"A Power Struggle Will Begin Within Putin's Inner Circle"
- 30.07.2026, 11:49
- 1,810
Resources are becoming increasingly scarce.
What is bankruptcy of the Wildberries marketplace and “Putin’s wallet” companies pose to the Russian economy? The website Charter97.org posed this question to Major General (ret.) of the SBU Viktor Yagun:
— There are indeed financial difficulties surrounding Wildberries. After several warehouses were damaged, Russian authorities began discussing possible measures of state support for the company and its affiliated entrepreneurs. Wildberries’ financial statements show hundreds of billions of rubles in liabilities, although the company itself claims that its debt burden remains manageable. Thus, having a large amount of debt does not automatically mean bankruptcy.
But if this major marketplace does become insolvent, the consequences will be severe. Hundreds of thousands of sellers, owners of pickup points, logistics companies, banks, and suppliers will be affected. Chains of non-payment will emerge, tax revenues will decline, and the government will have to bail out the company through loans from state-owned banks, tax breaks, or budget subsidies.
This would not necessarily lead to the immediate collapse of Russia’s entire banking system, but it could create a major source of financial instability and shift private losses onto the state and Russian taxpayers.
A similar situation is possible with the Rotenbergs’ or Timchenko’s entities. Their companies are involved in major government and infrastructure projects, so the Kremlin will most likely seek to prevent their uncontrolled bankruptcy. The most likely outcomes include debt restructuring, new state guarantees, the transfer of some assets to state-owned banks, or the de facto nationalization of troubled enterprises.
— How will Russian oligarchs respond if Putin continues to seize their money and assets to fund the war?
— Most Russian oligarchs will not openly resist. They will try to negotiate with the Kremlin, secure new government contracts, preferential loans, and guarantees, and prove their usefulness to the war economy.
At the same time, they will try to salvage what can still be saved: transferring ownership to relatives and trusted associates, moving capital through third countries, setting up backup structures outside Russia, and preparing personal evacuation plans.
Some large businesses will attempt to integrate even more deeply into the military-industrial complex. In the current Russian system, the surest way to preserve assets is to become indispensable to the regime. Therefore, the oligarchs will demonstrate loyalty, finance state projects, and at the same time try to protect at least part of their wealth.
However, this strategy has its limits. The longer the war continues, the fewer resources there will be to distribute among groups close to Putin. Within the elite, the struggle for state funds, contracts, and control over assets will inevitably intensify.