The Turning Point

Why does Russia need a war in the Middle East?

At the turn of the 2000-2010s, it seemed that Russia abandoned the USSR’s traditional support for its Palestinian, Lebanese and Syrian friends. Both under Yeltsin and under Putin — up to a certain point — the Russian course in the Middle East was pro-Israeli. Now Russia is once again supporting Israel's enemies. Why?

“Breach of agreements”

The turning point was 2007, Vladimir Putin’s Munich speech. Then for the first time he clearly stated that Russia was not ready to be content with the role of a peripheral state or even a regional superpower. According to Putin, Western partners did not keep the agreements reached first with Gorbachev and then with Yeltsin that the new Russia would control the “natural zone of its influence,” that is, the territory of the former USSR with the exception of the Baltic states. The expansion of NATO to the east and negotiations with Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova on their inclusion in the European Union were perceived by Putin as a violation of the rules of the game. This did not suit Moscow.

But you can look even further back: to 2001. The new President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, then still conventionally a moderate, pro-Western liberal, saw himself as the president of one of the European countries, a member of the “Western club of leaders.” After September 11, 2001, Putin met the United States halfway. He repeatedly reminded at the Valdai Forum, in interviews, and at meetings with foreign leaders that he made every effort to create partnerships with the United States. He supported the US anti-terrorism operation in Afghanistan and agreed to use his authority to persuade the heads of state of post-Soviet Central Asia to cooperate with the US. The American army was given territory for military bases and logistics centers.

It was assumed that this was a temporary measure until the end of the operation against al-Qaeda. However, even after the end of the operation, many military bases were not evacuated. Western troops, advisers, consultants came to the region to stay in it. From Putin's point of view, this was a violation of the agreements.

Then, at the Munich Security Conference, we heard for the first time that Moscow was dissatisfied with the existing level of partnership with Western countries, and that Russia had no choice but to insist on its priorities and rights, as they were then seen from the Kremlin.

No sitting on two chairs

Then it became clear that the Western idea had not taken root in Russian society itself. The country failed (if they even tried) to build one or another Western model — neither a free federation of ethno-national entities guaranteeing the rights of ethnic, religious, cultural and other minorities, nor a civil nation. All that remained was to return to the imperial idea. But the empire exists as long as it grows and strengthens. When it stops growing, people stop listening to it, and this is the beginning of its decay. We know what happened next. There was the Georgian war, which Putin absolutely got away with. And after this, almost all the rules began to be changed unilaterally. Including in the Middle East.

For many years in this region, the Kremlin tried to maintain conditional neutrality and take the position of an honest broker who can talk with Sunnis, Shiites, Iran, Turkey, Fatah, and Hamas, and at the same time with Israel. This was important for them: modern Russia is not the powerful Soviet Union, it cannot stand in the Middle East on one Arab leg. For a long time it needed a second one — an Israeli one.

Even when Putin began to build a new anti-Western bloc, he tried to sit on these two chairs. In Moscow, at a fairly high level in those days, one could often hear that Russia had two closest allies in the Middle East: Iran and Israel. In light of many years of tension between the two countries, this was received with considerable surprise in Jerusalem. But as long as there were no serious disagreements between Israel and Russia (except for Syria), the existing discrepancies were put outside the brackets of relations. Inside these brackets there was a lot of space for politics, diplomacy and trade.

And then a disaster happened on October 7, 2023. Putin officially condemned the Hamas attack, but at the same time supported Hamas rather than Israel. A new big Middle Eastern war has begun. For Putin, this was an excellent opportunity to once again say that the long-term American strategy in the region was a complete failure.

Picture without Russia

The events of October 7 and their consequences turned out to be another winning moment for Putin: if not for the Hamas attack, we would now be watching the king or crown prince of Saudi Arabia, the Israeli prime minister and the US president shaking hands on the White House lawn, whereafter signing an agreement establishing full-fledged diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Further, other countries from the moderate countries of the Saudi bloc would begin to join this agreement. And this would effectively end the hundred-year-old Arab-Israeli conflict. Non-Arab Muslim countries would follow them — Pakistan, or, for example, Malaysia. Well, the largest country with a Muslim population is Indonesia. Everything would have been approximately the same if not for October 7th. Russia had no place in this picture.

But what happened happened. The Middle East conflict has not gone away; it has changed its character. From the Arab-Israeli conflict it has become a conflict between a local version of the global North and the global South. The Global North is a club of Western democracies led by the United States, to which Israel belongs. On its periphery are pro-American Sunni regimes. And on the opposite side is the Iranian bloc as a representative of the global South, which includes, in particular, Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait. There are also “countries with reduced subjectivity” — Iraq (in fact, most of it becomes a province of Iran), Syria (the spheres of influence there are divided by Iran, Turkey, Russia and partly the United States).

Real partners

Israel is not involved in the Syrian story, except that agreements were reached between Israel and Russia after the appearance of Russian military space forces and special forces there to coordinate actions. Israel does not touch Russian troops and does not test the Russian air defense system, which would be quite painful for the Kremlin, but it warns of its intentions to strike Iranian proxies, and the Russian command does not interfere with this.

Russia sets the tone in Syria, but Iran does so to a greater extent. In fact, its branch is the Houthis — this is one of the quasi-states that do not have state status and are controlled by terrorist groups. They are supported and controlled by Tehran. The Houthis have created such a quasi-state in North Yemen. Russia has a very moderate presence there, as in the Gaza Strip.

Moscow was not always delighted with the size of the dividends it received from saving the Assad regime. In gratitude, he gave territory for the creation of Russian military bases. But as soon as the Russians solve a certain problem and liberate the territory from the Islamic State, the Iranian flag appears there. Russia seems to be on the sidelines, and this irritates it.

But Russia does not prevent this. Iran and Russia need each other. These are partners. And after February 24, 2022, and especially after October 7, 2023, they became strategic partners. This is parity of interests. Iran needs Russia as a partner in its nuclear program and for solving geopolitical problems. Russia needs Iranian drones on the Ukrainian front. Iran supplies Moscow with weapons, ammunition, and aircraft engines — things that Russia now cannot obtain on the Western market.

The Kremlin is using its allies in the South Caucasus (including Armenia) to secure supplies of essential equipment and dual-use technologies needed to replace failing systems previously purchased in the West. In addition, Russia sees itself as more than just part of the global South. It competes for leadership in this bloc with China and India. It needs powerful allies in the region, and Iran is the strongest of them.

World War III

Russia has many goals in the Middle East. It is unlikely that Russia participated in the development of the terrorist operation carried out quite effectively by Hamas. Indeed, Hamas's military wing is not qualified to plan such an operation. There were advisers and partners, primarily from Iran. Various rumors are circulating in the information community that there was supposedly a certain group of experts from the “great northern empire”, but there is no factual evidence of this yet.

In Gaza, ammunition for Kalashnikov assault rifles is produced under license. Hamas uses Russian exchanges to launder money. But all this is indirect evidence of possible connections. We cannot prove with evidence that Russia stands behind the Hamas attack on Israel. But in any case, Russia took full advantage of the situation. It demonstrated the effect of its presence in the region and gained image due to the failed agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Publicly, Israel is not changing its relationship with Russia. It directly supported Ukraine — both then-Israeli prime ministers condemned the Russian invasion. Moscow didn't like this. But no one is interested in breaking off relations and moving on to confrontation. Russia is strong. The Israeli military-political establishment believes that Russia has enough resources left in the Middle East to set our region on fire. Israel absolutely does not want to get another front in addition to the four on which it is de facto fighting. Israel has not joined the economic boycott of Russia, but it also does not allow its territory, banks and trading networks to be used to circumvent Western sanctions.

In fact, the third world war is already underway in the Middle East. While in Israel, it is impossible not to notice this. It combines a proxy war, direct clashes, a very difficult diplomatic conflict, and testing of new types of weapons. This is a big war, where everyone fights with everyone and at the same time everyone communicates with everyone. Countries that are at war with each other still maintain diplomatic relations: this was unthinkable in the 20th century. This is what a world war in the postmodern era looks like.

Ze'ev Hanin, The Moscow Times