Journalists Have Uncovered A Secret Communication Channel Used By Russian Forces

Confidential information has been disclosed.

The Telegram group was secret, but open to the public. Throughout the year, links to video conferences on Yandex Telemost were posted there for the chiefs of staff and command officers of the 143rd Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment of the Russian Armed Forces.

Journalists from ASTRA discovered an open Telegram group called “F***ing Organization,” where secret orders from the headquarters of Russia’s 5th Army were posted daily throughout the year. Before the posts stopped being updated, a lot of interesting information was published there—information clearly not intended for prying eyes.

The group published individual lists of military personnel, tables of video surveillance systems, ammunition requisition forms, tables with usernames, passwords, and even two-factor authentication keys for unit commanders to view UAV streams.

Separately, the chat contained a code for rivers in the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions (“Verkhnya Tersa” — “Angara,” “Gaychur” — “Volga,” “Mokrye Yaly” — “Neva,” “Yanchur” — “Yenisei”). The message also demanded that these code names be urgently communicated to commanders, as they could be used during negotiations via audio and video communications.

The order stated that assault units were suffering casualties due to insufficient supplies and the low effectiveness of robotic systems. In a separate directive, the command ordered that automated vehicles be equipped with Starlink terminals and that their availability be reported regularly.

The group also published a secret order from the 5th Army headquarters regarding operational camouflage in the Vremevsky direction dated December 7, 2025, in which units were ordered to create false military facilities and simulate their activities in order to mislead Ukrainian intelligence. To make it look real, they were told to simulate life at the fake positions, including the movement of personnel, the arrival and departure of command vehicles, smoke from field kitchens, etc.

The headquarters also demanded that photos and videos of the fake facilities be sent in such a way that they appeared to be covert footage taken by local residents with pro-Ukrainian views, allegedly passing information to Ukrainian intelligence services.

The document lists specific units of the Russian army: the 127th Motorized Rifle Division; the 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment; the 218th Tank Regiment; the 1171st Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment; the 872nd Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment; as well as specific areas of simulation exercises with coordinates indicated.

Among the messages was also an order from the information warfare headquarters, according to which the Russian command assessed the information situation in the Vremyevsky direction as “complex” and ordered the organization of psychological operations against Ukrainian units, including the regular dropping of propaganda leaflets from drones onto Ukrainian Armed Forces positions.

The group also contained an order to organize reconnaissance activities in the occupied territories, signed by the army’s chief of intelligence, Colonel A. Umrikhin.





The Russian military was also required to conduct radio games—pre-scripted fake radio exchanges between Russian units. The document detailed, down to the minute, which messages regimental and intelligence unit commanders were to broadcast. Such operations are used to mislead the enemy and create a false picture of troop movements for radio intelligence.

The channel “Bloody Organization” existed for a year, and messages appeared there until May 4, when the admins realized that outsiders were joining the conversation. The channel, it should be noted, was open and publicly accessible.

“Who’s joining, and who are they? What are they doing here? Then all these strange stories start about data leaks and hacked accounts. Security comes first,” wrote the owner of the open group. There are currently no new posts there.

You can support the website Charter97.org

MULTI-CURRENCY ACCOUNT FOR ASSISTANCE:

Bank's name: Bank Millennium S.A.
Address: ul. Stanislawa Zaryna, 2A, 02-593, Warszawa
IBAN: PL97116022020000000216711123
SWIFT: BIGBPLPW
Name of the account holder: Fundacja “KARTA ‘97”
Purpose/title of payment: Donation for statuary aims

You can contact us by the e-mail charter97@gmail.com