First Putin, Then Lukashenko: What Changes Are In Store For Belarus?

The winds of history shifted and began to blow in a different direction.

What might the most realistic scenario for the changes coming to Belarus look like? Is that time truly approaching, or are we just indulging in unrealistic dreams?

Pavel Severinets stated in an interview with “Belsat” that the time for change in Belarus could come as early as October. To be clear—October of this year. Severinets acknowledged that “Lukashenko may pull off miracles of political maneuvering,” but on the other hand, he may no longer be able to cope with “all the somersaults and mid-air about-faces.” According to Severinets, Russian regions are experiencing a hidden default, regional governments are having their debts written off, and the Russian president’s approval rating is falling.

I must admit, Pavel Severinets is one of my favorite Belarusian politicians. I respect him for his courage, consistency, and integrity. And as a deeply principled person and a sincere believer, he traditionally exudes historical optimism. This is essential for a politician—to speak of the inevitability of victory in any situation, to inspire and lead people.

However, my task as a columnist and publicist is a little different. I must try to analyze the situation we face today and the existing trends in order to reflect on whether a window of opportunity for Belarus is truly so close at hand.

And here, the most important factor is the situation in Russia and the Russia-Ukraine war. Severinets acknowledges this, as do all politicians and analysts. There may come a time when Moscow’s control over the situation in Belarus begins to weaken.

In this regard, several developments are worth noting. The Russian economy is slowing down, the budget deficit for January–July 2026 rose to 2.8% of GDP, and the war continues to put pressure on public finances. At the same time, tensions between various groups within the Russian elite are intensifying.

It remains unclear how severe the fuel crisis in Russia—triggered by Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil refineries—might become. According to various sources, gasoline production in Russia has fallen to 65% of average seasonal consumption. Could there be disruptions in food supplies, for example, to Moscow? How will people get to and from work in their cars amid a fuel shortage? Perhaps these questions no longer sound like journalistic hyperbole.

The very latest news. On September 1, Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned airlines and insurers that Russian airspace is becoming dangerous due to the growing number of Ukrainian drones. At the same time, he emphasized that Ukraine does not aim to attack civilian aircraft. The objective is different: if Ukrainian drones regularly appear over Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other cities, airlines must take this risk into account themselves.

“(Russian airspace will effectively be closed https://charter97.org/ru/news/2026/9/5/697338/). The war that Russia started is closing its own airspace,” Zelenskyy said.

For Russia, this is a rather unpleasant prospect. The country is facing a situation where the war is gradually ceasing to be merely a problem confined to the front lines and isolated targets in the rear. It is beginning to affect the normal functioning of one of the state’s most important elements—civil aviation.

The goal of the operation should be more than just disrupting air travel. Kyiv hopes to cut off Russian officials, oligarchs, and other wealthy supporters of Putin from international routes. And now, the first foreign airline has canceled flights to Russia following a warning from Volodymyr Zelenskyy about the dangers of Russian airspace.

Ukraine’s strategic goal remains to increase the cost of continuing the war for the Kremlin—so that the consequences of the war are felt more and more by both ordinary citizens and the Russian elite.

And on top of that, there’s the possibility of a new wave of mobilization. I believe that today’s Russian state will not allow its subjugated citizens to dodge the draft.

Ukrainian drones, the fuel crisis, inflation, the threat of mobilization, and the decline in approval ratings for the government in general and for Putin in particular—could all of this lead to active political protest? Hardly. Over the years of the war, Russians have already learned about the brutal consequences of any public dissent. However, social discontent is building up and could erupt into something unpredictable at any moment, as has happened repeatedly in Russian history.

Why am I paying so much attention to the situation in Russia? After all, there is a general understanding that a window of opportunity in Belarus will only open in the event of either a crisis or, at the very least, a significant weakening of Russia.

Figuratively speaking, this is expressed in the formula: first Putin, then Lukashenko. If we imagine that Lukashenko were to somehow disappear right now, while a strong and self-assured Putin remained in Moscow, this would pose clear threats to Belarusian independence—threats of drastic Kremlin intervention in our affairs in one form or another.

And Russia’s current weakening—even if it does not result in any radical changes—in any case creates a more favorable environment for Belarus’s democratic prospects.

Economic problems may not lead to an immediate collapse, but they could force the Kremlin to start prioritizing. When Moscow has less disposable income, a simple question arises: Is Russia willing to continue paying such a price for control over Belarus? And if the war in Ukraine begins to move toward some kind of conclusion or simply a prolonged ceasefire, Belarus’s geopolitical value to Russia may change. And then Lukashenko will have something he loves very much: the opportunity to play both sides. In fact, there are already plenty of signs that he understands this. And any such balancing act is, in one way or another, a step away from Russia.

To sum up—yes, I see no reason to dismiss Pavel Severinets’s overly optimistic assessment that grounds for radical changes in Belarus could emerge as early as the coming months. But personally, it seems to me that we’ve already passed the lowest point of the most negative scenarios. It seems to me that the very wind of history has shifted and begun to blow in a different direction.

Vitaly Tsygankov, “Belsat”

You can support the website Charter97.org

MULTI-CURRENCY ACCOUNT FOR ASSISTANCE:

Bank's name: Bank Millennium S.A.
Address: ul. Stanislawa Zaryna, 2A, 02-593, Warszawa
IBAN: PL97116022020000000216711123
SWIFT: BIGBPLPW
Name of the account holder: Fundacja “KARTA ‘97”
Purpose/title of payment: Donation for statuary aims

You can contact us by the e-mail charter97@gmail.com