A Ukrainian Pilot Explained Why Two Russian Planes Collided

The Russian aviation industry has begun to face serious problems.

In recent days, Russia has suffered several losses in its combat aviation fleet. In the Kursk region, two Su-35S fighter jets collided. At the Taganrog airbase Ukrainian drones destroyed a Mi-8 helicopter and damaged a Mi-35. The day before, GUR operators also struck a Russian aircraft, presumably a Su-24, in occupied Crimea.

What could have happened to the two Su-35Ss in the Kursk region? Why did the Russian fighter jets collide in the air?

The website Charter97.org spoke with retired Ukrainian Armed Forces colonel, military expert, and flight instructor Roman Svitan about this:

— Most likely, it was a flight in formation. The pilots were practicing formation flying, and one of the Russians made what is known as a piloting error. I think so because that’s the most common cause. When two aircraft of the same type collide in the air, it most often happens during a formation flight.

The fact is that this is a very complex type of flight. The interval and distance between the aircraft are very small. This is especially true when practicing complex types of formation flying, such as mock dogfights. While performing certain flight maneuvers, visual contact can be lost and then reestablished. For example, the aircraft entered a cloud, the wingman lost sight of the leader and began searching for him without reporting it.

Such moments ultimately lead to one aircraft colliding with another. Very often, the pilot of the lead aircraft is killed. The wingman keeps an eye on the lead aircraft, but the lead pilot does not visually monitor the wingman. As a result, the wingman may collide with the lead aircraft. In such cases, both aircraft can be lost, and the pilots can be killed. I think this is exactly the kind of situation we’re seeing right now.

— What could have led to such a mistake: a lack of experience on the part of the pilots or fatigue?

— It’s clear that a lot depends on experience. That’s one hundred percent true. But the main reason still lies in the complexity of formation flying itself. It is very complex in and of itself.

Two aircraft are flying side by side at transonic speeds. Just imagine that. Let’s say the standard separation and distance are 50 to 70: 70 meters is the distance, and 50 meters is the separation. But this separation can decrease, especially when flying through clouds. In poor visibility, it’s deliberately reduced. The aircraft fly too close to one another, the pilots lose control of their aircraft, and one plane collides with another. Formation flying is the most difficult type of flight. Therefore, such flights are among the most accident-prone. This applies to combat, training, practice, and evaluation flights.

That is why I believe the main cause lies precisely here: an error in piloting technique during a formation flight. That is the correct term for it.

But for now, what happened remains a mystery. This is merely my analytical assessment, so to speak. No one knows the real cause yet.

— Recently, Ukraine has destroyed or damaged several Russian aircraft and helicopters at once. What accounts for these successes by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in striking key targets at Russian airfields?

— First and foremost, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are tasked with achieving air superiority. To do this, of course, it is necessary to destroy Russian radar systems—that is, the radars of the Russian Federation’s electronic warfare units. These are primarily located at airfields.

Airfields are the primary locations for anti-aircraft missile systems and surveillance radars of the Russian Federation’s electronic warfare forces. Naturally, targeting an airfield to destroy radio-technical equipment also provides an opportunity to take out Russian aircraft stationed there. Our forces are not necessarily specifically targeting them. This may be a consequence of carrying out the primary mission of destroying the airfield infrastructure.

Let’s say there is army aviation stationed at these airfields. It uses virtually all of these facilities as tactical staging airfields. Army aviation consists primarily of helicopters. There are also aircraft there that sometimes haven’t taken to the air for decades—especially old Soviet aircraft like the Su-24.

Why? Because they can sit at airfields for years in so-called “Aurora” mode—that is, used as sources of spare parts. This does happen. No one even provides air cover for these aircraft, which is why they come under attack.

The main types of Russian tactical aircraft at airfields within striking range are, to put it mildly, rarely encountered. When was the last time you heard of a Su-30, Su-34, or Su-35 being destroyed at such an airfield? These are the main types of Russian combat aircraft.

They have, after all, been moved beyond the operational range of our tactical drones—that is, beyond the 300-kilometer zone. That’s where the main airfields of the Russian tactical aviation are located. We currently have few capabilities to reach them in real time. By “real time,” I mean direct control, where a drone operator can select a specific target right at the airfield. We do not yet have such capabilities, but we will. The geographic scope of our strikes will definitely expand, and this is already yielding certain benefits. We can see this very clearly. The benefit lies in the fact that new opportunities are opening up for us.

Some of our technological breakthroughs are particularly important. It is precisely these that give us confidence that, over time, we will be able to go even further and begin destroying the main types of Russian aircraft at airfields—first and foremost the Su-34 and Su-35. For now, the Russians are doing a good job of handling this task themselves and are destroying their own aircraft during formation flights.

— You said that the main aircraft of the Russian tactical aviation have been withdrawn beyond the 300-kilometer zone. How does the need to take off from more distant airfields affect the state of the Russian Air Force and its ability to carry out combat missions?

— The fact is that the combat mission itself does not change due to the remoteness of the airfields. Let’s say, for example, the mission is to drop 200 KAB bombs per day. To carry out this mission, the Russians allocate the necessary resources: flight-hours, aircraft, and pilots who will be deployed.

After we used our drones to drive the Russian air force beyond the 300-kilometer zone, the situation changed. Although at first, ATACMS missiles were the ones driving the Russian air force back. When ATACMS missiles with a range of up to 300 kilometers began striking Russian airfields, the Russians moved their aircraft farther than 300 kilometers away. This exactly doubled the number of resources the Russian Air Force has to deploy. They have to use twice as many aircraft and flight crews. Consequently, the consumption of aircraft resources doubles.

Aircraft do not have infinite service life. Let’s say an aircraft has a nominal service life of 10,000 flight hours. Once this service life is exhausted, the aircraft is dismantled and remains at the airfield. It turns out much like that Su-24 that was “written off.” It can sit there for decades until someone removes a spare part from it for another aircraft.

Therefore, this approach is also beneficial for us. The Russians need twice as many aircraft, pilots, aviation resources, and fuel to accomplish the same task.

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