Russia Is Running Out Of Resources For The War

Even mobilization does not guarantee the Kremlin success.

In just one month, Russia will hold “parliamentary elections,” which, according to many experts, could usher in a new chapter in the history of Putinism, marked by even harsher repression and an even more authoritarian style of governing the country.

Against the backdrop of recent obvious setbacks—the lack of any success on the Ukrainian front, economic stagnation, and the disruption of Russians’ normal way of life due to strikes on fuel and logistics infrastructure—expectations are growing in society that the military conflict will escalate. There is frequent talk of possible provocations against European NATO countries, an intensification of the war in the Black Sea, an increase in attacks on civilian targets in Ukraine—and, of course, a mobilization aimed at boosting troop numbers in the Donbas. The latter has become one of the most discussed topics and is fueling feelings of anxiety and panic among many Russians.

Just under four years ago, Vladimir Putin already attempted to yank hundreds of thousands of people out of their peaceful lives and throw them into the “action” he had organized. As was reported at the time, the mobilization decree called for sending up to 1 million people to the troops, but the campaign was limited to 300,000–350,000. The public reaction, which greatly angered the president, was extremely negative: about 1 million people fled the country, and trust in the government plummeted to record lows.

The response was a spontaneously formed system that I called “deathonomics” (my book detailing this system will be published in October by Freedom Letters): The Kremlin agreed to pay mercenaries a salary four times the national average; governors launched a competition to “recruit cannon fodder,” offering bonuses in the millions for signing a contract; and law enforcement officials began fabricating criminal cases, the penalties for which could be avoided by enlisting in the war.

This system proved effective: more than a million people—primarily marginalized elements, people in difficult life situations, the unemployed and unskilled workers, as well as those who were not in demand by employers due to their age or health, joined the ranks of the army, thereby resolving the problem of a shortage of military personnel. The Russian economy and society lost little from the exploitation of this “social waste,” but the army, judging by the results achieved over four years, gained nothing either.

“Deathonomics,” however, provided Putin with the opportunity to wage his Kampf (his struggle—ed.) for four years without “disturbing” Russian society or creating a sense of a wartime atmosphere among the people. The Kremlin quite reasonably concluded that Russians would not experience pangs of conscience due to the absence of such a conscience among the majority of the population, and therefore maintaining their accustomed way of life would ensure complete social nonresistance. Meanwhile, by the end of 2026, several serious shifts had occurred, leading the “death economy” model toward an obvious—though not necessarily fatal—crisis.

There are no longer people willing to face certain death for a pittance

First, in Russia, there are largely no longer people willing to face almost certain death for the money offered by the Kremlin: those who valued their lives relatively cheaply have either been killed or are no longer capable of fighting (CSIS estimates Russian military casualties—killed and wounded—at more than 1.4 million). The authorities are trying to recruit convicts sentenced under the most serious charges (permission for this was granted a month ago) and are willing to enlist anyone as a soldier without any medical examination—but even this is unlikely to remedy the situation.

Second, the appeal of commercial military service has declined: while in 2022, the monthly pay of 195,000 rubles was three times the national average salary, by 2026 the former had risen only to 200,000–210,000 rubles, while the latter had increased to 109,000 rubles, narrowing the gap to just 1.8 times and making the risk unjustified. Furthermore, even Russians earning slightly less than the average—those with jobs, families, and children—are unwilling to enlist; their life situation does not seem hopeless, and they value their lives.

Third, the 2022 model of “death economy” was based on expectations that the war would be relatively short-lived and replicated the standards of “private military companies” (such as “Wagner”), where contracts were for six months and the relationship between commanders and fighters was generally one of partnership. Now, with many soldiers serving for several years, no end to the war in sight, and the level of violence and looting by the command reaching unprecedented levels, offers to enlist in the military are met with skepticism and distrust.

Fourth, “death economy” no longer fulfills all its functions as Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory create a sense in society of a transition from a “special military operation” to a full-scale war (incidentally, the Kremlin is now quite open to the use of this term), and since it is no longer possible to maintain society’s previous detachment from the war, the fundamental objection to another mobilization does not seem as convincing as it once did (especially since propagandists are promising to “convince” Russians that the war has now taken on a defensive character).

Mobilization will either not happen or will be partial

The inevitability of mobilization in Russia has been discussed before. Since early 2023, this topic has come up regularly at least twice a year, and I was perhaps the only expert who, all these years, has maintained that the Kremlin would not go through with it (some of my opponents even named the exact dates when it would happen; a certain Professor Solovey identified more than 20 [!] such dates during that time). Now, however, I cannot be entirely certain that Putin will not attempt to carry out a mobilization along the lines of 2022, although I estimate the probability of such a scenario to be low—between 25 and 30 percent. There are several reasons for this.

First and foremost, society today is even less prepared for mobilization than it was in 2022. It’s one thing to accept it six months after the war began, when the front line is constantly shifting and Ukrainian troops are on the offensive (there is hope for a turning point and a quick victory). It is quite another matter to agree to it in the fifth year of the conflict, when the Russian army has been stuck in place for three years and has been unable to break through a single section of the Ukrainian defenses (the history of wars over the past 200 years knows of no single example where a war, which began as a blitzkrieg and turned into a war of position, was ever won by the side that started it). The question “Why?” looms larger than ever.

Furthermore, we must not forget that in September 2022, Putin had no intention of paying the mobilized troops large sums of money: from the very start of the war, contract soldiers received their 40,000–50,000 rubles; the decree to quadruple their pay was signed amid public outrage over the mobilization as early as the beginning of November. The Kremlin was faced with the reality of rising expenses it hadn’t anticipated. Today, no one expects that mobilization will bring altruists into the ranks: those mobilized will receive the same pay as contract soldiers, which eliminates the main (though now forgotten) trigger for the 2022 mobilization.

Finally, the authorities understand that mobilization on a larger scale than in 2022 is impossible with open borders and the preservation of what remains of civil liberties. Therefore, there is already discussion about imposing martial law as a mandatory “addition” to mobilization, and this is an extraordinary measure that is unlikely to be accepted by society (and will, at the very least, lead to serious economic disruption, fraught with the risk of a full-scale crisis).

Many experts argue (quite reasonably) that increasing the size of the fighting force in an era of drone and robot warfare will change little, but this factor is unlikely to convince the Kremlin, since Vladimir Putin lives in a world shaped by the first half of the 20th century and relies on reports from his generals, who share the same narrow perspective; therefore, one should not count on rational thinking or consideration of modern realities in this context.

All of the above suggests that the choice today appears more difficult than in any previous year, but I would still bet that mobilization will either not happen at all or will be very “limited” in nature: the legal framework for calling up reservists for active duty has been in place since last year; in some regions, the authorities are already trying to coerce people into signing contracts; recruiters’ efforts are becoming increasingly sophisticated. Furthermore, in my view, the Kremlin still has plenty of options for refining its “death economy.”

New Windows of Opportunity: Higher Pay and Domestic Violence

I would say the main change is in the principles of compensation. I see the inflexible nature of volunteer compensation as the main reason for the slowdown in recruitment. In Ukraine, where martial law is in effect and mobilization is enforced, there are discussions about raising the salary of a front-line private to $7,000–8,000, which is, on average, eight times the national average. A study conducted by the CASE Center back in 2024 showed that doubling the pay for Russian soldiers could attract at least 1 million people to army recruitment centers. It is clear that, given the massive budget deficit by Russian standards, such an increase seems unlikely, but I would like to draw attention to one important point. Of the 4.5–4.7 trillion rubles paid annually to Russian military personnel, about half consists of so-called “death benefits”—that is, payments to relatives following the death of service members. Many experts, however, argue that these enormous sums (14–16 million rubles) motivate no more than 10% of those enlisting; the rest hope to survive and are more concerned with their pay. By reducing the “death benefits,” for example, to 5 million rubles, it would be possible to increase current monthly payments to 500,000–600,000 rubles without an overall increase in spending, which would undoubtedly accelerate the rate at which contracts are signed (which still falls just short of the Kremlin’s desired targets).

Furthermore, since the threat of criminal charges remains one of the most common methods of pressuring potential soldiers, it is hard not to recall an issue on which Russian society is remarkably unanimous: domestic violence. In 2017, through the efforts of the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church, it was “decriminalized”: as a result, in 2022, for example, the average fine for assaulting a family member was just over 5,000 rubles (€50), the number of murders of women and children rose sharply, and the proportion of women who experienced domestic violence and reported it to the police fell, according to experts, to 10–15%. The passage of a law on domestic violence, which is supported by about 90% of Russians, would be a real “window of opportunity” for replenishing the army—without resorting to mobilization—with the same rabble that has largely been recruited into it over the past four years, and would not meet with any public protest; quite the contrary.

We do not know what Putin will decide this fall regarding the means to continue his criminal war, but one thing is clear: no methods are capable of securing victory for Russia anymore. “Deathonomics” proved to be a decent solution to the current problem: it made it possible to avoid forced mobilization and halt the Ukrainian offensives of 2022 and 2023. — but it could not and will not ensure the Kremlin’s success simply because it is modeled on wars like World War I or World War II, where the number of soldiers could determine the outcome of battles (and even then, not always). In terms of technology and strategy, however, Russia will only fall behind—and this is becoming clear to an increasingly broad segment of its elite. Therefore, it seems to me that the Kremlin is now simply trying to avoid any radical decisions, hoping for some unexpected events that might shift the balance of power in its favor. These hopes will not come true; they will not bring victory to V. Putin, but at the same time, they will most likely prevent the mass mobilization that many experts and politicians have recently come to regard as inevitable…

Vladislav Inozemtsev Delfi

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