"The Russian Army Is Catastrophically Depleted."
2- 4.09.2025, 11:35
- 5,492
What are the main reasons for the failure of Putin's summer offensive?
This is what Charter97.org talked with Ukrainian military and political observer of the "Information Resistance" group Alexander Kovalenko:
- The Russian army is no longer an army of the model of 2024, 2023, much less 2022. It is significantly depleted. Now it fights mainly with human resources, the infantry component. There is a total shortage of tanks and armored fighting vehicles in the units. There is already a shortage of artillery. This is all a consequence of the colossal losses in the actual fourth year of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
When we say that this war has changed a lot because it has become a drone war, this is partly true. But UAVs stagnate warfare. When it comes to offensive, all-out offensive operations, classic offensive assets are immediately needed. Experiencing a colossal deficit of classical means when conducting all-arms offensive operations, the Russian army showed how insignificant its results were.
For example, during the fall campaign of 2024 - September, October, November - the captured territories amounted to almost 1800 square kilometers. I should note that the fall period is very difficult for offensive campaigns: rainy season, thaw, difficulties in moving equipment. Nevertheless, more territories were captured then.
In 2022, when the full-scale invasion of Ukraine was just beginning, the captured territories in the first months and until the end of 2022 amounted to about 64 thousand square kilometers. We see a big difference.
Now the Russian army is catastrophically depleted. And even though it seems to have 700,000 personnel, these forces are simply not enough to carry out classic all-arms offensive campaigns.