“Front Poured”: Russian Army Is Ready To Flee From Kherson

The Ukrainian military is successfully using rolling artillery barrage tactics.

Yesterday, events began that could have been predicted long ago, and Oleksiy Arestovych was the one who predicted it: the Russian front near Kherson "poured".

Ukrainian troops did not launch a large-scale offensive. This is important to understand. Apparently, they did not have such a task.

They just treated the Russian troops to the same medicine that Putin treated Volnovakha, Mariupol and Bakhmut: a continuous barrage of fire, the basis of which was the most ordinary, only American "Grads": the M270 MLRS, but not with expensive accurate M31 missiles that carried 70 km away are Russian depots, and with the M26, which were used back in 1991 in Iraq. These are obsolete, inaccurate missiles that the United States decommissioned and even destroyed in 2018. They hit at 15-32 km, and this is the exact analogue of the Russian "Grad".

“The MLRS with M26 missiles, which the Americans recently supplied, and the aircraft delivered a powerful fire strike on Russian positions near Kherson,” says reserve colonel, military pilot Roman Svitan. — As a result, in some places the troops simply fled from the first line. The cascading collapse of the front (that is, when the lines of defence fall one after another - the first, second, third - ed.) did not happen, but the front "poured".

This was to be expected: no matter how events unfold in the coming days, the strategic position of Russian troops near Kherson is hopeless.

It was the result of a creeping offensive by Ukrainian troops near Kherson. Without using rolling artillery barrage tactics (the tactics were different then), Ukrainian troops infiltrated in small groups through a loose front, while Russian troops sometimes retreated. Military expert Oleh Zhdanov, a reserve colonel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, a former employee of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, spoke more than once about situations when Ukrainian secret subversive groups, which had the only task of reconnaissance of the situation, suddenly discovered that the enemy preferred to leave their positions.

This creeping offensive allowed Ukraine to occupy bridgeheads and gave the opportunity for artillery could bombard the bridges across the Dnipro river, and Putin made a strategic mistake at that time: while the bridges were still intact, he sent an additional grouping to the right side of the Dnipro river, moreover, he ordered it to go on a (failed) offensive.

After that, the trap slammed shut. The Armed Forces of Ukraine destroyed bridges with Excaliburs and HIMARSs, not only across the Dnipro river, but also the Daryevsky bridge across the Ingulets tributary, “thus cutting the Russian grouping not into two, but into three parts,” as Oleh Zhdanov again noted. One part remained on the left bank near Melitopol, and the second part, on the right, was again cut in two by the Ingulets.

After that, the Ukrainian Armed Forces attacked Russian air defence on the right bank of the Dnipro river, ensuring the future air supremacy of Ukrainian aviation (we can see it), and in Crimea, the ATACMS missiles (the Ukrainian side denies that this is the ATACMS) began to destroy airfields and depots.

Everything was ready even last week to start the destruction of the Russian grouping on the right bank of the Dnipro river. Apparently, the Ukrainian troops simply paused to celebrate Independence Day on August 24th. “They were afraid that Putin’s responses would spoil the holiday,” suggests Roman Svitan.

And they started after the holiday on Monday.

Once again: we are not talking about the direct beginning of an offensive.

This offensive, on the one hand, began a long time ago: even when Russian troops periodically abandoned their trenches to the Ukrainian secret subversive groups. On the other hand, it has not started even now, because we do not see any "armoured fist", no victorious columns of Ukrainian armoured vehicles advancing after the rolling artillery barrage.

Ukraine simply does not have the armoured vehicles, and if it had, the Armed Forces of Ukraine would hardly have attacked Kherson, they would have gone straight to Melitopol, according to Roman Svitan. “It would be better to attack Melitopol and cut off the Russian troops on the right bank with armoured vehicles,” agrees General Serhiy Krivonos, the former deputy head of the National Security and Defence Council.

It is the lack of armoured vehicles that is now the weakest point of the Ukrainian army. It is hard to use infantry assaults in a war of the 21st century, and you can’t form a reserve, because a reserve is something that can be quickly transferred to the scene.

Therefore, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valery Zaluzhny, taking into account this weak point, apparently, planned the Ukrainian offensive. The 25,000-strong Russian grouping on the right bank of the Dnipro river is not completely cut off (by attacking Melitopol), but it is being destroyed. A wave of unguided missiles and M26s is simply falling on their positions. At the same time, Ukrainian partisans are operating in Kherson: exactly on the eve of the offensive, collaborator Oleksiy Kovalev was killed in his house. This demoralizes the occupiers further.

The most reasonable thing under these conditions would be to retreat: running, swimming or by air mattresses. Still, we can predict two things. The first: Putin will strictly forbid retreat. He will impale the Russian army, like a bear on a spear, on a carpet fire of aviation and artillery.

The second: the army, most likely, will not survive. The Kremlin propagandists can report to Putin that "the people are waiting for him".

The absolute senselessness of the war, the total hostility of the people, the outrageous theft and the unprofessionalism of the leadership: all still do not affect when the army is on the offensive. But when it is on the defensive, the front can collapse, and this is especially true of the Airborne Forces. “The Airborne Forces are not adapted to sit in the trenches under artillery fire and near Kherson, they sit in the trenches,” says Roman Svitan. “We have not yet seen how the Russian troops behave on the defensive. I think they will be completely demoralized,” Oleksiy Arestovych predicted.

It is, of course, wrong to build an operation plan based on the mistakes that the enemy will make. "A commander who counts on the enemy's mistakes will never win," wrote Sun Tzu. Therefore, as I said, Zaluzhny's plan was built without taking these mistakes into account.

That is why it does not involve an offensive. And it uses only artillery and aircraft attacks against the Russian troops without direct contact. Zaluzhny keeps the manpower safe.

The mistakes of the Russian command, namely, Putin’s order to “stand”, and the animal fear of desperate soldiers: “to run”, are an additional bonus in this plan, and not its basis.

Yulia Latynina, Novaya Gazeta Europe