The Spirit Of Anchorage Has Vanished

What the G7 Summit Revealed to Ukraine and Putin.

The G7 Summit has become an important indicator of how the international context of Russia’s war against Ukraine is changing. Its main significance lies not only in the leaders’ specific statements, but above all in the political signal it sends. The West is once again demonstrating its ability to act in unison on the issue of Ukraine. After a period of uncertainty, mutual irritations, and Moscow’s attempts to exploit the differences between the United States and its European partners, the summit showed that the strategy of putting pressure on Russia has not gone away. Moreover, it is once again becoming central to Western policy.

It is particularly important that, following Washington’s announcement of framework agreements on de-escalation regarding Iran, the U.S. administration has been able to refocus its attention on Russia’s war against Ukraine. In this new context, the U.S. president is no longer displaying the hostility toward Ukraine and European allies that had previously raised serious concerns. On the contrary, Washington’s rhetoric has once again aligned more closely with the West’s common position. Russia must end the war, Putin must move toward an agreement, and the continuation of hostilities is becoming increasingly costly and politically unviable for Moscow.

This does not mean that all disagreements between the U.S., Europe, and Ukraine have disappeared. They remain. Washington seeks to retain its role as the chief mediator. Europeans want a more prominent role in the future negotiating framework. Ukraine insists that peace cannot mean capitulation or the legitimization of Russian aggression. But something else is of fundamental importance. The summit did not express support for Russia’s logic of territorial concessions in exchange for ending the war. Nor was there any acknowledgment that Ukraine supposedly has no cards to play and must therefore accept whatever terms Moscow imposes. On the contrary, the political significance of the meeting lay in the acknowledgment of an obvious fact: Russia is not winning the war, while Ukraine is maintaining and gradually strengthening its negotiating position.

During the pause in active negotiations, the situation has indeed changed. Russia had hoped to use this pause to increase pressure on the front lines, wear down Ukrainian defenses, psychologically blackmail the civilian population, and convince the West of the inevitability of Ukrainian concessions. But this strategy did not work. Ukraine was able to prevent the front lines from collapsing, continue its campaign of strikes against Russian logistics, military facilities, and oil refining infrastructure, and demonstrate that the Russian offensive is not turning into a strategic victory.

This has enormous political significance. Russia’s negotiating position has always been based on a single premise: that the realities on the ground supposedly inevitably favor Moscow. The Kremlin demanded that the West and Ukraine acknowledge these realities—that is, recognize Russia’s right to dictate terms by force. But now the situation looks different. The realities on the ground no longer support Russia’s confidence in victory. They reveal the protracted nature of the war, the enormous cost to Russia, the vulnerability of Russia’s military and energy infrastructure, and, most importantly, the Kremlin’s inability to achieve its maximalist goals by military means alone.

Russia continues its campaign of terror against Ukrainian cities, civilian infrastructure, energy facilities, and cultural heritage. But terror is not a strategy for victory. It may bring pain, destruction, and casualties, but it does not solve the Kremlin’s main problem. Ukraine is not capitulating; the Ukrainian state is functioning; the army remains combat-ready; and Western support is not waning. It is precisely this that makes Russia’s position increasingly less convincing, even to those who were previously inclined to pressure Kyiv for the sake of a quick peace.

Therefore, the main conclusion of the G7 summit is that the only realistic way to end the war remains an immediate ceasefire without any preconditions from Russia. Not recognition of the occupation. Not Ukraine’s renunciation of sovereignty. Not a ban on its European or Euro-Atlantic future. Not the legalization of Russia’s ultimatum. Rather, a ceasefire as the first and necessary step to stop the killings, destruction, and further escalation.

The sooner this happens, the fewer the casualties will be. But the responsibility for the fact that this has not yet happened does not lie with Ukraine. Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated its readiness for a ceasefire and negotiations. Russia, on the other hand, has consistently turned negotiations into a tool for stalling, exerting pressure, and political manipulation. Putin did not want peace when he was offered relatively favorable terms. He counted on being able to achieve more. To crush Ukraine, force it to surrender, and wear down the West until it agreed to Russia’s version of a settlement.

That opportunity appears to have been missed. When Moscow could still have been offered the lifting of some sanctions, the restoration of economic ties, or a special relationship with Washington, the Kremlin chose to continue the war. Putin bet on a military victory and did not get it. Now he faces a new reality. Ukraine has not been broken, Europe has not backed down, the U.S. is returning to the idea of putting pressure on Russia, and the argument that Ukrainian concessions are inevitable no longer seems convincing, even within the framework of pragmatic American logic.

This is precisely why the so-called “spirit of Anchorage,” which Moscow has long cited, is effectively losing its practical significance. Russian diplomacy has tried to portray it as a sort of informal agreement between the U.S. and Russia, under which Washington was supposed to pressure Ukraine and extract concessions from it. But if Ukraine holds the front lines, strengthens its long-range capabilities, and deals painful blows to Russian infrastructure—while the G7 speaks of the need to increase pressure on Putin—then the old formula ceases to work.

For Trump, this is also a matter of political rationality. Putting pressure on Ukraine in a situation where Russia is not winning would mean taking responsibility for an unjust and unstable peace. Moreover, such a peace would not mark the end of the war. It would merely be a pause before a new wave of aggression. Russia would receive confirmation that military force and terror can achieve political results. And this would pose a threat not only to Ukraine but to European security as a whole.

Therefore, the West’s current approach appears far more realistic. Its purpose is not to push Ukraine toward surrender, but to force Russia to acknowledge that victory is impossible. Sanctions, pressure on Russia’s energy sector, combating the shadow fleet, strengthening Ukraine’s air defense, supporting Ukrainian arms production, and assisting in the protection of energy infrastructure are all elements of a single strategy. This strategy should make continuing the war more costly for the Kremlin than a ceasefire.

Of course, this does not mean that Putin will immediately agree to peace. Most likely, Moscow will continue its usual tactics. It will drag out negotiations, put forward impossible conditions, try to divide the West, feign a willingness to engage in dialogue, and at the same time continue its attacks on Ukraine. The Kremlin will try to convince Trump that it is Ukraine that is standing in the way of peace. It will appeal to the realities on the ground. It will demand recognition of the occupation, Ukraine’s neutral status, and restrictions on its defense capabilities.

But Russia’s problem is that its own formula is beginning to backfire. If we proceed from the realities on the ground, as Moscow has constantly demanded, then these realities no longer look like a Russian victory. They look like a strategic impasse for the aggressor. Russia is suffering colossal losses, is unable to achieve a decisive breakthrough, is facing attacks on its rear, and is being drawn ever deeper into a war that is not yielding the political outcome it desires.

The G7 summit demonstrated precisely this. Ukraine is no longer in a position where it can simply be presented with an ultimatum. Its position is not ideal, but it is significantly stronger than Moscow had anticipated. If the West remains united, intensifies sanctions pressure, and continues to arm Ukraine, then negotiations will not follow Russia’s script of capitulation but will instead be guided by the logic of forcing the aggressor to end the war.

Therefore, the main outcome of the summit for Ukraine is cautiously positive. The West is once again demonstrating unity. The U.S. is aligning more closely with the European position. Russia no longer appears to be the party dictating terms. Putin has lost the opportunity to secure a peace that would be most advantageous to him because he spent too long trying to achieve a victory he could not attain. Now the question is not what concessions Ukraine must make, but how to force Russia to recognize the limits of its power.

This is precisely the most important political message from the G7 summit. The war can end only when the Kremlin realizes that continuing its aggression does not improve—but rather worsens—its position. Ukraine and its allies must do everything possible to ensure that this realization becomes inevitable for Moscow.

Petro Oleshchuk, Ph.D. in Political Science, Professor at Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, exclusively for Charter97.org

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