Security of Baltic States: Russia's threats, NATO's capabilities and Belarus factor

A land corridor from Belarus to Kaliningrad could be carved out in few hours.

Upon proposal of the East European Security Research Initiative, a selection of experts from Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Poland and Ukraine commented on the current issues of the Baltic states security, including the threats of Russia’s hybrid and conventional aggression, NATO’s capabilities to secure the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the Baltic states, and possible role of the “Belarus factor”, given its close military cooperation with Russia.

Marius Laurinavičius, Senior Analyst at the Vilnius-based Eastern Europe Studies Centre:

The threat of some kind of Russian aggression against the Baltic states is already widely recognized as a real possibility. That is the point of view taken not only by politicians both in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and their partners in EU/NATO, but by military leaders of the North Atlantic Alliance, including Supreme Allied Commander in Europe general Philip Breedlove as well.

These officials base their threat assessments not solely on analytical research. They can rely on the intelligence data in equal measure. Therefore, concentrating analytically on realness of such threat one can call rather redundant. Thorough analysis of factors, which make hybrid warfare or a conventional attack more anticipated, should prevail instead.

The example and experience of Russian aggression in Donbas leads most of analysts, politicians and military leaders towards thinking of a scenario, which would repeat the Ukrainian one. But such way of thinking could be misleading due to several reasons.

First, Putin’s Russia tends not to repeat the same scenario in different places and different circumstances. It rather uses a special strategy for every goal it tries to achieve.

Secondly, the main factors, which made the Ukrainian scenario possible in Donbas were an open border with Russia and a massive supply of modern weapons to the so-called separatist region, not to mention thousands of fighters, both volunteers and regular Russian soldiers. Repeating all this in the Baltic states would not be so simple as they have well-guarded borders with Russia. And any violation of the borders would mean a conventional attack scenario.

Russia can try to destabilize any of the Baltic states by means which were used in the case of Bronze Soldier in Estonia in 2007. But that differs considerably from the Ukrainian scenario, and the Baltic states are able to cope with it themselves.

On the other hand, a probability of a Russian conventional attack against Baltic countries is much underestimated. Especially considering that the imaginary necessity of “preventive Baltic occupation” is already publicly discussed by analyst Rostislav Ischenko, who is closely related to Kremlin.

It is highly possible that at least some of the Russian political and military elite will try to implement such an idea in coming years both for internal political reasons and their imaginary security concerns of Russia. The main of these concerns is the security of Kaliningrad’s enclave, which for the Kremlin always was and still is a military outpost for any confrontation with the West. Taking into account that current Russian elite tends to think in terms of imminent confrontation with the West, Russian security concerns for Kaliningrad region can easily be transformed into concept of “preventive Baltic occupation”.

Article 5 of the NATO Treaty guarantees will not be considered by Russia as real one until they will not be supported by sufficient amount of troops and weaponry on the soil of the Baltic states, in order to defend (not only to deter) these countries from any Russian attack. On the contrary, Russian elite simply does not believe that the West is ready to defend Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia, which are considered as “small and unimportant to NATO” taking a risk of military confrontation with Russia, especially the nuclear one. And that creates an additional temptation to test Article 5 in the light of almost imminent collapse of NATO in case of not defending any of its allies. As getting rid of NATO by any means should be considered as an ultimate goal of Putin’s regime, it makes a threat of conventional attack against the Baltic states even more possible.

Russian military exercise “Zapad – 2009” as well as other information about Kremlin’s military planning prompts that Moscow considers Belarus as a vital ally for the implementation of any scenario of conventional attack against Baltic states.

Roman Yakovlevsky, political observer, writing on foreign policy and security issues for independent Belarusian and foreign media:

In order to make objective assessment of the role and especially the possible impact of the so-called “Belarusian factor” on future security developments in the Baltic-Black Sea region, one should recall the Regional Force Grouping (RFG) of Belarus and Russia, established in 2000 under the decision of the Supreme State Council of the Union State of Russia and Belarus. The aim was to ensure security in the Eastern European region of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, including the territory of the Republic of Belarus, Kaliningrad region, a part of the Baltic Sea water area and the Russian Federation’s regions neighboring Belarus.

Treaty on Establishing of the Single Regional Air Defense System as important part of the RFG was signed by Russian president in 2009 and by his Belarusian counterpart in 2012. In accordance with the agreement on joint protection of the Russia-Belarus Union State’s airspace, the Russian pilots on a rotating basis are on combat duty in Baranovichi. The deployment of Russian military air base on the territory of Belarus is to be completed by 2015, the year of presidential election in Belarus.

At the same time, the implementation measures of the so-called “operational” agreement on creation of the command and control system of the Single Regional Air Defense System remain quite unclear. According to Minsk, in a state of alert and during wartime all the Air Defense System resources will be used as an integral part of the RFG of Belarus and Russia. Such interpretation gave the reason to suppose that the existing command and control system should remain unchanged in peacetime, i.e. has no strict chain of superior command. But after the annexation of Crimea and unleashing war in the east of Ukraine, the degree of tension in the RFG responsibility region has been steadily increased due to the Putin’s inspiration.

There are plans to hold a large-scale Russian-Belarusian military exercises “Union Shield 2015” on the territory of the Russian Federation in the fall of 2015. Given that Russia considers the annexed Crimea as its national territory, one should not exclude the probability of Belarusian soldiers’ deployment on the peninsula with other participants to this exercise. If such a scenario comes true, it would be hardly to predict all the consequences for security developments in the region as well as further relations between Minsk and Kyiv. Some experts are already inclined to consider the possible involvement of Belarus in Russia’s hostile military actions in Ukraine through the system of logistic support created on the Belarusian territory by the RFG infrastructures.

The possible impact of the “Belarusian factor” on security issues of the Baltic states and Poland could be considered as more predictable one. As Belarus is contiguous with three NATO member states, in case of giving a new impetus by Kremlin to the RFG functioning when a virtual threat could arise, these neighboring countries would be covered by the NATO protective umbrella. Then Belarus would become a target, with all possible aftereffects. Therefore, there is a tendency in Minsk and in the capitals of NATO neighbors to emphasize the need for increasing the level of mutual trust based on the existing national interests.

But in a view of the almost absolute dependence of Minsk from Moscow, especially in the military sphere, there would be some difficulties and misinterpretations with defining the Belarusian national interests, including in those structures designed to protect such interests. The sudden dismissal of Belarusian defense minister in the midst of the crisis in Ukraine in autumn last year, with insufficiently clear explanations for that fact and his total disappears from public life, may give reasons to believe that different opinions on this issue could exist among Belarusian military leadership. Such situation could not be completely ruled out as well as the repeating of Ukrainian experience, when the loyalty of high military stuff appeared to be a myth.

The scenario of Russian aggression against Ukraine has shown that the Kremlin could also execute hybrid methods and tools of influence to be applied against the Baltic states and Poland. It is increasingly referred to the Kaliningrad enclave. This western part of the Russian Federation, which is not less important than allied Belarus, is a vital component of the RFG of Belarus and Russia together with its entire operational infrastructure. Being increasingly aware of such a threat, political authorities in Warsaw and capitals of the Baltic countries with growing resoluteness and persistence require strengthening the NATO presence in their territories. The understanding of security guarantees is growing in Ukraine as well. The NATO also comes up with the need for its own modernizing that will allow addressing effectively the new threats and challenges stemming from the East and the Southern part of Eurasia.

Daniel Szeligowski, analyst at Poland-Ukraine research centre foundation, based in Poland; economist and political scientist:

Hybrid war against the Baltic states has already begun. Massive disinformation campaign, propaganda and psychological pressure are all in place. Still, it does not necessarily mean that Putin is going to send his troops on another holidays. He may have them in Tallinn or Riga in two days, but it seems that it is not what he really wants. Instead, Russian plan is to create divisions between EU and NATO countries and to seek a sort of new grand bargain with the West. Destabilizing the Baltic states and proving that NATO’s solidarity clause does not exist anymore may well be a part of that plan. Russia has another means of influence than little green men. It could play national minority card, run cyber-attacks as well as buy politicians and officials.

Nevertheless, I don’t argue that possibility of Russian conventional aggression against the Baltic states should be excluded. Quite the opposite. “Preventive occupation of the Baltic states” is now being openly discussed in Russian newspapers. Should Putin invade the Baltic states, it won’t be stopped at the moment. As some military analysts say, it could really take up to two days, NATO troops in Estonia/Latvia/Lithuania or Poland seem to be the only real guarantee of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Baltic states, if potentially faced with Russian aggression.

As we have seen for the last few months, military exercises are being used by Moscow as a cover for troops’ rotation and their deployment along the Ukraine’s border. Therefore NATO should closely pay attention to military cooperation between Belarus and Russia. In fact, there are no border crossings between Belarus and Russia and no border controls, which means it can be easily crossed. Also, there are several Russian military bases in Belarus. Taking all into consideration, the West should not be taken in by Lukashenko’s willingness to distance himself from Russia when it comes to security.

The European Union, let alone the Baltic states, is not ready to counter Russian information and psychological war. Partly due to the insufficient financing, partly due to the lack of simple knowledge. Hence, a growing pressure on the EU to re-engage with Russia should be expected until the end of the year. There are already some signs of the EU-Russia cooperation on the issue of the EU-Ukraine free trade deal entry into force. It is also interesting that ongoing review of the European Neighborhood Policy is aimed at creating new framework for cooperation with EU’s neighbors whilst putting priority on dealing with Russia. Even though, it is not a grand bargain that Putin seeks. This will determine the security landscape of the EU’s external border.

It is paradoxically, but both the EU and Russia want the same: security. There is only one little difference: the EU feels secure when its neighbors are economically strong and well-governed, while Russia feels secure when its neighbors are economically weak and politically disintegrated. Russia does not want to win. It only wants others to lose.

Maksym Khylko, Senior Research Fellow at the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Associate Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Ukraine:

Even after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, NATO chiefs continue underestimating threat to the Baltic countries. The false idea prevails as if Russian forces were so much tied down in Ukraine that they would hardly be capable to attack the Baltic states sooner than in three or four years.

It may sound paradoxically, but in fact Russia will manage to refocus to the Baltic campaign in the nearest future due to the Western politics of freezing conflict in Eastern Ukraine. The U.S. and the EU did nothing to prevent Russia from building up enough strong and well-armed proxy military forces in Donbas, while Kyiv, according to the Western-mediated Minsk agreements, undertook commitments to refrain from military attempts to recover the conquered territories. Under such conditions Russia can temporary suspend its adventure in Eastern Ukraine and concentrate forces on another front.

There is one more miscalculation of the Western Allies, namely focusing primarily on the hybrid war threats to the Baltic states. In fact, the components of hybrid warfare were launched by Moscow long ago in the form of propaganda, cyber-attacks, penetration into political and economic life, training ethnic Russian youth from Baltic countries in ‘patriotic’ paramilitary camps, and so on. Now it comes closer to the threat of conventional aggression; and Russian military trainings of 2013 with exercising occupation of Baltic states and blockade against NATO assistance should be treated seriously.

Ethnic situation in Estonia and Latvia with about 25%-strong Russian minority is more complicated than it was in Ukraine before the war. Ethnic Russians, who constitute 17% of Ukraine’s population, are strongly integrated into society and have no reason to feel discriminated. To the contrast, in Estonia and Latvia there is a considerable amount of ethnic Russian ‘non-citizens’ with corresponding restrictions in civil rights, while dozens of thousands have Russian citizenship and compactly reside in ethnic enclaves.

The joint armed forces and mobilization reserves of the Baltic countries are much less strong than the Ukrainian ones, and the amount of military equipment is several times less than those possessed by Russia-backed Donbas separatists. By declaring their readiness to fire at Russian ‘green men’, Baltics military should be also ready to face the full-scale invasion as Moscow’s answer to the ‘murders of ethnic Russians’. Under such cookedup pretext, in 2014 Russian parliament took decision to approve the use of troops in Ukraine.

The presence of 150 rotating U.S. troops and few Abrams tanks is rather a symbolic support, while the reliability of NATO Article 5 is now more questionable than ever. It is not only because of the lack of real solidarity and political will within the Alliance, but as well because of the lack of military capabilities of European Allies to deploy rapidly the necessary amount of troops.

It should be kept in mind that the Baltic countries are semi-surrounded by Russian troops, deployed in Russia itself, in Belarus and in Kaliningrad enclave. Minsk can control the use of Russian troops deployed in Belarus territory no more than Kyiv could control the use of Russian troops in Crimea. A land corridor from Belarus to Kaliningrad could be carved out in few hours and when finished the Baltic states would be cut off from their NATO Allies land forces.

The best way to secure oneself from possible occupation is to make such hypothetical adventure a too costly affair, primarily relying on the own military capabilities. To that end all the Baltic states should considerably increase their military spending. Currently only Estonia fulfills the NATO target of 2% military spending, but it is also not sufficient amount, giving the small-scale GDPs of the Baltic countries. Aggregated military budget of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is only about €1.1 billion. With about 6.9 million total population of the Baltic states, the total strength of active military personnel is about 33,000. To compare, Israel spends on defence about 5.6% of GDP (about €15 billion) with 176,500 active military personnel strength, while its total population number is 7.8 million.

Applying for the permanent presence of NATO battalions in each Baltic country is reasonable. Besides, the military cooperation at regional level should be strengthened, including the Nordic Battlegroup, BALTBAT and LITPOLUKRBRIG battalions (considering the latest experience of Ukrainian troops to fight against Russian forces). Detailed military scenarios of deterring Russian invasion should be elaborated with defined responsibilities of the neighboring allies in order to halt offensive for at least 48 hours, till the deployment of NATO Spearhead Force.

Oleksandr Tytarchuk, Associate Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Ukraine; former Military Adviser of the Ukrainian Delegation to the OSCE:

On the backdrop of ongoing efforts to revise the existing spheres of influence, the Baltic region will continue to be one of the most vulnerable parts of the current European security system. In case of encountering some problems with the “persuasion” of its Western counterparts, Moscow would probably seek for demonstrative resumption of active hostilities in the east of Ukraine. Russian military presence along the borders of the Baltic states will also be increased simultaneously from all directions at that, including the Western military district of the Russian Federation, Kaliningrad special district and the Regional Force Grouping of the Russia-Belarus Union State, while not forgetting about “Russian compatriots” in the Baltic countries themselves.

This is the Estonia appeared to be the most vulnerable of the Baltic states in current conditions as a country directly bordering on Russia, with its Narva city located at the eastern extreme point of the country and populated on 90% by ethnic Russians. If the Russian military aggression being unleashed against Estonia, the allied obligations of NATO Members will be seriously tested, not to compare with purely political security assurances for Ukraine declared under the Budapest Memorandum 1994.

No doubts that increasing military presence of the Alliance in the Baltic countries poses a direct threat to Moscow’s interests in the region. Though the redeployment of troops by itself, including under the guise of participation in joint military exercises, couldn’t be considered as effective step of the Alliance in addressing aggressive aspirations of Moscow, but rather the opposite. At present stage, the main objective of such capacity building may be seen as a kind of mere reassurance for Baltic colleagues, and no more. The possibility of establishing reliable and sustainable chain of supply for NATO forces being deployed in the Baltic region remains under a big question mark because of the explicit threat of active suppression from the Russian Federation, including with military potential both of the Kaliningrad special district and Regional Force Grouping of Belarus and Russia as crucial bridgeheads in the fight for the Baltics and maintaining military deterrence for Poland.

Increasing of the Russian military presence in Belarus under the motto of creating the above-mentioned Regional Force Grouping will also have a negative impact on further security developments in and around Ukraine, which will be clamped in a vise, given the deployment of the Russian troops in adjacent areas of the Russia-Ukraine border, as well as in Transnistria, and annexed Crimea that turns into a new militarized enclave.

As for the Belarus itself and its military capacity is concerned, it still remains quite modest in terms of completing self-help tasks mentioned above, although rather impressive in comparison with aggregated quantitative potential of all the Baltic neighbors. Despite the recent statements of the Belarusian president on the need to strengthen state defense capabilities in the Northeast direction, there is the Northwest Operational Military Command, as the most powerful one of the two existing national Operational Military Commands in terms of equipment and personnel strength, whose subordinated military units have already been located in the direction of Lithuania and Latvia.

On the backdrop a fairly neutral rhetoric of the official Minsk, its actual steps in building up military capabilities and managing national Armed Forces do not prevent the creation of a military bridgehead that can be used for Russia’s aggressive actions against the Baltic countries and Ukraine as well. And here I’m talking primarily about the deployment of modern aircraft, missiles and air defense systems (even not mentioning about nuclear delivery systems) as crucial elements of the Russia’s deterrence strategy towards the West against the background of broadening its expansion in Eastern Europe.

In upcoming confrontation, Ukraine, while in actual underbelly of the Russian regional military formation being established on the territory of Belarus, seems to be an important asset providing a decisive influence on maintaining security of the Baltic states. As the first practical step in this direction, one could consider the establishment of regional military cooperation between Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania, whose further development has clear benefits for all the countries of Eastern Europe.

With the aim of strengthening security on its northern flank, Ukraine needs to devote more attention to the situation developments in Belarus, as well as establishing broad working contacts with official Minsk whilst emphasizing on informational sphere, which, besides existing agreements, is actually still unimpaired. In general, strengthening the bilateral Ukrainian-Belarusian cooperation will surely contribute to the resolution of a number of common issues specific for both countries in the face of the current crisis of European security. Belarus itself, never minding all Minsk official declarations and intentions, has been already involved in that crisis indirectly and could not be further regarded as a neutral party within the margins of future confrontation amid grand bargain for the Eastern European region.

Raimonds Rublovskis, Researcher at Riga Stradins University, former National Military Representative of Latvia at NATO SHAPE:

The current possibility of Russian conventional attack on the Baltic states is very low due to the fact that Latvia and other Baltic states are the members of the EU and NATO. This fact means that NATO simply would be obliged for responding to restore the status quo, not mentioning about the EU and its sanctions’ potential to be drastically increased. If the North Atlantic Alliance fails to address the challenge according to the provisions of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, this definitely will signify the end of this Organization. Having in mind this fact, both NATO and the EU have to be effective in addressing current and potential threats to security situation in the Baltics. Otherwise, possible security developments could significantly challenge the survival of these organizations that may lead to their total collapsing.

However, one cannot exclude some elements of active using hybrid warfare in the Baltics in current circumstances. Therefore, at this very moment the main challenges and threats to Latvian security are stemming from within and mostly bears internal character, namely challenging situation in economic development, growth of emigration flow from the country, high unemployment rate, etc. Under such “favorable conditions” serving as a kind of breeding ground, the above-mentioned hybrid approach for threatening current security situation inLatvia is the most probable one to be undertaken.

The Baltic military cooperation and Baltic-Nordic military cooperation have been already well developed. However, due to the fact that the Baltic countries don’t possess sufficient military capabilities to deter possible military invasion, and Nordic countries have significantly decreased their military capabilities since the end of the Cold War, both mentioned frameworks of cooperation – purely Baltic and Baltic-Nordic – could be considered as those being mostly politically driven without significant military impact on the ground.

As for Belarus is concerned, this country is now definitely playing an important role to security developments in the Baltic region. The main factors here are the country’s proximity and high intensity of military cooperation with the Russian Federation. Therefore, Belarus is and will remain in the future very important security actor for both the NATO’s allies and the Russian Federation.

Pawel Fleischer, Founder of the Academic Security Forum, former planning officer at the NATO SHAPE:

The Russian actions in Ukraine have surprised most every NATO member state. The countries neighboring with Russia have felt shadow of conceivable struggle. NATO once again has re-examined its defense policy, due to increased Russian assertiveness in foreign policy and progressing armed forces modernization program. Sudden use of force by the Russian Federation in Ukraine and increase of its military activity in the air and sea near to NATO borders have forced the Alliance to enhance its defense capabilities after the difficult expeditionary mission in Afghanistan.

The “New Generation Warfare” is an official name for hybrid warfare, according to general Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff. New doctrine, which has been successfully tested in Ukraine, is based on the idea that the main battle-space of contemporary conflicts is a human mind. For that reason Russia is using economic, diplomatic, ideological measures for destabilizing countries in the so-called “near abroad (Russian: blizhneye zarubezhye). From all the NATO member countries the Baltic states territorial integrity is the most threatened.

The current Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian abilities to deter possible Russian actions against their countries is very low. Despite the Alliance member states declarations on the need for increasing defense spending due to budget constraints in the past, armed forces of the NATO European members will remain underfinanced. NATO need to possess ability to defend all Allies to counter hybrid warfare not only by military means, but also politically, economically and psychologically (including cyber domain). The time factor plays the most important role in using the hybrid warfare. NATO needs to strengthen its presence in the region by establishing supply depots in the Baltic states for faster force generations and sustaining the Alliance political credibility for a solidarity manifestation in the finest hour.

Belarus, which since the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine has not taken a clear position on it, plays an important role for NATO and the Baltic states defense posture. This country as a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization is securing the Western flank of the CSTO. Through the neighborhood with two Baltic states and Poland, Belarus is also playing crucial role for forward deployment of the Russian Armed Forces. Three Russian military bases, which are responsible for providing air defense of Russian airspace, has already being located on the Belarusian soil. This country headed by president Lukashenka is used by Moscow as a kind of buffer zone that heavily relies on political, economic and military support from Russia.

By taking significant role in mediation between France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine, Belarus leader has appeared as a new important player in the Eastern Europe. The “last dictator in Europe” could potentially change the balance of power in this part of Europe. As a victim of Western sanctions, Mr. Lukashenka, for the price of lifting bans by the European Union and the United States, could appear to be a valuable political figure in settling crisis in the Eastern Ukraine. Thus, he could be also important mediator between NATO and Russia in resolving the on-going “Cold War”.