Russia's Shortage Of Soldiers Reaches Unprecedented Proportions

And this is no coincidence.

Judging by everything I read and see, the scale of the shortage of people at the front in the Russian army has reached some previously unseen proportions.

I will try to formulate the main considerations — this is a thesis extract from a thousand z-texts that I have read over the past month. Traditional clarification: everything I write about is information from pro-war channels, if there is my own assessment or my opinion somewhere, I will mention it separately. So.

In Russia, for the third time in a week, they have announced an increase in payments to volunteers and new contract soldiers. The z-authors themselves write that this is happening for a reason — people no longer go for the same big money. Pro-war authors are not sure that the new payments will help.

After Anastasia Kashevarova raised the issue of “undertreated wounded on crutches, without an eye, with serious injuries” being sent back to the front, many more military channels wrote about numerous similar cases. Moreover, over the past couple of weeks, this phenomenon has become so commonplace that they write about it casually as if it were something self-evident.

A process of, let's say, “reforming” individual units has begun at the front. For example, there is now a “Motorized Rifle Regiment of the Aerospace Forces”. I quote: “People are recruited from airfields. There are engineering and technical personnel, flight and lift personnel, and flight personnel are present. Armed personnel, radio operators, mechanics, engine and brake operators. Sergeants, warrant officers and officers. It seems there is even one navigator.” Another quote: “…in the navy, as soon as they can, they transfer contract soldiers to marine brigades. Up to the point of transforming the commandant's platoon into an assault platoon. Now here's a motorized rifle regiment from the VKS personnel. In addition, there are situational initiatives at the front. For example, take at least a few “unnecessary” signalmen to replenish the assault company. Transfer the RMO soldiers to the UAV platoon that is being formed, because there are no specialists under contract or mobilization. Form evacuation groups from the mortar battery — after the loss of materiel. Disband the sniper platoon of the sniper company in order to transfer personnel to the assault platoon. This is all routine, starting around December 2023 — the result of constant, without operational pauses for replenishment or preparation, “positional offensive”.

Losses. It is clear that this is not Bakhmut yet, but they write more and more about losses. And about terrible losses. Another quote: “For those who do not understand — there is no one to physically attack. The manpower is exhausted... The level of a number of tactical commanders is below the baseboard. When conducting an operation, these “father-commanders” do not prepare an evacuation group. Company commander of “Storm”. Logic: “Why? The lightly injured will get out themselves, and we do not pull out the heavily wounded ones.” .... in one of the static directions, the leadership made a “brilliant” decision .... not to take the “cargoes 200”, because this increases the statistics of losses. And for now, the “ownerless” ones lie, listed as alive or missing. It is allowed to take them out in parts, in doses, so that the statistics do not grow.” The losses can be judged not only by the texts of z-authors, but also by the videos published by Ukrainian channels. I understand that you hardly watch them, but, frankly, they are not even surprising, but simply dumbfounding. There have been many such videos in the last few days, they look more or less the same: an armored column is driving through a field. The entire field is under fire from Ukrainian artillery. FPV drones are in the air. The column is being burned. Sometimes entirely, sometimes someone manages to escape. Then the drones finish off the scattered infantry, which are trying to hide anywhere — but there is nowhere to hide. The third year of war. Even the dumbest frog in the farthest swamp knows about drones, but the equipment still moves across the fields without cover. Why? Because the commanders have orders to advance — so they advance.

And sometimes, for example, in the Pokrovske area, an infantry column moves like that. Without anything. With predictable results.

Usually at this point I am asked the question: if everything is so bad and there are not enough people, then why does the Russian army take one city/village/forester's hut after another? The answer is not very complicated.

Firstly, quite often the “captured settlement” is a village or city in which all the buildings are so destroyed that they can no longer be defended. Secondly, as I wrote above — they were ordered to advance and they are advancing. Without regard for losses.

But the further they advance and the more territory they capture “with excessive losses” and “meat assaults”, the fewer there are those who feel the need to go further forward. And they either try to buy them with huge amounts of money, or they drag the cripples to the front, assemble motorized riflemen from aviators, and so on.

That is, the question is not so much about advancement, but about the price per hundred meters and the possibility of continuing to advance with such a rate of losses. The z-authors have a simple answer to the question — a second wave of mobilization. But it seems that they themselves do not really believe in this.

Ivan Filippov, Facebook

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