Roman Svitán: The Loss Of Crews In Ust-Luga Is Much More Painful For Russians

13.11.2026, 11:29

The Ukrainian Armed Forces are destroying infrastructure that Russia will not be able to quickly rebuild.

On the night of November 11, while repelling an attack by Ukrainian drones on the port of Ust-Luga near St. Petersburg, Russia, according to reports from Z-channels, may have have lost three military aircraft at once, along with their crews. Among them are reportedly Ka-52 and Mi-8 helicopters. The third aircraft could have been a MiG-31 fighter jet. One of the possible causes cited is friendly fire from Russian air defense systems.

What happened near St. Petersburg, and what could have led to such a massive simultaneous loss of Russian aircraft? The website Charter97.org spoke with Ukrainian Armed Forces Reserve Colonel, military expert, and flight instructor Roman Svitan about this:

— To be honest, nothing unusual. Friendly fire during massive attacks is a fairly common occurrence, especially when the attack is properly planned. There’s a concept known as “reaching the target at a specified time.” From different routes and directions, in a “star formation,” several dozen aircraft approach the target simultaneously. In this case, we’re talking about more than a hundred of our drones.

The Russians reported that about 150 drones were shot down. That means there were roughly two hundred in total. If a large number of aircraft approach a single target at the same time, it is practically impossible to manage the interception process in a mixed-mode scenario. Either anti-aircraft missile systems—organized by echelons, ranges, and defense lines—or fighter aircraft must be deployed. One or the other. When everything gets mixed together, friendly fire is inevitable.

Imagine the radar screen of the enemy’s electronic warfare units or an anti-aircraft missile system. It immediately displays a hundred targets. It’s practically impossible to use the “friend or foe” mode because, when it’s activated, an additional marker appears above the main one. Then it’s “friend.” If the additional marker doesn’t appear, it means it’s “foe.” This leads to the most terrible mix-ups. No combat control officer can possibly handle dozens of targets on their own. If a mixed air defense system is operational and not organized by altitude or sector, such mix-ups are inevitable.

Three aircraft destroyed in such a situation is still an understatement. By and large, they could end up shooting down nearly half of their own aircraft. A Ka-52, which was engaging our drones, a Mi-8, which was also engaging our drones, and a MiG-31 were destroyed. The latter, to be honest, is very surprising. How could they fail to distinguish this high-speed target? It’s one thing when targets are comparable in speed: our drones fly at about 200 kilometers per hour, and helicopters at roughly the same speed. They’re hard to tell apart.

But when we’re talking about speeds of 500 kilometers per hour and higher, that’s either outright incompetence or sheer unprofessionalism. They couldn’t even distinguish a target moving at that speed. On the one hand, this is a cost of warfare; on the other, it reflects the incompetence of the Russian air defense forces, especially the combat control officers. There are specific protocols for transferring intercept control, but in this case, everything was likely botched. Several factors converged at once, leading to friendly fire.

— In a month and a half, Russian aviation losses have approached 20 aircraft and helicopters. How can the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ success be explained?

— First: the intensity of combat operations has increased. To reduce flight time and increase the number of sorties per shift, the Russians have to move their aircraft closer to the front line. And the Ukrainian Armed Forces are taking them out there.

It’s no coincidence that they first flew from Voronezh toward Engels and then returned to Borisoglebsk. Russian tactical aircraft were destroyed right at the airfield. It’s about 500 kilometers to Borisoglebsk. This is an operational level: we can reach that area, and we have a sufficiently wide range of weapons. This is the first main reason related to the intensity of the fighting in the run-up to the fall offensive.

The second reason is the inability to establish sufficient air defense density at protected facilities, such as airfields. The Russians simply do not have enough anti-aircraft missile systems and cover systems. All of these resources have been diverted to defend Moscow, the Kerch Bridge, and Valdai. And even there, the coverage is insufficient. Radar systems and anti-aircraft missile systems will continue to be redeployed to those areas.

The third reason is that the Ukrainian Armed Forces now possess a sufficiently wide range of operational-level weapons. We can guide them to their targets at long ranges using machine vision, artificial intelligence, and parallel communication channels under the direct control of operators.

These three factors have made it possible to inflict serious damage on Russia’s main tactical and army aviation forces.

— What consequences will such severe losses have for the Russian Air Force in the near future?

— When it comes to tactical aviation, we’ve taken out about 5–7% in a month. These are quite significant losses, comparable to an entire year’s production. They build the planes, and we shoot them down on the ground in a single month.

For the Russians, this is a warning sign that they’re doing something wrong. The situation with army aviation is more complicated. They have hundreds of helicopters, produced by different factories, and there are various modifications. Therefore, the loss of a few aircraft is not yet critical for Russian army aviation.

But with the crews, everything is much more complicated. A helicopter itself can be manufactured in a year or a year and a half. It takes at least three to four years to train a crew, and five to seven years to reach first- or second-class proficiency.

Therefore, the loss of helicopters along with their crews is far more painful for the Russians than the loss of the aircraft themselves.

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