas and Crimea is becoming a reality.

It is difficult to talk about the war party. I am not an insider, but I think that Putin himself belongs to it. Who is even more radical among them? That is, what he does is already beyond the boundaries of any reasonable actions. Of course, this is primarily Russian aggression against Ukraine, but at the same time he threatens the West with a nuclear war. Not even in Soviet times was such a thing ever seen.

— Should we take the Kremlin's claims about a nuclear strike seriously?

— Some people think it's a bluff, but he says it's not. I think that in relation to politicians like Putin, one must adhere to the presumption of sincerity. It lies in the fact that we must reckon with the option that seems to us a bluff, but in fact, the politician can really do it. I am not an expert on nuclear war and theories of mutual deterrence, and assured destruction, but I am following this discussion. It has some pretty disturbing aspects.

If we paraphrase the theses of some experts, the Soviet leadership adhered to the doctrine of mutual destruction and, in fact, avoided such situations that could lead to nuclear war. But the Russian leadership overestimated this and believes that it is possible to win a nuclear war, depending on the striking scale, some kind of limited strike, the use of tactical weapons, and so on. But the Russian leadership overestimated this and believes that it is possible to win a nuclear war, depending on the striking scale, some kind of limited strike, the use of tactical weapons, and so on. This, of course, is very disturbing.

— What does Kadyrov's refusal to mobilize in Chechnya mean?

— I think that this is the fear of losing the power that helps him at the local level to maintain the unlimited power that he has. In fact, he is a sultan, so to speak. Perhaps he has more power in Chechnya than Putin has in all of Russia, and it is clear that this power rests on bayonets. I don’t know if is it true, but there is information that his soldiers were not distinguished by any great heroism in the battles in Ukraine, that they rather robbed, raped, and served as retreat blocking detachments. If this is true, then this further encourages Kadyrov not to send them there, because they can simply be killed there.

He probably wants to have them at home as a certain guarantee of his power, in order to be able in case of some unforeseen situations that may occur in Russia (although I am a sceptic and do not see what could currently lead to the fall of the Kremlin regime), together with his Praetorian Guard, to resist these developments. Perhaps even to resist some external attack, although it is difficult to imagine who would want to attack him.

— Is it possible that Putin at some point will force Lukashenka to mobilize and send Belarusians to this war?

— In this matter, I would like to refer to Yuri Felshtinsky, whom I consider a highly qualified specialist. He believes that Putin needs Lukashenka as the head of an independent state so that there is no annexation at the present time. Then, if a limited nuclear war is unleashed, if missiles are launched from the territory of Belarus, then the answer will be directed against Belarus, and not against Russia. And if he annexed Belarus, then there could have been a blow against Russia itself.

This creates certain benefits for Lukashenka, from his point of view. Knowing that Putin is not interested in annexation now, he thinks he will keep his power in the country. This is a very shortsighted position, and in the long run, it will hurt Belarus no less than annexation.

If Putin puts too much pressure on Lukashenka, then certain disagreements may arise between them. Lukashenka will demonstrate loyalty, and provide everything that is possible: airfields, territory, etc. But it seems to me that he will still try to evade sending his troops to Ukraine. By the way, this is also partly due to what we discussed about Kadyrov, that this is his hope to retain power. Another question is whether the Russian troops will be able to support and protect him like the local Praetorian Guard, people he knows.

— What awaits the Lukashenka regime if the Kremlin is not helped by mobilization and Putin is forced to make certain concessions?

— What awaits the Lukashenka regime if mobilization does not help the Kremlin and Putin is forced to make certain concessions? Of course, one can theoretically imagine that Russia would sign something like this, but it will be without Putin, it will be someone else, another group that will take his place. It's impossible to do it with him. If you look at all the agreements signed by Putin, they were unfavourable to the opposite side. The Minsk agreements for example, when he benefited because of his advantage. He really could kill Ukrainians, destroy the Ukrainian army, and so on. Angela Merkel and Francois Hollande contributed to this agreement, and it did not function at all later.

What could be the consequences for Lukashenka? If the power corporation that is now in Moscow weakens and loses some of its leading representatives, including Putin, then support for Lukashenka will also weaken. We have a strange interdependence between Putin and Lukashenka in this case. Lukashenka is still afraid of Putin, but without the support of the Kremlin, his regime will not survive.

If, for any reason, Putin is forced to leave, something happens to him, then the new Russian government will have to demonstrate a new attitude towards both Ukraine and Belarus. This will be an opportunity for them to show themselves to the West that they are different. The new power will have to refuse aggressive actions concerning Ukraine. And then it will demonstrate its commitment to the idea of preserving the independence of neighbouring states, that they no longer have such aggressive encroachments, that they do not want to annex Belarus, and so on.

I again proceed from the lessons of history. When Stalin died, that gang, those people who were equally responsible for all the crimes of his regime, tried to demonstrate to the West their commitment to democracy, to peace, to all sorts of principles that they had never observed before. Lavrentiy Beria even offered to accept the Soviet Union into NATO.

Any change in Moscow that would mean a weakening of its power, especially Putin's departure, would weaken Lukashenka as well. Therefore, he is interested in Putin's support, but he also wants to maintain his power. The realisation in the current situation is a problem, of course, for Lukashenka, that is why he rushes about. First, he promises something to Putin, then he makes strange statements, but he does not send troops yet, although he provides territory and infrastructure for the attack on Ukraine. This means direct responsibility for all the crimes committed by the Russian army there.

— The unrest began due to the announced mobilization in some of the cities of the Russian Federation. What are the consequences, should we expect more serious protests?

— It is an unpleasant fact for the regime, but I am rather sceptical in this respect. Actions of a rather radical, I would even say violent nature, this is what can lead to real changes and at least a partial correction of what concerns this mobilization. Because simply walking the streets (it is clear that this is also civil courage) and chanting the “No War” slogans in no way affects the policy of the state, and even more so the strong position of this powerful corporation.

There must be some radical decisive action of the type that in 2014 led to the overthrow of Yanukovych in Ukraine. It is clear that his regime was far less repressive than the current Putin's, but there is simply no other possibility. That is, all this is still at the level of individual survival strategies and an attempt to avoid mobilization in this way. As for the weakening of power, I think that this does not influence it a lot.

So much was said that Putin would not dare to the mobilization, because it would bring some kind of social tension, that this could lead to protests. Now, this is happening little by little, but it seems to me that the Kremlin, unfortunately, will cope with all this. All the repressive mechanisms and weapons are under his control, and those who protest have nothing at all. Again, this is just an individual survival strategy: escape, avoid the mobilization, hide, and maybe even choose jail instead of being killed right away. Can the regime weaken from this?

— Do you mean that peaceful protests in our conditions will no longer work?

— We discussed this issue in Slovakia when really amazing events took place in Belarus in 2020. My position was that I have no right to interfere in this discussion with some of my own advice to Belarusians, Belarusians themselves should figure this out. In the end, it turned out that the regime survived. So, I believe that it is still necessary to analyze not only the consequences of the events but also the reasons.

This is a general position: if you have a regime that, firstly, is illegitimate, and secondly, uses force and violence, repression, it is not going to cede power to anyone, then how can it be eliminated in some peaceful way? It seems to me that this is impossible.

Again, I do not want this to sound like a call for any specific action in any case. But based on what is happening in the world, taking into account historical experience, we can conclude that such regimes can be eliminated either by force from within, or in the event of a military defeat.

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