Political Analyst: Belarus Could Withdraw From The "Union State" In Three Ways

24.10.2026, 10:49
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This issue is already relevant today.

Political scientist and historian Roza Turarbekova on the website “Bank of Ideas” analyzes ways for Belarus to leave the “Union State” and explains why it is important to discuss this today.

How Can Belarus Withdraw from the “Union State”?

In contemporary international politics, much attention is focused on the erosion of Belarus’s sovereignty and its growing dependence on Russia. When extrapolated into the future, this gives rise to negative scenarios, each more bleak than the last.

However, the continuation of these trends in the future is not set in stone. To reverse these trends, we should frame the question the other way around: How can we halt this process and set the reverse process in motion—the process of restoring sovereignty and strengthening independence? One of the essential components of this broad question is: How can Belarus withdraw from the “Union State”?

Without withdrawing from it, it is hardly possible to seriously discuss the restoration of sovereignty.

Why is it important to discuss this issue today?

This involves a kind of scenario planning aimed at identifying a positive outlook for Belarus. To build a positive future, we must first imagine it. Envisioning the future is one way to influence it.

Let’s imagine that the political situation in Belarus is changing for the better and a democratic, pro-European government comes to power. How many skeptics, critics, and opponents will ask the key question at that moment: How should we change our relations with Russia? Is the dependence critical—ranging from trade and production to borders and security? Sovereignty is too fragile.

At that moment, the government and society can turn to the experience of this kind of scenario planning.

Denunciation of the Founding Treaty via a Referendum

The legal basis for the “Union State” is the 1999 Treaty on its Establishment. The simplest approach might seem to be the denunciation of this Treaty in accordance with the procedure provided for therein. Withdrawal from the “Union State” is provided for in Article 67 of the Treaty. To do so, a referendum will need to be held.

This raises an important question: how—and under which Constitution—should the referendum be conducted? If we rely on the current 2022 Constitution, then, in accordance with Article 74, only the president can propose a referendum. He, in turn, may consider a proposal from the “House of Representatives” or 450,000 voters and approve it.

Thus, a critical crossroads arises: to initiate the procedure for withdrawing from the “Union State,” the constitutional uncertainty must be resolved.

Either the procedures outlined in the 2022 Constitution should be followed, or Article 74 must be amended, or the 2022 Constitution must be declared invalid due to the political circumstances under which it was adopted (mass repression and the suppressed revolution of 2020), after which either a new Constitution must be adopted or one of the previously valid versions must be reinstated.

Let’s imagine that, somehow, a referendum has been initiated and a vote is being prepared. Campaigning for withdrawal from the “Union State” may require serious political effort under conditions that are far from ideal. Is there another way out?

Audit and Denunciation of Individual Treaties

Perhaps there is such a way out. This involves conducting an audit (or, more precisely, a screening) that would identify the most vulnerable points and allow us to focus our main efforts on them. The contractual and legal framework of the modern “Union State” can be broadly divided into two groups: the first consists of treaties that form part of the Republic of Belarus’s international obligations; the second consists of intergovernmental agreements and resolutions of the Supreme State Council, which do not have the force of law.

For example, all programs under the “Main Directions for Implementing the Provisions of the Treaty on the Establishment of the Union State,” which were adopted for 2021–2023, 2024–2026, were not formalized as legislative initiatives and do not constitute obligations toward Russia.

Within these programs, there are various agreements, resolutions, and treaties that have already been signed and are in effect. Belarus may unilaterally withdraw from some of them.

However, there are others that will require a more careful approach. Interstate treaties that have undergone the ratification process and have their own withdrawal mechanism must be subject to the denunciation procedure. Here, it is important to understand which treaties are in question and what terms and conditions are stipulated in them.

The most sensitive treaties of this kind for Belarus—those that erode sovereignty and require a denunciation procedure—are:

1. The Treaty on Security Guarantees within the “Union State” dated March 13, 2025.

This treaty is the most complex and extremely dangerous. It carries the risk of Russian interference in domestic political processes, as well as the potential use of Belarusian territory for military aggression against NATO member states. The document is not tied to the Treaty on the Establishment of the “Union State,” which means it cannot even be repealed by a referendum.

Withdrawal from this treaty is possible after 10 years, or it will be automatically renewed. Six months’ notice must be given for denunciation. Thus, the legal opportunity to withdraw from the treaty’s obligations will arise in 2035.

2. The Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus on the General Principles of Indirect Taxation, dated October 3, 2022.

This agreement is one of the most dangerous to sovereignty, as it regulates Belarusian excise taxes and VAT in accordance with Russian standards. Furthermore, an integrated system for tracking these taxes has been established. One of the inalienable sovereign rights of a people is the right to set its own taxes. Interference and regulation in this area are signs of the erosion of sovereignty. For example, EU countries have not yet done this.

Denunciation of this agreement is possible three years after its entry into force, and to terminate it, notice must be given six months before the end of the three-year period; otherwise, it will be automatically extended. If the treaty enters into force in 2023, the termination procedure will be possible as early as 2026, taking into account the three-year period.

3. Treaty on the Formation of a Unified Electricity Market.

This agreement is risky given the virtual absence of an electricity market in Belarus. Belarus lacks a diversity of electricity suppliers. Russia, on the other hand, does have them. Allowing them access to the Belarusian market would mean tying the country to Russia’s orbit in a critically important sector.

Withdrawal from the agreement is possible with six months’ notice. However, the termination of the agreement does not affect the fulfillment of obligations under contracts concluded by entities within the unified market. Ultimately, the key issue is not so much the denunciation of the agreement as the termination of contracts signed by specific entities.

4. The Agreement on the Harmonization of Customs Legislation and Cooperation in the Customs Sphere dated March 4, 2022.

The agreement is concluded for a term of 5 years with automatic renewal. To withdraw from it, the Russian side must be notified 6 months in advance. Consequently, we can note the possibility of termination in 2027 and every five years thereafter.

The list provided is not exhaustive. Under the relevant scenario, it is important to conduct an audit of the legal and contractual framework governing Belarusian-Russian relations within the “Union State.” In addition, it will also be important for the government to carry out preparatory work to ensure that the sector affected by a particular treaty subject to denunciation does not suffer (energy, taxes, customs duties, finance).

Chinese Tactics or Quiet Sabotage

Perhaps it is worth considering a third option. For example, in Kazakhstan, the development of the EAEU project has been deliberately slowed down since 2020. Tokayev did not support the EAEU Development Strategy, which called for the institutional strengthening of supranational bodies.

This behavior can be described as a “Chinese tactic”: no sudden shifts, so as not to upset the balance, but also no deeper involvement. In the case of Belarusian participation in the “Union State,” this tactic can be used to halt institutional convergence and wait for favorable conditions for withdrawal. Sabotaging intergovernmental agreements and gradually preparing for denunciation. Moreover, such tactics are nothing new for the Belarusian establishment: they were put into practice prior to 2020.

Another issue is that in this case, the situation is more likely to be frozen than resolved: waiting for favorable conditions for withdrawal may drag on, or, conversely, unfavorable conditions may arise.

Conclusions:

Withdrawal from the “Union State” is possible through three avenues: a referendum to repeal the Treaty on the Establishment of the “Union State”; denunciation of intergovernmental treaties and withdrawal from signed agreements; the “Chinese tactic.”

1. The first path is a radical political one.

It is possible in the event of a drastic change in the political regime and geopolitical orientation and involves:

Initiating and holding a referendum on the termination of the Treaty on the Establishment of the “Union State.”

Early withdrawal from the Treaty on Security Guarantees or withdrawal upon the expiration of the 10-year term in 2035.

2. The second path is the step-by-step denunciation of individual, most sensitive treaties.

This is possible in the event of a bureaucratic transition in favor of nationally oriented leaders and entails:

Refusal to comply with the most dangerous intergovernmental agreements.

Preparing procedures for the denunciation of intergovernmental treaties upon their expiration—in 3 to 5 years—as well as upon the expiration of electricity supply contracts.

Termination of the Treaty on Security Guarantees upon its expiration after 10 years.

3. The third path—the “Chinese tactic.”

This can be viewed as a path toward a “soft and gradual divorce” from Russia, while waiting for a favorable international situation to denounce treaties and hold a referendum. It entails:

Abandoning further development of the “Union State” project.
Moving away from implementing decisions at the intergovernmental level.
Building a new system of relations with neighbors and Europe.

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