Portnikov: Behind The “hellish Sanctions” Against Russia Lies Yet Another Of Trump’s Calculations
1- 17.09.2026, 15:28
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The U.S. president may gain a new means of exerting pressure on China and India.
The U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill named after the late Senator Lindsey Graham, which imposes new sanctions against Russia and countries that purchase Russian energy resources. The bill had previously been approved by the Senate and has now been sent to U.S. President Donald Trump for his signature.
Renowned Ukrainian journalist and political commentator Vitaly Portnikov explained why, in his opinion, the passage of the bill is linked not only to pressure on Russia but also to U.S. domestic politics.
The website Charter97.org presents key excerpts from his remarks on the YouTube channel.
— The U.S. House of Representatives voted in favor of the so-called Lindsey Graham Act. It has been a year and a half since the late senator introduced his proposal and emphasized that it would help weaken Russia and end the Russian-Ukrainian war.
As is well known, the bill was supported by senators prior to the vote in the House of Representatives. And now it must be signed by U.S. President Donald Trump. For some reason, many people are wondering: Will Trump sign this bill? Of course he will. If the U.S. president had no intention of signing this bill, it would not even have been brought to a vote by Republican House Speaker Mike Johnson. This, incidentally, is what happened with the Ukraine Support Act, which was previously passed by the House of Representatives and now has no chance whatsoever—not only of being signed by President Trump, but even of being considered by the Senate.
This raises the question: Why did Donald Trump and the Republicans—it was the Republican majority that secured the passage of the new law, while the majority of Democrats voted against it—agree to pass a law that imposes so-called “hellish” sanctions against Russia? First and foremost, because these “hellish sanctions” are, for now, purely theoretical.
The decision on whether to impose new sanctions against the Russian Federation and against countries that purchase Russian oil and gas must be made by U.S. President Donald Trump himself. The law grants him that authority. Decisions on sanctions will be made not in the House of Representatives or the Senate, but in the White House.
Thus, Donald Trump—and this is precisely what sparked opposition to the law from a large number of Democratic members of Congress—will gain new tools for so-called trade wars. And he himself will select the countries that, in turn, may face new, higher tariffs from the U.S.—up to 100%—simply for being buyers of Russian oil and gas.
When we talk about such purchases, we are referring primarily to the People’s Republic of China and India. But we shouldn’t forget that there are many other countries among the buyers of Russian oil—albeit in significantly smaller volumes. Let me just remind you that Hungary still buys Russian oil. And thus, Trump could gain the formal right to impose new tariffs against the entire European Union, because the European Union has granted Hungary an exemption to purchase Russian energy resources.
There you have the entire logic behind such legislation, should it become necessary to apply it in a confrontation with the European Union—or with any other country that purchases Russian oil in any quantity.
Now the next question: Will tariffs be imposed on the People’s Republic of China—the main buyer of Russian energy resources? Trump has already tried to impose such tariffs on China, but suffered a real fiasco. This fiasco led to the repeal of high tariffs against the Chinese economy, because it became clear that the U.S. is critically dependent on Beijing when it comes to certain key sectors of the American economy itself.
Thus, it is quite difficult to imagine at this point that the U.S. would cease cooperation with China by launching a new tariff war. India is another matter. There, Donald Trump has already tried to pressure Narendra Modi, and India has indeed significantly reduced its purchases of Russian oil. But that was before the U.S. war against Iran.
Now there is a serious shortage of both petroleum products and diesel fuel, which Russia no longer exports but actually purchases. And for countries that have lost access to traditional trade routes due to the ongoing crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, Russian oil remains an important commodity—no longer a luxury, but simply essential for the development of their own economies.
Therefore, it can be said that even if Donald Trump imposes sanctions against China and India, this does not necessarily mean that the oil refineries in those countries will stop buying Russian oil—if that happens at all. If the law actually takes effect after Donald Trump signs it.
Then you might ask: Why is this law needed at all, and why was it passed a year and a half after Lindsey Graham proposed it? Because the U.S. midterm congressional elections are approaching.
And Donald Trump, like all Republicans, needs to demonstrate to voters—a significant portion of whom in the U.S. support Ukraine and oppose Russia—that they are passing legislation aimed at ending the Russian-Ukrainian war and punishing the aggressor. Voters will realize only after the midterm elections have taken place that this legislation may never take effect, and even if it does, it may not lead to any real results.
For now, however, this bill will be a major talking point at campaign rallies featuring Republican candidates—in response to Democrats’ accusations that the Republican Party isn’t helping Ukraine. “No, it’s you who aren’t helping. You didn’t even vote for the law that’s supposed to pave the way for draconian sanctions against the Russian Federation,” their Republican rivals will retort to the Democrats.
So, first of all, this is a decision of a purely domestic political nature. And second, it is a decision that, even if implemented, is unlikely to seriously influence the course of events surrounding the Russian-Ukrainian war.
A far more important decision could have been be a vote in favor of the Ukraine Support Act, which has already been passed by the House of Representatives. It provides real funding for Ukraine, arms deliveries, and opportunities for the Ukrainian army to establish new positions on the battlefield.
However, it is precisely this bill—because it is specific and because it does not allow the President of the United States to evade its implementation—that Donald Trump, in my view, will block for as long as he has the means to do so.
And if we imagine that the Democrats win not only the House of Representatives but also the Senate and pass similar legislation, then the President of the United States will face a dilemma: either sign this bill and thereby undermine his own approach to aid for Ukraine, or block its signing and thereby demonstrate what his administration truly thinks about Ukraine.