Lukashenko's Trap

Peter Oleshchuk
10.06.2026, 11:32
1,558

A dictator cannot be viewed as a neutral mediator or a potential partner.

The current situation in relations between Minsk and Washington appears to be an attempt at a complex geopolitical game, in which Belarus is once again being used not as an independent actor, but as a tool of foreign policy pressure. The United States, it seems, is attempting to apply a well-known diplomatic tactic to the Belarusian front. The essence of this tactic is to try to sever an opponent’s key ally, weaken the opponent’s position, and gain additional leverage in future negotiations.

A similar logic was already evident in American approaches to China and Russia. Pressure on Beijing was accompanied by attempts to reset relations with Moscow, build pragmatic ties with the Putin regime, and thereby weaken the Russia-China alliance. The idea seemed quite simple. If Washington had managed to at least partially reorient Russia toward the United States, this would have given it additional leverage in its confrontation with China.

However, in Putin’s case, this strategy did not work. The Russian regime is too deeply entrenched in anti-Western ideology, the war against Ukraine, dependence on China, and its own imperial logic. Moreover, even the war against Ukraine, which American diplomacy tried to use as a lever of pressure and a bargaining chip, did not become a tool for a real shift by the Kremlin toward Washington.

Now, it seems, a similar strategy is being applied to Belarus. The United States is attempting to improve relations with the Lukashenko regime, hoping that a partial reset will weaken Russia’s position or at least provide additional leverage in relations with Moscow. But this is precisely where the main problem arises. Such an approach may turn out not to be a way to weaken the Kremlin, but rather a tool that Moscow and Minsk use to undermine the pressure of sanctions.

Lukashenko, of course, has seized this opportunity. For him, manipulating the issue of liberalization and a reset of relations with the West is a well-known political tactic. In the past, he has repeatedly used it in his dealings with the European Union. The pattern has almost always been the same. After another wave of repression and sanctions, Minsk would show limited signs of softening, release some political prisoners, start talking about dialogue, and then return to its usual practices of authoritarian rule, repression, and blackmail.

Now Lukashenko is trying to replicate the same model in his relations with the United States. In doing so, he has accurately identified which arguments to emphasize in his talks with the Trump administration. First and foremost, these are business, deals, raw material assets, and potential economic benefits. It is precisely in this context that discussions surrounding the Belarusian potash sector should be viewed, including interest in the Nezhin Mining and Processing Plant and the possible involvement of American capital.

For Washington, such a scheme may seem tempting. On the one hand, it is business, and business traditionally plays an important role in the political thinking of Donald Trump. On the other hand, potash is of strategic importance for the fertilizer market, and thus for agriculture and food security. Against the backdrop of the U.S.’s complicated relationship with Canada, the idea of securing an alternative supply source or economic leverage in Belarus may seem appealing.

But this is precisely where the trap lies. Lukashenko is not merely offering an economic deal. He is proposing a political precedent of partial normalization of relations without any real change in the nature of the regime. The release of some political prisoners, isolated gestures toward Washington, and talk of pragmatism do not mean that Belarus ceases to be an authoritarian state, an ally of Russia, and an accomplice in the aggression against Ukraine.

Moreover, there is no reason to believe that Minsk’s current approach to relations with Washington runs counter to the Kremlin’s interests. On the contrary, it may well be coordinated with Moscow or at least perceived by the Kremlin as advantageous. For Russia, the partial legitimization of Lukashenko in the West opens up several opportunities at once.

First and foremost, this sets a precedent for easing sanctions without changing the regime’s policies. If Lukashenko can secure concessions while maintaining his repressive system and alliance with Moscow, a similar argument could be used in the future regarding Russia. Furthermore, Belarus could once again become a convenient hub for circumventing sanctions, gray-market schemes, the supply of sanctioned goods, and financial transactions. The more economic channels are opened to Minsk, the more opportunities will arise for Moscow as well, given the depth of Russian-Belarusian integration.

Another danger stems from the fact that a partial reset with Lukashenko would allow Washington to exert pressure not only on Minsk but also on its European allies and Ukraine. If the U.S. softens its approach to Belarusian potash, pressure will then be brought to bear on Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine, demanding that they ensure transit or revise their own restrictions. This is no longer simply a matter of fertilizer trade. It is a matter of the stability of the entire sanctions architecture.

For Ukraine, this logic is particularly dangerous. In Kyiv, they understand the nature of Lukashenko’s regime well and have no serious illusions about his ability to become a politician independent of Putin. Belarus has provided its territory for Russian aggression against Ukraine, remains part of Russia’s military infrastructure, and continues to serve as the Kremlin’s strategic rear. Therefore, any attempts to portray Lukashenko as a potentially independent player who can be quickly detached from Moscow appear highly dubious.

The danger also lies in the fact that a softening of policy toward Minsk will be perceived by authoritarian regimes as a signal. One can participate in aggression, carry out repression, blackmail neighbors, and then receive partial rehabilitation through limited concessions and favorable offers. This undermines the very idea of sanctions as an instrument of accountability.

The threat posed by the Lukashenko regime has not gone away. Belarusian territory remains a source of military pressure on Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltic states. Minsk’s rhetoric, joint actions with Russia, demonstrative threats, and participation in Russia’s system of pressure on Europe continue. Therefore, any talk of a reset must be assessed not through the prism of short-term gain, but through the lens of strategic security.

Washington may believe it is using Belarus against Russia. But the reality may turn out to be the opposite. Minsk and Moscow are using U.S. interest in deals, potash, and diplomatic successes to weaken the sanctions regime and legitimize Lukashenko. That is precisely why we must be as cautious as possible with the Lukashenko regime.

Ukraine and Europe should not succumb to pressure if it is driven by short-term economic calculations or the Trump administration’s desire to demonstrate foreign policy success. Supporting the Lukashenko regime or easing sanctions without the actual dismantling of the repressive system and an end to Belarus’s participation in Russian aggression would not be a diplomatic maneuver, but a strategic mistake.

Lukashenko cannot be viewed as a neutral mediator or a potential partner who can be quickly removed from Moscow’s influence. He is part of Russia’s system of pressure on Europe. Any policy that ignores this fact ultimately works not to weaken the Kremlin, but to strengthen its ability to continue blackmailing and evading accountability.

Petro Oleshchuk, Ph.D. in Political Science, Professor at Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, exclusively for Charter97.org

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