Myth Debunked: Unexpected Insights From A Successful Ukrainian Armed Forces Operation Near Lyman

The Telegraph questions the central tenet of modern warfare.

The Ukrainian operation in the Lyman area could become one of the most significant ground operations of the war. This assessment was made by British military analyst and former British Army colonel Hamish de Bretton-Gordon in an article for The Telegraph. According to him, the Ukrainian Defense Forces have managed to regain control of more than 200 square kilometers of territory, which proves that even on a battlefield saturated with drones, armored vehicles and infantry remain critically important.

The author pays particular attention not only to the scale of the liberated territory but also to the manner in which the operation was conducted. In his view, over the course of several months, the Ukrainian military likely concealed its true intentions while simultaneously preparing a comprehensive offensive involving armored vehicles, drones, electronic warfare systems, camouflage, and precision-guided weapons. This refers to the so-called combined-arms model of warfare—the very one that in recent years has increasingly been called obsolete against the backdrop of the rapid development of unmanned systems.

The Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality

The columnist notes a telling contrast: Shortly before the Ukrainian operation, Vladimir Putin told American representatives Steve Whitcoff and Jared Kushner that the transfer of the entire Donbas region to Russia remained a condition for ending the war. At the same time, Russian troops themselves are under serious pressure in the Lyman area. It turns out that Moscow continues to demand concessions from Ukraine while simultaneously struggling to hold onto territories it has already captured.

In the author’s view, this clearly demonstrates the disconnect between the Kremlin’s political statements and the actual situation on the front lines. For Kyiv, this could provide an additional diplomatic argument: Volodymyr Zelenskyy will find it easier to defend his position in negotiations, since it is difficult to convince anyone to cede territory when the Russian army itself is forced to retreat.

Why Drones Cannot Replace Infantry

The operation near Lyman, according to de Bretton-Gordon, also refuted the notion that modern warfare can be waged primarily with the help of drones. Drones have indeed radically changed the nature of combat operations—they are used for reconnaissance, guidance, strikes against military equipment and logistics, as well as for engaging targets at significant distances.

However, drones have a fundamental limitation: they are incapable of independently capturing territory and holding it against the enemy. This still requires military personnel. Ukrainian forces have demonstrated that armored vehicles can operate even in conditions where drones have become an integral part of the war: despite casualties, a combination of electronic countermeasures, camouflage, and support drones allows the vehicles to maneuver and sustain the offensive. At the same time, armored units do not operate in isolation—their actions are complemented by the massive use of drones, artillery, and other weapons.

A classic military principle in action

According to a British analyst, the Ukrainian military effectively employed a classic tactic: find a weak spot in the enemy’s defenses, establish superiority there, and strike before the enemy has time to deploy reserves. Bretton-Gordon himself describes this strategy as follows:

“Strike the enemy hard, strike fast, create an element of surprise, and strike where it hurts.”

Therefore, the author emphasizes, the outcome near Lyman should not be simplistically interpreted as a “victory of tanks over drones.” Rather, it is a demonstration of the effectiveness of a combined-arms approach, in which armored vehicles, infantry, drones, electronic warfare, artillery, and aviation operate in concert, complementing one another.

The main conclusion, according to the columnist, is that the army of the future can be neither a traditional armored army of the Cold War era nor a purely “drone army.” It must combine both components—while also having sufficient personnel to capture and hold territory.

Risks for the Kremlin and Lessons for the West

The success of the Ukrainian operation also poses problems for the Russian leadership. If Moscow fails to field a sufficient number of combat forces under the current military conscription system, the Kremlin may be forced to launch a new wave of mobilization. For Putin, this would pose a serious political risk, as it would clearly demonstrate to the Russian public the true cost of war.

At the same time, the author argues, the results of Ukraine’s military operations should serve as a warning to Western countries as well. The United States and European nations should not assume that a Russian victory on the battlefield is inevitable. Premature concessions to Moscow, in his view, would only give the Kremlin time to regroup and prepare for a new phase of the war.

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