Why Did Lukashenko Attack Latvia?

Now the dictator will wait to see how the outside world reacts.

To understand current situation, it is necessary to pay attention to four events that preceded it:

1. A week ago, the chief of the Belarusian General Staff Pavel Muraveiko—who is rightly considered a staunchly pro-Kremlin appointee—was dismissed. He was replaced by a general who did not receive his education in Russia (Vladimir Belyi)—perhaps the first such case in the last decade.

Against the backdrop of the expansion of powers granted to the head of the Belarusian Security Council, Volfovich (considered a loyalist to Lukashenko), all of this amounts to a sort of “shuffle” of security officials and their replacement with individuals more loyal to Lukashenko himself. It also leads to a certain limitation of the authority of those who have one foot in Moscow and the other in Minsk.

2. A trial shipment of Belarusian potash is already on its way to the U.S., but even so, Lukashenko took the liberty of grumbling at Trump a couple of weeks ago (in the sense that it’s time to make up your mind: either make an offer or stop messing with us).

Of course, this isn’t a rebellion against Trump. But Lukashenko allows himself to make such statements precisely because he realizes he’ll face no consequences for them, and Trump, by all accounts, will continue to play along with him in exchange for political prisoners. This means Lukashenko has the opportunity to appeal to the U.S., and the U.S. has direct contact with him.

3. Russia continues to pressure Lukashenko to allow his territory to be used for sophisticated hybrid attacks.

4. Over the past six months, Lukashenko has begun to court the patriotic segment of Belarusian society quite actively and has even made several conciliatory remarks toward IT professionals, who were the driving force behind the revolutionary events of 2020. This is due to the critically rapid decline of Lukashenko’s core electorate—voters with a Soviet-oriented mindset. And this, in turn, is leading to a shift in the overall political landscape—not toward Europe, but away from the Soviet Union and Russia.

Belarusian statehood is becoming an important value for the majority of Belarusians, and Lukashenko—even in the eyes of pro-Belarusian patriots—increasingly appears to be the defender of that very statehood. Despite the fallacy of this approach, this is precisely the political discourse we are seeing.

Taken together, all of this indicates that the current provocation on the border with Latvia is not the beginning of any large-scale joint actions by Russians and Belarusians. So far, it looks more like an attempt by Lukashenko to sit on the fence: he doesn’t want to fall out with Moscow, but at the same time is doing everything he can to avoid a more serious conflict with the U.S., the EU, and China.

He needed to demonstrate a certain degree of loyalty to Moscow—and he did so. At the same time, he did not cross any serious red lines. And against the backdrop of two ships sunk off the coast of Bulgaria, this is just a harmless game.

Now Lukashenko will wait to see what the international reaction will be. For him, the ideal scenario would be the one with Ukraine and the relay stations: when we declared that we would destroy his oil refinery, and he was forced to tell Putin, “Sorry, Vovan.”

Putin will undoubtedly put pressure on Lukashenko, since without Belarusian territory, his hybrid attacks on the EU will be significantly weaker. However, so far it seems that in the short term, Putin is unlikely to succeed in forcing Lukashenko’s hand.

Vadim Denisenko, “Facebook”

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