Ukrainian General: Russian Army Nearly Encircled In Kherson

The front could falter.

AFU have gained good momentum and can conduct successful counteroffensive operations over the next 2-3 weeks - before the enemy has had time to rebuild its reserves and train the newly mobilized. The occupant can flee from Kherson, as it is practically encircled. In other parts of the front, the enemy may burst into a panic.

The front may at some point falter. If the AFU is able to break through the occupant's defenses in the Luhansk direction, there may be a break in the front. Then the Ukrainian army will have an excellent opportunity to "work" with the Donetsk grouping of the aggressor. The head of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine in 2005-2010, Army General Mykola Malomuzh expressed this opinion in an exclusive interview with obozrevatel.com.

- On the night of October 5, the enemy attacked the Kyiv region with kamikaze drones. In Bila Tserkva, the air defense system worked, but there were still strikes. What do you think the enemy may be planning against Kyiv and the region? Is Kyiv still a tidbit for him?

- New strikes, especially massive ones (there were 12 of them) were made after the announcement of the annexation of the territories where the so-called referendum was held. This is a significant event to intimidate the citizens of Ukraine.

The enemy demonstrated its ability to deliver strikes against the Kyiv region, Kyiv's satellite city of Bila Tserkva. There is the possibility to deploy military targets. But it was the first reconnaissance strike.

This strike is of military significance as well - to test the capabilities of our air defense and other control systems. Drones are more difficult to detect, they understand that. First the enemy is testing them near Kyiv, and then they may plan to attack Kyiv as well but using them on a larger scale.

Our air defense system works on five levels, and it is a reconnaissance in force to see which of these levels succeed and which do not.

Our military command assesses that it is quite difficult to organize systematic control of the sky and shoot down all drones. Now we have learned how to shoot them down, especially in the combat zone, where not only air defense but also tactical means, such as drones, helicopters, antiaircraft missile systems, certain SPG and so on are operating.

In the Kiev region, we haven't had such practice of detecting and destroying drones yet. However, we will develop the practice. Most likely, our defense forces failed to take into account a large number of drones used - 12 - against the capital area.

Putin is currently deciding how to proceed. Or, after signing the law on the "annexation" of Ukrainian territories, to start not just large-scale operations but to declare war, because, as he believes, the war is already on Russian territory. Or whether to continue the "special operation".

- What would it mean for Russia to declare war?

- The entire model changes. It's not just mobilization but also the conduct of military operations with the deployment of fronts. This is a more serious confrontation. We understand that even without a declaration of war, Putin has engaged all his forces to continue the aggression in Ukraine or at least create conditions to repel attacks by the AFU in those directions where they are conducting active counteroffensive operations.

He wants to retain the annexed territories. The crucial directions are Donetsk, Luhansk and Kherson, where there may be problems for the enemy in the coming days. Therefore, Putin will rush, perhaps, in changing the status of the "special operation" and strengthening the contingent in these directions, in the east and south.

Of course, the situation in the Belarusian direction will be strained. However, there are not enough mobilization forces and means there yet. The forces that are coming there have neither combat experience nor coordination, equipment, weapons, nor desire to fight. It is unlikely that the Belarusian direction will be a theater of military operations on a large scale, although provocations to distract our Armed Forces are possible.

Provocations may occur in places where Putin still has certain forces, for example, in the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk directions, and certain parts of the Kherson direction.

On the one hand, this is a new scenario of pressure on Ukraine. On the other hand, it is an attempt to pull up new reserves. In this context, kamikaze drones strikes (they have about 200) are a very dangerous topic. About 50-60 of them have been used (the General Staff says Russia used 86 drones, 60 were shot down. - Ed.).

It indicates possible massive strike against Kyiv. Kyiv already understands what capabilities it needs to use to counter such attacks. These are missile equipment and anti-aircraft missile systems, including those received from Germany, France, the United States, Britain. These are complexes that are deployed on the basis of the technical means we have received.

All conventional weapons will also be involved. These are howitzers that can shoot at low altitudes, large-caliber machine guns shooting down drones. These systems will be strengthened.

If massive drone attacks - dozens, hundreds - are used, most of them may be shot down. The chances of a large-scale strike on Kyiv are low. There is still a threat - in order to morally influence the leadership of Ukraine to induce it to the negotiation process on Putin's terms. This factor may be applied on a par with others - mobilization and the nuclear war threats.

However, it is a challenge for the enemy today. There is a powerful air defense system at work. Drones need to cover long distances. They will not cover hundreds of kilometers unpunished. But it is necessary to prepare to repel attacks on Kyiv, of course.

- These about 150 remaining enemy kamikaze drones. Where can they be sent? What was the main objective of acquiring them from Iran, even though Iran denies it?

- They were aimed at striking military targets, such as the advanced HIMARS, M270, radar systems that completely control the entire region in the war zone. This is their most effective use. They're guided, almost silently directed there. They are hard to detect as they accelerate and strike. 50 kilograms of explosives blow up any system.

Given that we have a very good protection model for military facilities and our complexes, the enemy has realized that kamikaze drones can also be actively used to intimidate civilians without such a defense system.

Areas with HIMARS on have various complexes that protect them. Moreover, this HIMARS still needs detection. It's very difficult. It's constantly maneuvering. Our military have worked out the model for protecting the modern equipment.

As for civilian objects or Soviet-era military facilities, they are not so well protected. That's why the enemy is throwing these assets at them - infrastructure, storage facilities and other objects.

- The head of the Luhansk regional military administration, Serhiy Haidai, said that as of October 5, the AFU had liberated several settlements in the region. It's a good trend. Do you think the AFU can maintain this positive dynamics and deal with the "old" occupied territories of Luhansk and Donetsk regions in the coming weeks?

- I think the dynamics is very good after the Kharkiv offensive operations. The enemy no longer has system reserves - prepared, coordinated military units and formations. They are trying to assemble them. Meanwhile, they want to save time. But it fails.

It also fails to bring up the reserves, because we can see that the mobilized are running away, that is, they add to panic. This is a huge disadvantage for the Russian troops. The newly mobilized destabilize the situation for strikes, such as air or artillery strikes.

So as long as the new reserves, trained and prepared, appear, the dynamic is good. We have the opportunity to enter recently seized territories - Svatovo, Lysychansk, Severodonetsk. There is a tendency for further offensive operations here, both in the Luhansk direction and Donetsk.

These may not be breakthrough offensive operations, but tactical operations will continue. It is already a matter of time for the enemy not to have time to prepare reserves. When they are ready and rush to the front, it will be harder to recapture these territories.

The Russian command says that 200,000 have been mobilized, but they have not even reached the training points yet. To immediately throw them into combat is not only detrimental to defense but also a complete failure, because there will be mass deaths and mass escape of these mobilized.

Therefore, we have 2-3 weeks to fight back both in the east and the south. This is also the major direction to liberate territories and possibly to create the prerequisites for the liberation of not only the right-bank but also partially the left-bank Ukraine. The AFU can strike in the direction of Melitopol, which is already the Zaporizhzhia region.

So far, the enemy does not have sufficient means. Both in the Kherson and Luhansk directions, they are in panic or the state close to panic. They are ready to flee. We know it from intercepts, intelligence information. They fear encirclement and are trying to get permission to retreat by any means. For example, from Kherson.

Putin has set the issue of not withdrawing from Kherson. He also raised the issue upon Lyman as well. But we have recaptured Lyman and are advancing. The Luhansk, Donetsk and Kherson regions will give the prospect of liberating the territories in the next 2-3 weeks.

- Can these cities themselves - Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson - be liberated in these next 2-3 weeks?

- There is a prospect in Kherson that they will liberate the city themselves, because the enemy is now there in a cut-off condition and may be encircled. Therefore, there is only one way out - to flee.

On Donbas - partially. There the most powerful groups, especially in the Donetsk region. It is very hard to advance there. However, if we break through the defenses in the Luhansk direction and move to Lysychansk, Severodonetsk and further, it will be a precondition for breaking the front, approaching the Donetsk grouping from the rear and the flanks.

If the entire front falters, there could be overall panic. If we have enough reserves, we can advance actively.