A Successful Strategy
- Vitaly Shapran
- 19.08.2026, 13:15
How to Exacerbate the Oil Crisis in Russia.
Last week, the International Analytical Agency (IAA) released data on the Russian Federation. Exports of crude oil and petroleum products from Russia in July totaled 6.97 million barrels per day (bpd), which is 630,000 bpd less than in the previous month and 420,000 bpd lower than the level in July 2025.
The reduction in petroleum product exports from the Russian Federation led to a shift in strategy by the Russians, who attempted to offset the reduction of fuel exports to zero by increasing the volume of crude oil exports. However, as IEA statistics show, they were unsuccessful in July.
Of course, the reduction in exports from Russia in July will have negative consequences for the federal and regional Russian budgets. This explains why the “old man in the pilot’s cap” fled all the way to Sakhalin and, from there, threatened the Europeans with retaliation for seizing “Russian” oil tankers.
In other words, disruptions in Russian oil shipments will lead to even greater losses for the Russian Federation’s budget. That is precisely why the war could be halted not only by a price of Russian oil below $45 per barrel, but also by a scenario involving a sharp reduction in the physical export of Russian oil and petroleum products.
The strikes on oil refineries have proven to be very painful for the Kremlin, and not just because of the budgetary implications. Putin’s team is rapidly losing its influence in Central Asia and Mongolia, which were buyers of Russian fuel and are now also experiencing a fuel crisis.
The only exception was Kazakhstan, which had ensured the country had its own refineries.
Beyond geopolitical influence, the fuel crisis has already affected relations between the federal government and the regions. Little Putin’s grand plan was for Russia to release 1.7 million metric tons of fuel reserves at the height of seasonal demand, after which the market would be supported by fuel from India and Morocco.
But the plan backfired: the federal government had intended to impose restrictions on imported fuel as early as July, but (likely after calculating the budget deficit for July) this decision was put on hold. And imported fuel is now stuck in Murmansk, since without restrictions, its price for the end consumer would reach up to 200 rubles per liter.
However, if things continue this way, the 200-ruble-per-liter mark is a very real prospect for Russians.
Last week, Rosstat gave them some relief by reporting a slowdown in gasoline price growth from 6.88% to 6.47% (over the course of a month). Russians themselves note that Rosstat’s statistics on gasoline prices have long been out of touch with reality, and 130 rubles per liter is no longer news in the regions.
The Russian government’s statements about the fuel shortage betray a sense of complete confusion. I think Deputy Prime Minister Novak, who oversees this sector, understands very well that in August the intensity of Ukrainian strikes on oil refineries will not decrease—and may even increase.
However, a real catastrophe is looming on the horizon—one that will occur if those “kind” Ukrainian drones happen to target the storage facilities for imported fuel in Murmansk as well.
Vitaly Shapran, unian.net
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